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  Abstract  
 
 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between China and the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter ‘ICC’ or ‘the Court’). China has long been supporting the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court. It actively participated in every stage of the 
negotiating process leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statue but chose to cast a 
negative vote at the end of the Rome Conference in 1998. There were several reasons stated 
by the Chinese delegation at that time for not joining the ICC, which were all framed in legal 
terms. However, there have been significant developments both in the Rome Statute itself 
and in practice since these Chinese objections were first articulated. The ICC has now 
functioned as an international adjudicative body for more than ten years. Some of the issues 
of concern to China have been, in one way or another, addressed through the jurisprudence 
of the ICC during its existence, and also through the practice of the Security Council in 
relation to the ICC. More significantly, all the amendments adopted at the Kampala Review 
Conference in 2010, in particular the crime of aggression amendment, directly or indirectly 
addressed China’s pre-existing concerns towards the Rome Statute. In addition, some of the 
Chinese reservations over the core crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction relate to fields of 
customary law that have undergone rapid developments in the past two decades. This thesis 
takes China’s concerns both individually and as a whole to examine them from the legal 
perspective in light of all the above-mentioned developments. It argues that those specific 
objections are not as robust as they first appeared in the 1990s, and should no longer be 
regarded as a significant impediment to China’s accession to the Rome Statute.  
 
The ICC is part of a broader landscape of international courts and tribunals. This thesis 
therefore also examines the substance of the specific concerns of China towards the ICC in 
light of China’s engagement with international judicial bodies, and some of the traditional 
concerns that have had an impact on that engagement. Traditionally the Chinese government 
shunned participation in international adjudication, adhering to diplomatic negotiations for 
the settlement of whatever disputes it was embroiled in. However, since the 1990s, during 
and even after the ICC negotiations, there has been an increasingly greater Chinese 
engagement with international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, with the exception of the UN 
human rights treaty bodies. The work undertaken in this thesis investigates the ways in 
which China has characterised the ICC as a human rights court of the traditional kind. This 
thesis argues that the ICC is distinct from UN human rights treaty bodies, and that China’s 
progressively wider engagement with international judicial bodies should not be hindered by 
a miscalculation of putting the ICC in a ‘human rights box’. This thesis concludes that the 
significant developments in both the specific ICC context and in the wider context (of 
China’s engagement with international judicial bodies) point to a need for the Chinese 
authorities to reassess and reconsider its position towards the ICC. Were the Chinese 
authorities to make a re-evaluation and decide to move towards full participation in the ICC, 
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                                                   Chapter I  
                                      Introduction    
 
Section I Overview  
 
On 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute
1
 of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’ or ‘the Court’) 
entered into force, ushering in a new era of accountability for international crimes.
2
 The ICC, 
the world’s first permanent international criminal court, promises to hold responsible those 
guilty of ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’,
3
 
specifically, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
4
 
The establishment of the ICC has been hailed as ‘the most innovative and exciting 
development in international law since the creation of the United Nations’.
5
  As of 1 May 
2013, the ICC has been in operation for more than a decade and has 122 member states.
6
 
China, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), remains 
outside of the Court, together with the US and Russia.
7
   
        In the 1990s, China exhibited a great interest in the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court, and its engagement in the whole process of the creation of the 
ICC was remarkable. However, at the end of the Rome Conference, China voted against the 
Rome Statute since it had concerns that had not been addressed to its satisfaction.
8
 Since its 
negative vote in 1998, China’s interest in the ICC has not diminished and it has followed 
closely the continuing evolution of the Court on many levels. At the same time, the specific 
concerns identified by China in the 1990s have been seen as barriers that prevent it from full 
                                                          
1
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (or ‘ICC Statute’), 2187 UNTS 90, 17 July 1998.  
2
 Philippe Kirsch, ‘ICC Marks Five Years Since Entry into Force of Rome Statute’, in Carsten Stahn 
and Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009), 11-12, p.11. 
3
 ICC Statute, Art.5 (1).  
4
 Ibid., The ICC will have jurisdiction for the crime of aggression only for crimes committed after the 
entry into force for the 30
th
 state party and only after the Assembly of States Parties has voted in favor 
of that after 1 January 2017. 
5
 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4
th
 edition (CUP, 2011), 
p.6.   
6
 Rome Statute, Status, available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en (All of the links in this thesis were last visited on 1 May 2013).  
7
 Ibid.  
8 
UN Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish 






participation in the ICC. On the one hand, since these specific Chinese objections towards 
the Rome Statute were framed in strictly legal terms, this research applies international law 
theory and practice to scrutinise these concerns to see if they are legally sound. On the other, 
all these concerns were formulated in the 1990s, but since then there have been substantive 
developments both in law and in practice surrounding the ICC. This work thus surveys the 
relevant developments to see if they have been moving in the direction of satisfying the 
underlying concerns of the Chinese authorities towards the Rome Statute.  
             The relationship between China and the ICC can be seen in its own terms, but it 
can also be viewed in the context of China’s broader engagement with international judicial 
bodies. The analysis of the China-ICC relationship is therefore set in a wider context, in 
which the substance of the specific concerns of China can be considered in the light of 
certain themes relating to China’s concerns towards international adjudication. As there has 
been a progressively increasing Chinese engagement with other international adjudicative 
bodies in the past two decades, this work examines whether the traditional concerns that had 
traditionally restricted China’s interactions with these bodies should still be regarded as 
significant obstacles for its engagement with the ICC. The purpose of this thesis is to 
consider whether, by virtue of the developments both in the specific ICC context and more 
broadly, the initial concerns of China about the Rome Statute still constitute a significant 
legal impediment to China’s accession to the ICC. There may, of course, be a whole range of 
policy or political factors influencing the Chinese government’s attitude towards the ICC, 
and sometimes the arguments made by China as a matter of law may reflect the super 
structure of its policy preference.
9
 In addition, the cultural differences between China and the 
so-called Western world may also account, in part, for the current gap between China and the 
ICC.
10
 However, the primary function of this thesis is to undertake a legal analysis of the 
concerns which China has framed as legal issues. While the overarching goal of this thesis is 
to look at the legal dimensions of the factors that should be taken into account in or call for 
future reconsideration and a rearticulating of the Chinese policy, appropriate attention will be 
paid to the possible policy reasons why China has not yet joined the ICC. Furthermore, 
                                                          
9
 As noted by Higgins, ‘Policy considerations, although they differ from “rules”, are an integral part of 
that decision making process which we call international law… [t]here is no avoiding the essential 
relationship between law and policy’. See Rosalyn Higgins, Problem and Process: International Law 
and How We Use It (OUP, 1995), p.5.  
10
 Although Western human rights values have exerted deep influence on China, this does not mean 
that a Westernised approach to international criminal justice is today fully accepted by China, whose 
perspective on human rights has its origins in traditional Confucian philosophy. See Joseph Chan, ‘A 
Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China’, in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. 





certain values that could be reinforced if China were to move towards full participation in the 
ICC will be identified.  
          Based on the above considerations, the thesis is structured as follows. It is 
composed of six substantive chapters in addition to this introductory chapter and the 
concluding Chapter. Section II of this Chapter provides a description of China’s historical 
engagement with the ICC, and sketches out in broad terms China’s specific concerns towards 
the Rome Statute. Chapter II examines the way in which China has engaged with other 
international judicial bodies, and it identifies the factors that have traditionally affected that 
engagement. In Chapter III and the subsequent Chapters the attention shifts back to the 
specific ICC context. These Chapters discuss in detail the specific Chinese concerns. Each 
Chapter primarily focuses on one kind of concern, and will be structured accordingly. In 
general, to begin with, each Chapter traces China’s involvement in the discussions on the 
specific issues that underlie its concerns regarding the Rome Statute. It then proceeds to 
examine these concerns in two dimensions: the legal merits of these concerns and the 
relevant developments which may address them. The concluding chapter will bring together 
all the threads discussed separately in the individual Chapters, and consider them as a whole, 
both in the ICC specific context and in the wider context.   
 
Section II China and the ICC: A Historical Sketch 
 
China has engaged in a consistent manner with the establishment of international criminal 
tribunals as a permanent number of the UN Security Council. This can be traced to the 
establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
 11
  and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
 12
 Even though China had reservations 
about the way in which the ad hoc tribunals were created, it did not seek to use its veto 
power within the Security Council to block the adoption of the resolutions establishing these 
tribunals. In the view of China, to create a tribunal by Security Council resolution was ‘not 
in compliance with the principle of State judicial sovereignty.’
13
 Nevertheless, China voted 
in favour of the Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY in view of the ‘special 
                                                          
 
11
 Statement by Mr. Jian Chen (China), Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3175
th
 Mtg., UN Doc. 
S/PV.3175, 22 February 1993, p.7, para.5; Statement by Mr. Zhaoxing Li (China), Provisional 
Verbatim Record of the 3217
th
 Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.3217, 25 May 1993, p.33, para.1.  
12
 Statement by Mr. Zhaoxing Li (China), Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3453
rd
 Mtg., UN Doc. 
S/PV.3453, 8 November 1994, p.11, para.7. 
13





circumstances’ in the former Yugoslavia, while insisting that the establishment of that 
tribunal would ‘not constitute any precedent’.
14
 At the time of establishing the ICTR, China 
reiterated its position that ‘it is not in favour of invoking at will Chapter VII of the Charter to 
establish an international tribunal through the adoption of a Security Council resolution’
15
, 
but abstained from the use of the veto. In 1994, while the Security Council was debating the 
creation of the Rwanda Tribunal, the proposal for a permanent international criminal tribunal 
was under discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
16
 In contrast, China 
afforded its support in principle to the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
tribunal by a multilateral treaty.
17
 When the idea of establishing the International Criminal 
Court gained momentum, China played a noteworthy role in the creation of its draft statute.  
 
1. China’s Involvement in Creating the ICC   
 
The International Law Commission (‘ILC’ or ‘Commission’) began considering the issues 
involved in the creation of an ICC in 1989 at the request of the General Assembly.
18
 Initially, 
the ILC’s work on this subject took place within the context of its on-going efforts to create a 
draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
19
 At its Forty-fourth 
Session in 1992,
20
 the ILC established a working group, which laid down basic parameters 
for a Draft Statute.
21
 At its Forty-fifth Session in 1993, the ILC received a report from the 
working group containing a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal with an 
extensive commentary.
22
 Without formally adopting the text, the ILC referred it to the 
                                                          
14
 Statement by Mr. Zhaoxing Li (1993), p.34, para.1.  
15
 Statement by Mr. Zhaoxing Li (1994), p.11, para.4.  
16
 James Crawford, ‘The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court’, 89 AJIL (1995), 
404-416, p.406.   
17




 Mtg., GAOR, 49
th
 Sess., UN Doc. 
A/C.6/49/SR.18, 26 October 1994, para.43.  
18
 See GA Res. 44/39, GAOR, 44
th
 Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/44/49(1989), p.310.  
19
 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-second Session, GAOR, 45
th
 
Sess., Supp. No.10, UN Doc. A/45/10 (1990), pp.36-54, paras.93-157; see William C. Gilmore, ‘The 
Proposed International Criminal Court: Recent Developments’, 5 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems (1995), p.265. 
20
 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-fourth Session, GAOR, 47
th
 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/47/10 (1992).  
21
 James Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal’, 88 AJIL (1994),  
140-152, p.140 
22
 See Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statue for an International Criminal Court [‘1993 ILC 
Draft Statute’], in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-fifth Session. 
GAOR, 48
th
 Sess., Supp. No.10, pp.100-131, UN Doc. A/48/10(1993) [‘1993 ILC Report’]; This 





General Assembly for comment.
23
 The General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution 
that requested its member states to submit to the Sixth Committee their observations on the 
proposed statute.
24
 Without submitting a written comment,
25
  China actively involved itself 
in the discussion of the product of the ILC in the Sixth Committee.
26
 In the same resolution, 
the General Assembly also invited the Commission to continue its work and develop a final 
draft.
 27
 At a very early stage of its 1994 session, the Commission re-established its Working 
Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, and Mr. Qizhi He from China 
was elected to be a member.
28
 Although the ILC members operated in a personal capacity, 
many aspects of Mr. He’s views expressed in the working group resonated very much with 
the Chinese perspective on several points of the draft statute.
29
  
               After making further revisions, the ILC submitted the final version of its draft 
statute for an international criminal court to the General Assembly in 1994.
30
 The Draft 
Statute prepared by the ILC working group was seriously debated in the Sixth Committee 
during its Forty-ninth Session and China took active part.
31
 While supporting the 
establishment of an international criminal court to ‘facilitate the prosecution of persons who 
had committed international crimes’,
32
 China outlined its national position on several 
features of the future Court.
33
  Meanwhile, China expressed its willingness to continue the 
exchange of views with other states in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome.
34
 
          At its Forty-ninth Session in 1994, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc 
Committee, open to all UN members, to review the major substantive and administrative 
issues arising out of the draft statute prepared by the Commission, and to consider 
arrangements for the convening of an international conference.
35
 In 1996, the Ad Hoc 
Committee was followed by a Preparatory Committee, which was created to prepare a 
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widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal court as a 
next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries.
36
 While the negotiating 
process in the Ad Hoc Committee
37
 was of a general nature and focused on the core issue of 
whether the proposition to create a court was serious and viable, the discussions at the 
Preparatory Committee
38
 focused squarely on the draft text of the Court’s statute.
39
 China not 
only actively participated in the work of both committees, but also called for ‘the 
participation of all countries in the preparatory work on the establishment of an 
international criminal court.’
40
 Meanwhile, China continued to take advantage of the 
opportunity to involve itself in the discussion of establishing the ICC through the debates in 
the Sixth Committee from 1995 to 1997.
41
 Though the negotiation transcripts of the Ad Hoc 
Committee and the Preparatory Committee are not available, the concerns of China 
regarding the draft Statute gradually emerged during the sessions of the Sixth Committee.
42
 
            In accordance with the General Assembly decision, the UN Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, open to all 
states members of the UN or members of specialised agencies or of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, was held at Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998.
43
 China’s engagement in 
the negotiations at Rome was conspicuous. It joined other delegations in a multilateral 
process which tried to resolve their differences by extensive negotiations.
44
 China also had 
delegates serving during the conference as vice-president of the conference and as members 
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of the Drafting and Credentials Committees.
45
 While some of the concerns which had been 
raised by China previously were taken on board and were reflected in the final draft of the 
Rome Statute, others remained unaddressed. At the conclusion of the conference, while 120 
countries voted in favour of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, China was among the seven states that voted against it.
46
  
         There were five reasons stated by the Chinese delegation at that time for not 
joining the ICC ‘(1)The jurisdiction of the ICC is not based on the principle of voluntary 
acceptance; the Rome Statute imposes obligations on non-States Parties without their 
consent, which violates the principle of state sovereignty and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Furthermore, the complementary jurisdiction principle gives the ICC the 
power to judge whether a state is able or willing to conduct proper trials of its own nationals. 
As a result, the Court becomes a supra-national organ. (2)War crimes committed in internal 
armed conflicts fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Further, the definition of “war 
crimes” goes beyond that accepted under customary international law and Additional 
Protocol 2 to the Geneva Conventions.(3)Contrary to the existing norms of customary 
international law, the definition of “crimes against humanity” does not require that the state 
in which they are committed be “at war”. Furthermore, many actions listed under that 
heading belong to the area of human rights law rather than international criminal law; this 
deviates from the real aim of establishing the ICC. (4)The inclusion of the crime of 
aggression within the jurisdiction of the ICC weakens the power of the UN Security Council. 
(5)The proprio motu power of the Prosecutor under Article 15 of the Rome Statute may make 
it difficult for the ICC to concentrate on dealing with the most serious crimes, and may make 





2. The Continuing Interest of China in the ICC  
 
However, the interest of China in the ICC was not terminated by its negative vote at Rome. 
Ever since then, it has demonstrated its continuing interest in the ICC in several key arenas. 
Following the Rome Diplomatic Conference, a Preparatory Commission was formed to draft 
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a number of documents crucial to the operation of the ICC.
48
 Participation in the Preparatory 
Commission was open to states that signed the Final Act of the Rome Conference, as well as 
states that were invited to the Diplomatic Conference.
49
 China, which had signed the Final 
Act, maintained a prominent position in the work of the Preparatory Commission, helping to 
draft the supplementary documents to the Rome Statute.
 50
  In the development of the 
Elements of Crimes, notwithstanding the grave concern it had voiced during the Rome 
Conference on the definition of some crimes, throughout the preparatory commission 
process, China demonstrated a great deal of flexibility.
51
 This indicated that after careful 
study China may no longer have some of the concerns it had previously raised about certain 
definitions. Concerning the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, China believed it was 
necessary to stress that the relevant provisions embodied in them must be consistent with the 
Statute and that in the event of conflict between them, the Statute shall prevail.
52
 It also 
actively participated in the Working Group on Aggression established by the Preparatory 
Commission to prepare proposals for a provision on aggression.
53
   
          At the same time, China consistently engaged with the General Assembly Sixth 
Committee’s discussions on the ICC. In 1999, China expressed its satisfaction with the 
progress achieved by the Preparatory Commission.
54
 In 2000, it applauded the adoption of 
the two instruments (Elements of Crimes, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), which 
were regarded by China as ‘a solid foundation for the smooth functioning of the 
International Criminal Court in the future’.
55
 In 2001, the Chinese delegate reaffirmed that 
‘his country had always supported the idea of establishing the International Criminal Court, 
and was satisfied with the results so far achieved by the Preparatory Commission’.
56
 In 2002, 
the Rome Statute entered into force after achieving 60 ratifications. 
57
 Following this event, 
the Chinese representative showed interest more explicitly by stating that ‘his country had 
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actively participated in the process of the setting up the International Criminal Court and 
that, while not yet a party to the Rome Statute, it would follow closely the development and 
operation of the Court and was ready to collaborate further with the international 
community in strengthening the rule of law’.
58
 In 2003, after the assumption of office by the 
Judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar of the ICC, China showed a positive attitude 
towards the approach adopted by the Prosecutor in his document on prosecution policy and 
indicated a keen willingness to follow closely the development of the fledgling institution.
59
 
In 2004, China further commended ‘the intense work done by the judges, prosecutors and all 
other staff to ready the Court to begin operations’.
60
  
          While constantly following closely the development of the ICC, China did not 
hesitate to point out its concerns about the current Statute and to clarify its ideas about a 
Court it would support. It emphasised on numerous occasions that China supported the 
establishment of an ICC characterised by its independence, impartiality, effectiveness, and 
universality, capable of punishing the gravest international crimes.
 61
 
           In 2005, in its Position Paper on UN Reform, China explained that ‘in view of some 
deficiencies in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which may hinder the 
just and effective functioning of the Court, China has not yet acceded to the Statute.’
62
 
Nevertheless, it acknowledged that the ICC still needed time to grow and mature,
63
 and noted 
that it may succeed in winning the confidence of non-contracting parties and gain broad 
international support through impartial and effective work.
64
  
       The Assembly of States Parties (‘ASP’ or ‘Assembly’) came into being pursuant to 
Article 112 after the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002.
 65
 Not only states 
parties are entitled to participate as members in the Assembly; all other states which have 
signed the Rome Statute or the Final Act of the Rome Conference may attend as observers.
66
 
China took full advantage of every opportunity of observing the meetings of the Assembly. 
The first act of the Assembly was to establish a Special Working Group on the Crime of 
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 open to all states, members of the ICC and non-members alike, to 
carry the work of the Preparatory Commission forward.
 68
 The SWGCA met at ASP 
meetings as well as at informal meetings at Princeton University, and concluded its work in 
February 2009.
 69
 China’s active involvement in both forums not only won it good will 
within the ASP, but also gained for itself the potential to positively influence the future 
Review Conference aggression discussions.
70
   
          Twelve years after the creation of the ICC, the first ever Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute took place in Kampala, Uganda from 31 May to 11 June 2010. The Kampala 
Conference provided a timely opportunity to reflect on some of the key aspects of the 
Court’s regime. China, though a non-state party ineligible to vote in Review Conference 
decisions, sent a delegation composed of an Ambassador, Legal Counsellor and other 
officers to Kampala to observe the conference and voice its opinions.
71
 At the General 
Debate of the Review Conference, China made a positive statement about the work of the 
Court during the past few years.
72
 It called for more efforts to enhance the international 
community’s confidence in the Court and consolidate the foundation for the Court’s 
sustainable development.
73
 Once again, China reaffirmed its commitment to work with other 
countries and contribute to the continued development of international criminal justice.
74 
Later in the same year, in a Chinese statement at the General Assembly, it further expressed 
its willingness to follow Kampala developments on the crime of aggression and its readiness 
to exchange views with other countries.
75
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            In addition, official statements entitled ‘China and the International Criminal 
Court’ appeared on the websites of the Chinese Foreign Ministry
76
 and the Permanent 
Mission of China to the UN
77
 in 2003 and 2004 respectively. The Chinese statements about 









 These statements likewise demonstrated China’s interest 
in following the progress and the operation of the ICC. In fact, more than merely following 
the development of the ICC, China has played a constructive role in passing the resolutions 
of the Security Council regarding the effective functioning of the ICC.
82
 
         All these different forms of engagement indicate that China was and still is 
interested in keeping open the possibility of joining the ICC.  This is in sharp contrast with 
the US, which is also a permanent member of the Security Council staying outside the Rome 
Statute. With some similar concerns regarding the ICC,
83
 China and the US have been 
following different paths in the pursuit of their relationship with the Court. Unlike China, 
which showed continuing interest in the ICC notwithstanding its negative vote at Rome, the 
US officially adopted an outright policy of hostility towards the Court during the earlier 
Bush Administration. From the American Service-Members Protection Act
84
, which restricts 
US cooperation with the ICC in numerous ways, to bilateral immunity agreements (so-called 
‘Article 98 agreements’),
85
 which prohibit states that are parties to the ICC from sending any 
US personnel to the Court, the US was determined to undermine the fledgling ICC. Though 
China shared similar concern, it has never taken the same hostile posture as the US did.  
China also made extensive preparations for Kampala by observing the meetings of the 
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SWGCA, whereas the US deliberately chose not to participate in the earlier negotiations on 
this matter before the Obama administration gradually shifted to a stance of ‘principled 
engagement.’
 86
 Though the history of the US-ICC relationship is beyond the scope of this 
work, in brief, it can been defined by a mixture of open hostility, disengagement, and now, 
principled engagement.
87
 Compared to the shifting US policy towards the ICC, China’s 
engagement with the development of the Court has been much more consistent and 
constructive.   
            Not only has the Chinese government demonstrated its continuing interest in the 
ICC, this newborn institution also generated wide-ranging discussions among Chinese jurists, 
experts and scholars. There have been four symposia
 88
 focusing on the ICC held within the 
Chinese legal community following the entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002. 
The participants included, among others, high-profile Chinese legal officers, though 
attending in their personal capacity, from the Chinese State Council, Foreign Ministry, the 
Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court.
89
 It also involved some ICC officers and 
distinguished international criminal law experts from overseas, such as Judge Philippe 
Kirsch and Judge Hans-Peter Kaul. These symposia addressed the major issues relating to 
the Rome Statute, and a certain amount of attention was also paid to the relationship between 
China and the ICC.  
       In addition to these academic discussions, two short articles on China’s perspective 
about the ICC have been published in English. These articles, however, merely focus on the 
five Chinese objections made at the end of the Rome Conference, and discuss them in a 
descriptive way.
90
 They fail to address in any depth the profound factors that have affected 
China’s engagement with the Court. The five Chinese objections made in 1998 were the 
most explicit expressions of the Chinese concerns regarding the ICC and will serve as the 
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cornerstone of this research. However, the pursuit of the Chinese position in relation to the 
ICC cannot be based literally on one single official statement. A historic and systematic 
study of the Chinese perspectives on the ICC and international adjudication more generally 
is necessary to gain an understanding of the true nature of these concerns. Examining the 
traditional concerns in the modern mirror paves the way or creates a background for a better 
understanding of China’s engagement with the ICC. More importantly, an updated study of 
the Chinese interactions with the ICC, and more broadly, with international judicial bodies is 
indispensable for understanding these concerns. This research, therefore, fills the vacuum by 
exploring the factors that have impacted on China’s engagement with the ICC both in the 







                                 Chapter II  
                    China and International Judicial Bodies  
 
Section I China’s Engagement with International Judicial Bodies  
 
1. From 1949 to the Earlier 1980s 
 
From 1949 to the early 1980s, the Chinese government resorted to diplomatic negotiations 
for settlement of whatever disputes it was embroiled in and rejected arbitration or 
adjudication by any international judicial bodies.
1
 This disengagement was related to China’s 
historical distrust of international justice, which was caused by its negative experience with 
international adjudication and its skepticism of the impartiality of the international tribunals 
that were disproportionately composed of western judges.  
     The initial Chinese experience with international law was against the background 
of an unequal treaty regime and consular jurisdiction in the wake of the Opium War (1839-
1842).
2
 These treaties bred Chinese scepticism about the impartiality of the principles and 
rules of international law. In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, though China was admitted 
into the negotiation of the Peace Conference as a victor state, the Treaty of Versailles did not 




 This unpleasant experience, 
although it did not lead China to disengage from international law and international 
institutions, did foreshadow its limited engagement.  
        In 1925, China was passively involved in a case with Belgium before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),
4
 but it did not take any part in the 
proceedings in the suit.
5
 Prior to the outbreak of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan 
(1937-1945), as a disadvantaged party, China hoped to turn to the League of Nations (LON) 
to resolve the crisis between China and Japan as well as prevent Japanese aggression. The 
paralysis of the LON in the face of aggression intensified China’s distrust of the international 
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system and its institutions.
6
  In the aftermath of the World War II, China sent several of the 
most influential contemporary Chinese international law scholars to participate in the Tokyo 
Trial, including, among others, Judge Ruao Mei, who worked together with a number of 
judges from other states to try the A-Class Japanese War Criminals; and Prosecutor Zhejun 
Xiang, who filed a complaint on behalf of the Chinese government. 
7
 Although China called 
for the indictment of the Emperor Hirohito, the US took various steps to prevent him and the 
other members of the imperial family from being prosecuted.
8
 The trial, which had an 
obvious American bias, planted seeds of distrust in China’s impression of international 
criminal tribunals.  
         Since its establishment in 1949, the Chinese government has been particularly 
cautious about submitting disputes in which it is involved to the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals. Although some early Sino-Soviet trading agreements contained a provision that the 
two parties might bring their future disputes to an arbitral tribunal for settlement, all such 
disputes including economic and trading disputes were actually dealt with through 
negotiations and consultations. 
9
 In 1962, China rejected India’s proposal for submitting the 
Sino-India border dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the PCA). 
10
  
           The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. 
11
 China, being member of the latter, is ipso facto party to the ICJ Statute. 
12
 A 
state’s consent to become a party to the Statute of the ICJ is not sufficient to establish the 
jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate a specific legal dispute. A second, independent consent 
is required – an acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under the relevant provisions of the 
Statute. It can be given in a number of different ways. First, the states parties to a dispute can 
refer a specific dispute to the Court by an ad hoc agreement concerning the specific dispute, 
known as a special agreement or compromis. Such jurisdiction has been generally known as 
voluntary jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 36(1) of the Statute.
13
 Second, consent can 
also be given by a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court provided 
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for in Article 36(2) of its Statute.
14
 Alternatively, such consent may be found under Article 
36(1) or 37, which permit jurisdiction to be based on compromissory clauses.
15
  
                From 1949 to 1971, as the Chinese government was excluded from the UN, there 
was almost no interaction between China and the World Court. Though the UN passed a 
General Assembly Resolution to restore the seat of China in the UN in 1971,
16
 which opened 
the opportunity for China to fully integrate into the international community, it rejected the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ openly and assertively.
17
 Whereas the Taiwan Kuomintang 
government declared in October 1946 its acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, 
the government of the People’s Republic of China informed the UN Secretary General in 
December 1972 that it did not recognise that declaration and considered it defunct. 
18
 
      In the 1960s and 1970s, there emerged a strong sense of distrust within the Chinese 
attitude towards the ICJ, which, from its viewpoint, was controlled by the West and might 
give judgments based on biased discretions. 
19
 This was particularly so following the 1966 
South West Africa Case,
20
 which was a major cause of disenchantment with the ICJ 
among developing nations. 
21
 The composition of the ICJ with judges from western countries 
and the perceived practice of these judges to perpetuate the vested interests of western states 
really intensified China’s scepticism about the ICJ. China felt that the composition of the 
Court did not reflect the main forms of civilisation and of the principal legal systems of the 
world. 
22
 Although China resumed its seat in the UN from 1971, in the subsequent ten years, 
there was no presence of Chinese judges in the principal judicial organ of the UN.
23
 Even 
though China was presented with two opportunities to put forward a candidate (in 1972 and 
1975), it failed to advance a candidate on each occasion.
24
 This was extremely 
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disproportionate with China’s international status, given the well-established practice of 
electing nationals of the ‘Big Five’ to the Court.
 25
  
          When signing, ratifying or acceding to international conventions, China 
consistently made reservations on the provisions for the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
26
  For 
example, China entered a reservation over Article 22, which confers jurisdiction on the ICJ,
27
 
when it acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) in 1981.
28
 In addition, the Chinese government has never made any 
special agreement (compromis) with other states to submit disputes to the ICJ. This coolness 
also extended to Chinese engagement with ICJ advisory proceedings. This was in a sharp 
contrast with the previous Taiwan Kuomintang government, which actively participated in 
the Conditions for Admission Case (1947)
29
 and the Reparation for Injuries Case (1948).
30
 
           In 1976, at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, China completely 
opposed the idea of the compulsory jurisdiction of the law of the sea tribunal.
 31
 It argued 
that ‘states should settle their disputes through negotiation and consultation…states were 
free to choose other means to settle their disputes. If a sovereign State were asked to accept 
unconditionally the compulsory jurisdiction of an international judicial organ, that would 





2. From the Late 1980s to the Present  
 
2.1 The International Court of Justice 
Since the late 1980’s, there has been a growing representation of judges from developing 
countries on the bench of the ICJ. This change, to some extent, has alleviated the scepticism 
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towards the Court from developing countries such as China.
 33
 The nomination of two 
Chinese international lawyers – Zhengyu Ni and Jiuyong Shi – as judges of the ICJ 
respectively in 1985 and 1994 has given China greater confidence in this institution.
 34
  
Therefore, some changes have occurred in China’s attitude to the ICJ. For example, in the 
wake of the ICJ’s final ruling in the Nicaragua case,
 35
 China urged the US to comply with 
the ruling of the ICJ; this was the first instance when China publicly asked any state to 
respect a ruling of the Court.
36
 In November 1986, the Chinese International Law 
Association sponsored a conference in Shanghai to discuss what attitude China should have 
toward the jurisdiction of the ICJ. More than 130 participants from universities, institutes, 
foreign administrations and judicial authorities gave many positive opinions about the ICJ.
37
 
In 1989, the Chinese government declared that it would abandon the practice of making 
blind reservations on all the provisions concerning the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
38
 In the same 
year, China began to participate in the discussions among the P-5 on how to strengthen the 
functioning of the ICJ. 
39
 The Chinese government made a clear political declaration that 
except for cases concerning essential national interests where negotiation and consultation 
would still be adhered to for settlement, China, in general, would not make any reservation 
when it signs, ratifies and accedes to international conventions related to the economy, trade, 




 China has kept open the option of referring disputes concerning the interpretation 
or application of the conventions to the ICJ in a number of treaties that it has ratified. In 
1993, China ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity,
41
 the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change,
42
 and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
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Disputes between States and Nations of Other States (Washington Convention).
43
 In 1997, 
China also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
44
 All these conventions contain a 
provision that allows parties to refer disputes to the ICJ for settlement.
45
 To some extent, this 
indicated that there was some softening in China’s acceptance towards the conventional 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.  
            In 2003, the successful election of the Chinese Judge Jiuyong Shi as President of 
the ICJ encouraged it to move towards more direct engagement with the Court.
46
 In 2010, the 
new Chinese Judge Hanqin Xue took her seat on the ICJ bench. Importantly, Judge Xue had 
previously been counsel for China in the recent Kosovo advisory proceedings and appeared 
before the Court in the oral hearings held in December 2009. 
47
 It was the first time that 
China had chosen to take part in the ICJ advisory proceedings.  However, up to now, China 
has never submitted a single dispute to the ICJ or participated in any of its contentious 
proceedings. It emphasised consistently in its Position Paper submitted to the General 
Assembly that ‘China is in favour of strengthening the role of the International Court of 
Justice, improving its working methods and enhancing its efficiency. The right of each 




2.2 International Arbitration  
In the late 1980s, the Chinese policy towards the settlement of international disputes by 
arbitration was adjusted to some extent. When signing, ratifying and acceding to non-
political, governmental or inter-state agreements related to trade, business, the economy, 
science and technology, and culture, China started to accept the inclusion of arbitration 
clauses or the arbitration method contained in the dispute resolution provisions.
49
 
         A significant area where China’s approach to international arbitration appears to be 
changing is in the field of international investment protection. In 1990, China signed the 
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 (2012) Sessions of the UN 
General Assembly. 
49
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which establishes an arbitration regime including the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for the resolution of investment 
disputes arising between a foreign investor and its host state.
51
  In 1993, China ratified the 
ICSID Convention, with the limitation that it would only consider submitting disputes over 
compensation resulting from expropriation or nationalisation to the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID.
52
  It is noteworthy that China also accepted the conventional jurisdiction of the ICJ 
embodied in Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.
53
  
          China now has one of the most extensive networks of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs).
54
  Its cautious approach towards international arbitration was also reflected in its 
earlier BITs. In common with China’s reservation concerning the ICSID, almost all of the 
China’s BITs before 2000 were limited solely to disputes concerning the amount of 
compensation due as a result of expropriation; liability and any other disputes arising out of 
the investments had to be resolved in local courts or local arbitration fora or through 
diplomatic negotiation between governments.
55
 However, since 2000, a new generation of 
Chinese BITs includes unconditional submission of all disputes between the investors and a 
contracting state falling within the scope of the BITs to international arbitration.
56
 It may 
well be that China is more willing to sign these agreements so as to allow Chinese investors 
to bring proceedings against foreign states. On the other hand, it also indicates that China is 
now less reluctant than previously to expose itself to international litigation. On 24 May 
2011, the Secretary-General of the ICSID registered an arbitration request submitted by a 
Malaysian company against China.
57
 It was the first case ever filed against the Chinese 
government before the ICSID.  
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         It bears notice that there are comprehensive undertakings for the use of the ICSID 
mechanism in China’s recent Free Trade Agreement (FTA) engagements as well. The efforts 
in this direction can be found in Article 54 of the China-Pakistan FTA,
58
 which provides that 
an investor may submit any legal disputes in connection with an investment in the territory 
of the state to the ICSID. China, being a founding member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (the PCA), renewed relations with it in 1993, when Foreign Minister Qichen 
Qian sent an official letter to the Secretary-General of the PCA informing him of the Chinese 
decision of resuming all its activities in the PCA and consequently nominated four renowned 
Chinese law experts as arbitrators of the PCA. 
59
 Later in the same year, he sent another 
letter to the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands declaring that China accepts all the Hague 




2.3 Dispute Settlement in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea  
The entry into force of the UNCLOS
61
 has been lauded by Professor Alan Boyle as ‘the most 
important development in the settlement of international disputes since the adoption of the 
UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice.’
62
 The 1982 UNCLOS has 
a complex dispute settlement system that entails both traditional consent-based processes as 
well as mandatory procedures.
63
 The rules on the settlement of disputes set out in Section I 
of Part XV oblige parties to disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the 
UNLOSC to seek to settle such disputes first of all by consensual means.
64
 It encourages 





 States also retain the right to resolve conflicts through 
alternative (bilateral, regional or general) agreements.
67
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            If states cannot settle their differences through the various means available under 
Section I, the compulsory binding dispute settlement system becomes operative.
68
 Section II 
of Part XV sets out the ‘compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions’, as it terms 
them, to which parties must have recourse if the means chosen by them fail to settle the 
dispute.
69
 Under Section II, the dispute can be submitted at the behest of just one of the 




         However, the parties are in fact given considerable flexibility in choosing the 
precise ‘compulsory procedure’ that must be pursued in such circumstances. Article 287 of 
the Convention gives its parties the option of making a written declaration at any time after 
signature of the Convention whereby they may choose a preferred means for settling a 
dispute brought under Section II. There are four possible means: the International Tribunal 




 an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VII of the UNLOSC,
73
 and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VIII.
74
 Where both parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure, that 
procedure is to be used, unless the parties otherwise agree. If the parties to a dispute have 
made different choices, or if no declaration is made, a preference for arbitration under Annex 
VII is presumed.
75
 These arrangements can be said to establish a flexible system of 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
76
 Such flexibility as to the choice of fora available to states parties 
was required in order to achieve consensus on compulsory dispute settlement at the Third 
Law of the Sea Conference.
77
 A simpler way of describing this system is to say that 
arbitration is compulsory unless the parties to a dispute have consented in advance or ad hoc 
to have it settled in some other way. 
78
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        China became a state party to the UNCLOS in 1996. It will be recalled that the 
Convention clearly provides that no reservations may be made.
79
 China has thus accepted the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the UNCLOS. As China has never made a choice of 
procedure in accordance with Article 287,
80
  it is presumed to have accepted arbitration as 
the default procedure.  
 The Convention provides for binding dispute-settlement procedures but further 
allows states, by written declaration, to optionally exempt themselves from the binding 
procedures for disputes regarding maritime boundaries, military activities and disputes where 
the Security Council is exercising its functions.
81
 The inclusion of this article is said to have 
been necessary in order to secure the agreement of states to the inclusion of a system of 
compulsory dispute settlement in the Convention.
82
 In 2006, China made a declaration in 
which it explicitly opted out of the compulsory dispute settlement under Section 2 of Part 
XV as follows: ‘the Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of 
the procedures provided in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the 




         Since China’s accession to the UNCLOS, there have been three Chinese judges 
who have served at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
 84
 In 2010, 
China chose to take part in the first ever advisory proceedings before the Seabed Dispute 
Chamber of the ITLOS. In the proceedings before the ITLOS regarding the responsibilities 
and obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the 
International Seabed Area, China submitted a written statement and argued that ‘the Seabed 
Dispute Chamber has jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion on the said questions.’
85
 
The Seabed Dispute Chamber, unlike the ITLOS, has a jurisdiction which is automatically 
accepted by all parties to the Convention.
86
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 Most recently in January 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against 
China regarding issues of the South China Sea under the UNCLOS,
87
 which both states have 
ratified. China rejected this request for arbitration and instead promoted bilateral 
negotiations as the only way to resolve the conflicting claims.
88
 In the view of China, ‘the 
claims for arbitration as raised by the Philippines are essentially concerned with maritime 
delimitation between the two countries in parts of the South China Sea, and thus inevitably 
involve the territorial sovereignty over certain relevant islands and reefs. However, such 
issues of territorial sovereignty are not the ones concerning the interpretation or application 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Therefore, given the fact that the 
Sino-Philippine territorial disputes still remain unresolved, the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures as contained in UNCLOS should not apply to the claims for 
arbitration as raised by the Philippines. Moreover, in 2006, the Chinese Government made a 
declaration in pursuance of Article 298 of UNCLOS, excluding disputes regarding such 
matters as those related to maritime delimitation from the compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures, including arbitration. Therefore, the request for arbitration by the Philippines is 
manifestly unfounded. China’s rejection of the Philippines’ request for arbitration, 
consequently, has a solid basis in international law.’
89
 China reiterated that ‘it is a 
commitment undertaken by all signatories, the Philippines included, under the Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that disputes relating to territorial 
and maritime rights and interests be resolved through negotiations by sovereign states 
directly concerned therewith.’ 
90
 Despite China’s objection to the jurisdiction of the 
UNCLOS arbitration, the jurisdictional issue will be decided by the arbitral tribunal pursuant 
to Article 288 of the Convention.
91
 China’s ongoing refusal to participate will not prevent the 
arbitration from moving forward.
92
 This case constitutes a major test as to whether China 
would abide by the decision of an international tribunal that goes against its own interest.  
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2.4 The World Trade Organization 
The WTO was established on 1 January 1995, pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization
93
 (WTO Agreement). Article 16.5 of the WTO 
Agreement provides that no reservations may be made in respect of any provision. In other 
words, ‘covered agreement’ of the WTO, including the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
94
 must be accepted by the 
members as a package without reservations. The DSU provides that, when consultation is 
unavailing in resolving a dispute arising under the covered trade agreements,
95
 the dispute 
will be settled through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSU confers compulsory 
jurisdiction on the DSB to resolve disputes. 
96
 The DSB’s role is to establish dispute 
settlement panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, monitor and implement rulings 
and recommendations and to authorise and suspend concessions. 
97
 Once adopted by the 
DSB, the Panel and Appellate Body reports are legally binding upon the parties to the 
dispute, subject to a consensus against adoption of the reports by all Members represented at 
the relevant DSB meeting.
 98
 Non-compliance with the recommendations of the reports may 
lead to trade sanctions.
99
 The DSS has been described as the most important and most 
powerful of any international law tribunals, although some observers reserve that primary 
place for the World Court.
100
 
          China entered the WTO in 2001 after fifteen years of negotiations.
101
 As a WTO 
Member, it is impossible for China to make reservations to the provisions on dispute 
settlement, which includes various compulsory jurisdiction. In 2002, China formally 
established its Permanent Mission to the WTO in Geneva to coordinate its participation in 
WTO dispute settlement.
102
 Although China is by no means the most frequent player in 
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WTO dispute settlement, it has become increasingly involved in recent years.
103
 As of 1 May 
2013, China has been involved in 138 disputes in various capacities: 11 as complainant, 30 
as respondent and 97 as a third party. 
104
 
           China’s pattern of interaction with the WTO DSB has shifted from extensive 
third-party involvement, to reluctant participation as a respondent, to enthusiastic use as a 
complainant in the years since its accession.
105
 Although China seemed somehow defensive 
in WTO dispute settlement in the early years of its membership, it gradually became 
offensive with enhanced WTO litigation capability, especially after its five-year transition 
period ended in 2007.
106
 At the same time, China has evidently made some changes in its 
approach and has invoked its third party rights on a more selective basis. 
107
 China’s positive 
attitude towards WTO dispute settlement may also be sensed from the fact that it has 
nominated 19 Chinese experts to the Indicative List of Panellists.
108
 In 2007, Yuejiao Zhang, 
former Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM, became the 
first Chinese citizen appointed by the WTO DSB as a member of its Appellate Body.
109
 This 
growing involvement in WTO DSS is of paramount significance for China, which, as 




2.5 UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies  
The UN currently has nine core human rights treaties: the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
111
; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)
112
; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination(ICERD)
113
; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);
114
  the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); 
115
 the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC);
116
 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW);
117
 the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance(ICED);
118
 and 
the Convention on the rights of Persons with Disabilities (ICRPD).
119
 Each of these human 
rights treaties has a monitoring body, composed of independent experts who examine the 
reports that signatory nations are obliged to submit under the treaty.
120
 
           Reporting is an obligation every state automatically accepts upon the ratification of 
the respective treaty without any requirement of further special consent. China has so far 













 It should be noted that China has signed but not yet ratified the 
ICCPR.
127
 China has strictly fulfilled its obligation to submit implementation reports as 
required by the relevant treaties. It has also regularly made statements at the General 
Assembly on China’s implementation of these treaties.
128
  
          In contrast to the reporting procedure, the nine UN human rights conventions do 
not all include a mechanism for the submission and consideration of individual 
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communications (complaints of human rights violations are referred to in the treaties as 
‘communications’). The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
129
 the Optional Protocol to the 
CEDAW,
130
 the Optional Protocol to ICRPD, 
131
 Article 22 of the CAT, Article 14 of the 
ICERD, Article 31 of the ICED, as well as Article 77 of ICRMW offer this possibility. 
Although the seven treaties have individual complaint procedures associated with them, 
mere ratification of the treaty itself does not empower the treaty body to scrutinise 
complaints made against a particular state. In each case, specific acceptance of the 
complaints procedure is optional for state parties to the treaty. A complaint can only be 
brought against a particular state if, in addition to ratification of the treaty itself, it has 




   A complaints procedure is a formal process by which an individual or, in some 
cases, a group of individuals, make a complaint to the treaty body associated with the treaty. 
The individual would claim that a state party has violated his or her individual rights under 
the Treaty.
133
 Although the decisions of the UN human rights treaty bodies are not legally 
binding, they have been given the authority by states parties to express their expert views as 
to whether a violation of human rights, and the states’ international obligation to protect 
those right, has occurred.  
        Despite its atypical features and the Committee’s radical difference from a court, 
the communications procedure amounts to a distinctive form of adjudication.
134
 So far, China 
has not made any declaration of acceptance on the competence of the respective committees 
and has thus denied individuals the right to submit individual complaints. For example, 
although the CAT established four procedures for the monitoring of the implementation of 
the Convention by the states parties to it, the only mandatory part of the monitoring 
procedure is that states parties are obliged to report to the Committee on the measures they 
have adopted to implement the Convention. Non-mandatory forms are established by Article 
20, a confidential procedure whereby the Committee can investigate reports of torture on its 
own initiative through confidential inquiries or fact-finding missions on the state’s territory; 
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by Article 21, covering interstate complaints; and by Article 22, allowing individual 
complaints. A state party is bound by Article 20 unless at the time of ratification or accession 
it expressly declares its unwillingness to accept the competence of the Committee, whereas 
Article 21 and 22 require an explicit declaration of acceptance of the Committee’s 
competence. China both explicitly repudiated the Committee’s competence to act on the 
provision of Article 20,
135
 and failed to make declarations of acceptance on the competence 
of the committee with respect to Article 21 and 22. 
136
  





 and Article 30 (i) of the CAT,
139
 all relating to the right whereby a dispute 
between two state parties can be referred to the ICJ. 
 
 
Section II Traditional Chinese Concerns regarding International Judicial 
Bodies  
 
1. Compulsory Jurisdiction  
 
The Chinese government has consistently held that states should settle their disputes through 
negotiation and consultation on an equal footing and on the basis of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
140
 It insisted that states should be free to choose other 
peaceful means to settle their disputes.
141
 As noted above, China rejected the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1972. Four years later, at the UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, it considered the question of the settlement of dispute involved the sovereignty of all 
states, and insisted on a separate protocol for countries to decide for themselves whether to 
accept the UNCLOS’s dispute settlement mechanism or not.
142
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          As a matter of fact, the principle of consent is a corollary of the principles of 
sovereignty and equality of states. Thus, consenting to international adjudication is a 
simultaneous expression and concession of sovereignty. 
143
 As PCIJ held in the Advisory 
Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, the fundamental legal principle underpinning the 
settlement of disputes involving sovereignty states is that ‘no state can, without its consent, 
be compelled to submit its disputes…to arbitration, or any other kind of pacific 
settlement.’
144
 It is obvious that the more specific the consent of one (or more) state(s) must 
be, the greater emphasis is placed on the sovereignty of this (or these) states(s). The 
alternative between compulsory and specific consent-based jurisdiction is thus not only of a 
technical nature but has substantive consequences.
145
  
 It is therefore necessary to examine the extent to which those treaties establishing 
international courts have been designed to afford states parties significant continuing 
discretion over the powers that the respective courts will have relative to jurisdiction. The 
ICJ’s jurisdiction is, by statute, premised on the consent of parties.
146
  When a state becomes 
a party to the Statute of the ICJ it merely accepts that the Court will function in accordance 
with the provisions of the Statute. In order for the Court to have jurisdiction with respect to a 
given case further acts of will on the part of the states involved are required.
147
 No matter 
what the technical basis for the Court’s jurisdiction may be – a Compromis, compulsory 
jurisdiction, or a compromissory clause, the mutual consent of both parties to the dispute, 
either for a particular case or generally for future cases, is required for the Court to be seized 
of a dispute.
148
 Even though the jurisdiction derived from Article 36(2) is universally known 
as ‘compulsory jurisdiction’, it has been noted that the term ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ is not 
precise.
149
 This is because states have no duty to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction. States assume 
this obligation in their discretion by making appropriate unilateral declarations. Therefore, 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36(2) is not really compulsory. It is, in 
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fact, optional. States have the option to accept it and can do so under terms and conditions 
that they determine themselves. 
150
  
            The ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction is only compulsory in the sense that consent to 
jurisdiction is granted by the states in advance, with respect to all or certain categories of 
dispute, and once a dispute arises, the state then does have a binding obligation and must 
submit to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
151
 However, there has been a reluctance to subscribe to 
the more general arrangements for compulsory jurisdiction and a preference for agreements 
concerned either with particular types of cases or individual disputes.
152
  Because the consent 
is granted in advance, with respect to all or certain categories of disputes, including future 
disputes, states that grant such consent expose themselves to a certain degree of 
unpredictability and vulnerability. This kind of compulsory jurisdiction is also available in 
other types of dispute settlement mechanisms, in particular, the jurisdiction of the ICSID and 
the individual complaint procedures under the UN human rights treaty bodies.  
             The concept of compulsory jurisdiction has been applied to investor-state 
arbitrations under investment treaties, particularly those subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention requires that the parties, i.e. the host state and 
the foreign investor, have consented to ICSID’s jurisdiction. As a result, an ICSID tribunal’s 
jurisdiction depends both on the accession to the Convention by the relevant states (the host 
state and the investor’s state of nationality), and the specific provisions of the written 
instruments in which consent to arbitration is expressed.  
         This is the approach found in investment treaties that include states’ consent to 
ICSID jurisdiction. In most cases, the investment treaty itself contains a standing, unilateral 
offer by the contracting states to submit investment disputes with investors from the other 
contracting party (or parties) to arbitration.
153
 While ICSID’s jurisdiction based on the 
advance consent of a state in an investment treaty is not typically referred to as 
‘compulsory’, the consent, once granted, creates a binding obligation for the state to submit 
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal – much like in the case of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ.  Because of the somewhat unusual ‘advance consent’ mechanism in most investment 
treaties, aggrieved investors can call upon states to arbitrate long after the states have spelled 
out in their investment treaties the conditions under which they consented to do so. The 
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element of unpredictability and vulnerability typical of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ is thus also present in ICSID under investment treaties.  
             A somewhat similar dispute settlement mechanism can also be found in the UN 
Human Rights treaties. Take the ICCPR for example; the Covenant establishes an optional 
inter-state or state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
154
 The ICCPR, in fact, does not 
contain an individual complaints procedure within the text of the actual treaty. A complaints 
procedure is contained in a separate instrument, the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. By 
becoming a state party to the Optional Protocol, a state recognises the competence of the 
treaty body, the Human Rights Committee, to receive and consider a written complaint from 
an individual who believes his or her rights under the covenant have been violated by the 
state party concerned.
155
 As its name indicates, the individual petition system is optional; it 
can be invoked only after a state party has ratified the Protocol.  
          The WTO DSS embraces mandatory exclusive jurisdiction and virtually automatic 
adoption of dispute settlement reports, extraordinary for an institution with such broad-
ranging competence and responsibilities.
156
 The DSU provides for compulsory referral of all 
disputes regarding the ‘covered agreements’ to the procedures set forth.
157
 All WTO 
members are subject to it, as they have all signed and ratified the WTO Agreement as a 
single undertaking, of which the DSU is a part.
 158
  There is no need for the parties to a 
dispute to accept the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system in a separate 
declaration or agreement. However, the DSU leaves room for members concerned to engage 
in consultation to settle their disputes.
159
 In this sense, the DSS still reserves to states some 
flexibility relating to third party adjudication.  
             Similar with the WTO, the compulsory judicial procedures under the UNCLOS are 
envisaged as an integral part of the Convention rather than being made subject to an optional 
protocol annexed to the main Convention.
  
In other words, consent to be bound by UNCLOS 
includes consent to its compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. 
160
  While 
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compulsory dispute settlement is integral to the effective operation of the Convention, it is 
clearly limited on a procedural level – in terms of deference to traditional consent-based 
methods, and on a substantive level – with respect to the disputes that are excluded from 
mandatory jurisdiction.’
161
 In addition, compared to the WTO DSB, which is the only forum 
for adjudication of disputes arising under the WTO Agreement, the ITLOS is one out of four 
choices of forum for the settlement of disputes arising under UNCLOS. In the latter case, 
states will be able to engage in ‘forum shopping’, taking their disputes to familiar tribunals 
such as the ICJ. The UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanisms thus retain considerable 
discretion for states regarding the forms of binding third-party settlement that they will 
accept and, equally significantly, allow states to exempt entirely from compulsory 
jurisdiction disputes concerning particularly sensitive areas, including military activities.  
            In looking at the relevant provisions of the ICJ Statute, the UNCLOS, the UN 
Human Rights Treaties, the ICSID Convention, and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, we have seen that each treaty provides to states different levels of discretion 
over the degree and type of authority that the respective courts will have over interstate or 
state versus individual disputes. The ICJ relies on the classic consensual paradigm: consent 
to jurisdiction must be expressly accorded either before or after any given dispute arises. Of 
all international judicial bodies, the ICJ is probably the one that still adheres most closely to 
the consensual paradigm. It is a forum where sovereignty is still treasured and where the 
limits imposed by the principle of consent are strongest, probably because the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae is the widest possible, encompassing any dispute between 
sovereign states on any matter of international law. In contrast with a second consent 
afforded to states in relation to the compulsory jurisdictions of the ICJ, the UN human rights 
treaty bodies, and the ICSID, a state, by virtue of becoming party to the WTO and the 
UNCLOS, would be consenting to its jurisdiction, which means the requirement of separate 
consent to jurisdiction is removed for states parties to the Statute. It should be noted that the 
UNCLOS and the WTO still provide some flexibility for states in relation to their 
jurisdiction; however, flexibility does not strictly mean state consent. The dispute settlement 
under the UNCLOS relies partly on the consensual paradigm and partly on the compulsory 
paradigm.  
            Despite China’s traditional concern regarding compulsory jurisdiction, since the 
1990s, there has been a greater Chinese engagement with international judicial bodies. It is 
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somewhat curious to notice that China has accepted the dispute settlement mechanism of 
both the WTO and the UNCLOS, which offer less discretion to states relating to third party 
adjudication. Even though both the ICJ and the UN human rights bodies offer optional 
dispute settlement mechanisms, which gives a greater role to state consent, China has failed 
to make a single declaration of acceptance. In contrast, China has actively made good use of 
the ICSID mechanism for the settlement of disputes between itself and foreign investors. It is 
obvious that apart from China’s primary concern towards compulsory jurisdiction, there 
have been other factors that affect China’s engagement with international adjudicative 
bodies.  
 
2. Other Factors  
 
It is apparent that China and the above-mentioned international judicial bodies are linked to 
different degrees. As to the dispute settlement mechanisms of both the WTO and the ICSID 
in relation to international trade disputes and international investment disputes respectively, 
China has fully accepted the jurisdiction of both without any reservation, and has gradually 
made greater use of both mechanisms in practice. The breakthrough for China’s acceptance 
of the ICJ’s conventional jurisdiction also focuses on the economy-related fields. On the 
other hand, China opted out of the compulsory jurisdiction of UNCLOS in relation to some 
sovereignty–sensitive areas, including maritime delimitations and military activities. More 
significantly, China has never showed any willingness to accept the competence of the 
respective committees which deal with individual complaints of human rights violations 
under the UN human rights treaties.  
            Even though there has been a greater Chinese acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of international judicial bodies since the 1990s, it has not been willing to 
relinquish its discretion over international adjudication overall. It still jealously guards its 
prerogatives to select the areas in which it will relinquish sovereignty. While there is a great 
willingness on the part of China to accept international adjudication in the economic and 
technical areas, there is still a reluctance to do so in territorial and maritime delimitations, 
military activities, and more significantly, human rights. Generally, the more important and 
sensitive the subject of a dispute is to a state, the less willing the state is to submit the dispute 
to third-party adjudication.
162
 Therefore, China’s concern about compulsory jurisdiction was 
intricately linked with the subject areas of the disputes. While China has been primarily 
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concerned with the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, the different 
subject areas that each body has jurisdiction over have also played an important role in 
China’s deliberation of its engagement.   
 In addition, historically, China has taken a sceptical, sometimes even negative 
attitude towards the dispute settlement mechanisms of international judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies mainly due to its distrust in the applicable international law. The Chinese 
perspective is profoundly shaped by its past experience of unequal treaties and the Western 





though China is gradually becoming confident in international law with its greater 
participation in the development and codification of both treaty law and customary 
international law, it does not mean that China is comfortable with international courts and 
tribunals making binding decisions. The second hurdle is China’s distrust in the 
implementation of international law by international adjudicative bodies, which, from its 
perspective, have been controlled by the West and might give judgments based on a biased 
use of discretions. In addition, the Chinese preference for negotiation and mediation over 
litigation has its origins in traditional Chinese culture, which calls for disappearance of 
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                                        Chapter III  
China’s Concerns regarding the Relationship between the 
Jurisdiction of the ICC and State Consent  
 
The acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was the most controversial issue in the entire 
negotiations surrounding the establishment of the ICC.
 1
 One question was how a state would 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction – whether states would automatically accept the court’s 
jurisdiction over crimes as soon as ratification took place, or whether they would have to 
give specific acceptance to the Court’s jurisdiction over each particular crime.
 2
 A related 
question was which states, if any, must have accepted the court’s jurisdiction before the 




Section I.  The Negotiation Process and the Concerns of China  
  
1. The Approach of the International Law Commission 
 
The divergent views on the acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction can be traced back to the 
1993 Draft Statute prepared by the ILC working group,
 
which contained several alternative 
proposals on this issue.
4
 One option under Article 23
5
 proposed by the working group could 
be characterised as an ‘opt-in’ system whereby jurisdiction over certain crimes was not 
conferred automatically on the Court by the sole fact of becoming a party to the Statute, but 
in addition, a special declaration was needed to that effect.
6
 While some members were of 
the view that this approach was the one which best reflected the consensual basis of the 
Court’s jurisdiction,
7
 some other members preferred an approach which, in their view, 
rendered more meaningful the status of being a party to the Court’s Statute.
 8
 They advocated 
a system whereby a state, by becoming party to the Court’s Statute, would automatically 
confer jurisdiction to the Court over the crimes under the Statute, although they would have 
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the right to exclude some crimes from such jurisdiction (‘opt-out’ system)
9
. China expressed 
its preference for the opt-in system during the debates on the 1993 Draft Statute in the Sixth 
Committee.
10
 It argued that ‘the Court should not have general compulsory criminal 
jurisdiction…It was essential to distinguish between acceptance of the statute and 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court.’
11
 A closely relevant issue was provided by draft 
Article 24, which listed the states whose consent or acceptance of jurisdiction would be 
necessary to enable the court to deal with a given crime. 
12
 China pointed out that ‘in draft 
article 24…reference was made mainly to consent to jurisdiction by the State on whose 
territory the suspect was found. In order to ensure a fair prosecution and trial, it was 
essential that such jurisdiction should receive the consent of both the State of which the 
suspect was a national and the State in which the alleged offence was committed’.
13
  
             Following the extensive comments made by states in the Sixth Committee, further 
discussions took place within the working group in 1994. Mr. He, the Chinese member of the 
working group, took the same view as the Chinese government regarding this issue. 
According to him, ‘all States should be able to decide whether or not to accept the statute 
and the jurisdiction of the court.’ 
14
 He pointed out that ‘it was of great importance for the 
acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by States to be voluntary. A distinction must be drawn 
between acceptance of the statute and acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court. Acceptance 
of the statue should only mean undertaking certain obligations to offer judicial assistance 
and engage in financial cooperation, whereas acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction 
depended on the express consent of States.’
15
 On the question of which states have to consent, 
Mr. He, again, endorsed the Chinese government’s argument by stating that ‘the consent of 
the State of which the accused was a national should not be overlooked in so far as the 
investigation and the collection of evidence by the court were concerned.’
16
 
            The 1994 ILC Draft Articles distinguished between genocide and other crimes for 
the purpose of conferring ‘inherent’ jurisdiction. Article 21(1)(a) provided for inherent 
jurisdiction in a case of genocide if a complaint was brought by a state party to the Statute 
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which was also a contracting party to the Genocide Convention.
17
 With respect to crimes 
other than genocide, the ILC’s approach can be classified as an opt-in system,
 18
 whereby 
ratification only signifies that the state is a party to the Statute and does not automatically 
mean that it accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction.
19
 Such crimes were to be subject to a second 
layer of state consent which was bypassed only in cases of a referral of the matter to the 
Court by the Security Council.
20
 The ILC was of the view that this approach provided for the 
possibility of a general declaration along the lines of the optional clause contained in Article 
36 of the Statute of the ICJ, giving states considerable choice and complete freedom for a 
selective approach after, and in spite of, having ratified the Statute.
 21
  
              China generally endorsed the modalities of state acceptance of jurisdiction, which, 
in its view, ‘confirmed to the character of the court’s jurisdiction and preserved State’s 
freedom of choice to become parties to the statute or to accept the court’s jurisdiction.’ 
22
 
However, China raised doubt about the inherent jurisdiction over genocide provided by the 
Statute by stating ‘it must be asked whether the court should have compulsory jurisdiction in 
such cases…becoming a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 




            On the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, the fundamental question was: 
which state or states must give their consent to the exercise of jurisdiction. 
24
 Article 21(1)(b) 
subordinated the exercise of jurisdiction to the acceptance by the state with custody of the 
suspect (the custodial state) and by the state on whose territory the act had occurred (the 
territorial state).
25
 Some members of the ILC would have preferred an additional requirement 
of consent of the state of nationality of the suspect,
 26
 but this condition did not appear in the 
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final draft. Article 22(4) also provided the possibility for states which were not parties to the 




2. Considerations during the Ad Hoc Committee and the 
Preparatory Committee  
 
During the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee
28
 and the Preparatory Committee,
29
 the 
major issue continued to be the desirability of inherent jurisdiction in respect of all states 
parties versus some form of opt-in mechanism.
30
 The proposal submitted by the ILC came 
under increasing criticism during the discussions in both committees.
31
 It is worth noting that 
in these discussions, delegates used the term ‘inherent jurisdiction’ in the same way that the 
ILC had; that is, states, by virtue of becoming party to the Statute, would be consenting to its 
jurisdiction.
32
  There was widespread agreement that there should be inherent jurisdiction 
over genocide, but different views on whether war crimes and crimes against humanity 
should be so treated.
33
 While the majority of delegations gradually expressed a preference for 
inherent jurisdiction over all the core crimes in respect of states parties to the Statute, a 




            The delegations opposing the extension considered the concept of inherent 
jurisdiction to be inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty. They believed that the issues 
of sovereignty raised during the course of the debate could not be disposed of by providing 
for a single expression of consent at the time of acceptance of the statute. 
35
 Instead, they 
stressed that the opt-in approach was consistent with the principle of sovereignty and to the 
practice of adherence to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
36
 They believed that the regime of opt-in 
was more likely to maximise universal participation.
37
 States supporting inherent jurisdiction 
for all core crimes maintained that the meaning of inherent jurisdiction was fully compatible 
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with respect for state sovereignty, since states would have expressed their consent at the time 
of ratification of the Statute as opposed to having to express it in respect of every single 
crime listed in the Statute at different stages.
38
 Hence, there would be no need for a selective 
opt-in or opt-out approach. Another point of divergence between the delegations was 




           China expressed the view in the 1995 Session of the Sixth Committee that 
‘acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction would be based on the voluntary consent of the States 
parties and could not be mandatory.’
40
 It also considered the concept of inherent jurisdiction 
contrary to the principle of complementarity.
41
 In the following year, the delegate of China 
maintained that ‘in accordance with the principle of state sovereignty, his Government had 
consistently held that the court’s jurisdiction must be based on the consent of States. The 
draft statute adopted by the International Law Commission provided for the court to have 
inherent jurisdiction (not subject to State consent) over the crime of genocide. His delegation 
opposed such an approach and was not in favour of expanding so-called inherent 
jurisdiction to other international crimes.’
42
  
            The concept of automatic jurisdiction did not mean that the Court would exercise 
its jurisdiction over the crimes listed in the Statute independently of any link between these 
crimes and a state party.
43
 The views were equally divided on the identification of 
connections of the states whose consent could be necessary for the purposes of the exercise 
of jurisdiction.
44
 Some delegations were in favour of keeping to a minimum the number of 
states whose consent would be needed for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction.
45
 They felt that 
the consent requirement should be limited to the territorial state, which had a particular 
interest in the prosecution for the case, or to the custodial state, whose consent was necessary 
for the court to obtain custody of the accused.
46
 Still other delegations took the view that the 
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consent requirements should be extended to additional states which could have a significant 
interest in a case, including the state of nationality.
47
  
           At the last session of the Preparatory Committee, held in March-April 1998, two 
alternatives emerged. The proposal presented by the UK
48
 departed from the opt-in system of 
the ILC draft. 
49
 It would confer automatic jurisdiction to the extent that a non-state party 
was not involved.
50
 The proposal further required that both the custodial state and the state 
where the crime occurred should have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by being state 
parties.
51
 With regard to non-state parties, the Court would not be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction unless both the custodial state and the territorial state had given their consent ad 
hoc.
52
 The German delegation made a proposal aimed at rendering the Court competence 
independent from any jurisdictional link. 
53
 It introduced the system of automatic jurisdiction, 
and at the same time it proposed a system with no preconditions, i.e. no consent would be 
required from the related states. The effect of the German proposal would be that the Court’s 
jurisdiction could be exercised over any suspect regardless of whether the territorial state, 
custodial state or any other state concerned was a party to the Statute.
54
 The proposal was 
predicated on the assumption that there existed universal jurisdiction under international law 
for the crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
55
 The rationale of the proposal was that 
the ICC should have the same jurisdictional authority as contracting states have under 
international law and that this authority would be transferred by them, through ratification of 
the Statute, to the ICC.
56
  
             At this stage of the discussion, the term ‘inherent jurisdiction’ was gradually 
dropped from use since it was not clear whether it referred only to state parties or also to 
non-state parties.
57
 Both the British and the German proposals were spoken of as conferring 
‘automatic jurisdiction’ with regard to States Parties. The question as to which state or states 
would have to accept the jurisdiction of the Court by becoming a party to the Statute: the 
territorial state, the custodial state, the victim’s state or the nationality state, or a combination 
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of these countries, either in a disjunctive or conjunctive list, was the subject of more 




3. Negotiations at the Rome Conference  
 
During the negotiations in the Committee of the Whole, there continued to be two 





 Others alternatives were submitted during the conference, among 
which the Korean proposal sought to combine the merits of the two ends of the spectrum and 
provide a compromise formula on the jurisdiction of the Court.
61
 The Korean proposal 
incorporated automatic jurisdiction,
62
 and set a precondition of state consent according to 
which one of the states listed has to consent: the territorial state, the custodial state, the state 
of nationality of the suspect or the state of which the victim is a national.
63
 Different from the 
Britain proposal which required the cumulative consent of the territorial state and the 
custodial state,
64
 the Korean proposal did not require more than one jurisdictional link to be 
cumulatively present, but assigned relevance, alternatively, to four types of link. This 
proposal gained wide support (roughly 80 percent of the states participating in Rome), but 
was not acceptable to some who wanted a second layer of state consent.
65
 China, in 
particular, continuously expressed its reservations over automatic jurisdiction.
66
 In his 
opening statement to the Rome Conference, the head of the Chinese delegation stressed that 
‘the court can exercise its jurisdiction only with the consent of the countries concerned.’ 
67  
However, China showed some flexibility by indicating that it could accept the possibility of 
automatic jurisdiction over genocide.
68
 Nevertheless, it still objected to the inclusion of other 
core crimes into inherent jurisdiction. This was because, in the view of China, ‘the three core 
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crimes did not all have the same status: whereas genocide was accepted by the whole 
international community as a crime, crimes against humanity and war crimes fell into a 
different category.’
69
 It further pointed out that inherent jurisdiction would exclude many 
countries otherwise willing to become parties to the Statute.
 70
 China restated its preference 
for the opt-in system,
71
 which, in its view, would allow many countries to become parties to 
the Statute and allow the Court to acquire universality in a very short period of time.
72
 
China’s proposition was endorsed by other P-5 members. Both the US and Russia expressed 
the view that they would be prepared to consider automatic jurisdiction only over the crime 
of genocide for state parties, but would require opt-in provisions for states parties in respect 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
73
 France made clear that it required an opt-in 
provision for war crimes.
74
  
          The question of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction was inextricably linked to 
the question of the preconditions for the exercise of that jurisdiction. Should automatic 
jurisdiction for state parties be agreed, the views were still divided on which state or states 
would have to accept the jurisdiction of the Court by becoming a party to the Statute to 
establish the necessary jurisdictional link. Another controversy was whether the consent of 
non-party states should be required, and if so, which ones.
75
 While a large number of states 
expressed support for inherent jurisdiction over the core crimes without clarifying if it would 
require consent of a non-state party,
76
 China explicitly stated that for non-state parties, the 
consent of the state of nationality and of the territorial state should be required in the case of 
automatic jurisdiction over genocide.
 77
 As for crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
China argued, there should be opt-in jurisdiction with the consent of the state of nationality 
and the territorial state.
78
 The US also favoured the approach whereby the Court should only 
be able to act when the states concerned allowed it to do so in specific cases and when the 
state of nationality of the suspect consented.
79
 It spoke strongly against all of the proposals 
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by which the custodial state’s consent would be sufficient, describing these as ‘universal 
jurisdiction’.
80
 In the final plenary meeting of the Committee of the Whole, the US submitted 
an amendment to make the exercise of jurisdiction conditional on the consent of the state of 
nationality of the accused person.
81
 However, the indispensable requirement of the 
acceptance of the state of nationality of the accused was not acceptable to the majority of 
states as it was seen as causing a probable paralysis of the ICC. 
82
 
            It was on this issue that the differences proved irreconcilable and consensus 
eventually broke down, leading to a vote at the end of the conference.
83
 The approach, which 
was codified in the final text of Article 12 of the Rome Treaty, combines state acceptance of 
jurisdiction with preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. Despite the 
objections from the permanent members of the Security Council, Paragraph 1 provides 
‘automatic jurisdiction’; namely, when a state becomes a party to the Statute, it automatically 
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court without any further consent.
 84
 It should be noted, 
however, that there is a limited exception to automatic jurisdiction in the transitional 
provision of Article 124, which allows states to use a once only, time-limited opt-out with 
respect to only war crimes.
85
  
            On the precondition to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, Paragraph 2 allows 
disjunctively for the acceptance by one or more of the territorial state or the state of 
nationality of the accused.
86
 Rather than making jurisdiction exclusively contingent on the 
consent of the state of nationality (as the American proposal envisioned), this compromise 
provision recognises the consent of the territorial state as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 
This means that persons accused of committing the relevant crimes may be subject to 
prosecution even if the state of their nationality is not a party to the Statute. The precondition 
is only required when a state party or the Prosecutor proprio motu brings cases before the 
Court.
87
 This precondition on the exercise of jurisdiction can be fulfilled by having either the 
territorial state or the state of the nationality of the suspect as the party to the ICC Statute, or 
it can be fulfilled by either one of the above states accepting ad hoc ICC jurisdiction.
88
 
Article 12(3) contains the possibility for a non-state party, if its acceptance is required under 
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Article 12(2), to declare ad hoc its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to 
the crime in question.
89
 
             Chinese concerns had gradually emerged during the sessions of the Rome 
Conference with regard to the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties. At the 
last session of Committee of the Whole, China maintained that ‘article 12 concerning the 
issue of jurisdiction was the most important article in the whole Statute. As currently drafted, 
it would mean violating the sovereignty of States parties, and would not only impose 
obligations on States not parties, contrary to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
but would in fact place greater obligations on them than on the parties.’
90
 It was clear that 
both the opt-in jurisdiction and the pre-conditional conjunctive consent by the territorial state 
and the state of nationality of the accused insisted upon by China were rejected by the final 
text of Article 12 of the Rome Treaty. These issues eventually proved important in swaying 
the Chinese government to cast a negative vote in respect of the Rome Statute at the end of 
the conference. After the voting, China explained its vote to the Plenary Committee of the 
Conference, where it maintained that the nature of the jurisdiction adopted in Article 12 of 
the Statute did not respect the state consent principle.
 91
 According to the Chinese delegation, 
this provision incorporated universal jurisdiction and imposed an obligation upon non-states 
parties and constituted an interference in the judicial independence or sovereignty of states.
92
 
In his interview by a national newspaper, the head of the Chinese delegation at the Rome 
Conference reiterated this position by stating that ‘the jurisdiction of the ICC is not based on 
the principle of voluntary acceptance; the Rome Statute imposes obligations on non-States 
Parties without their consent, which violates the principle of state sovereignty and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.’
93
  
               Later in the Sixth Committee, the Chinese delegation elaborated on its objections 
towards Article 12 in more significant details.
94
 The Chinese representative attached great 
importance to the principle that in all circumstances states should give their consent before 
the Court could exercise its jurisdiction.
95
 With regard to the approach towards accepting the 
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jurisdiction of the Court, China emphasised its preference for ‘the mechanism that would 
allow States, in becoming parties to the Statute, to choose whether they would accept the 
Court’s jurisdiction over all crimes or only over certain crimes’ (the so-called opt-in 
approach). 
96
 It was noted that this should be the proper approach especially when ‘countries 
still had differences over which crimes should fall under the jurisdiction of the Court and 
how those crimes should be defined’. 
97
 China argued that ruling out the opt-in might prevent 
many countries from becoming parties to the Statute. 
98
 
              The most significant criticism raised by China was perhaps the one related to the 
issue of ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of non-states parties. China continued to 
maintain that Article 12 provided for universal jurisdiction, which directly infringed on the 
judicial sovereignty of states.
 99
 It further argued that ‘the provisions concerning jurisdiction 
in the Statute could create a situation in which non-parties assumed more obligations than 
parties. For example, under article 124, a State, on becoming a party to the Statute, could 
declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of the Statue for the State 
concerned, it did not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to war crimes. Under 
article 121, paragraph 5, any amendment to article 5 to 8 of the Statute would not have 
effect with regard to State parties that has not accepted the amendment. States parties could 
invoke the two provisions referred to in order to reject the Court’s jurisdiction over the 
crimes in question. On the other hand, as long as the territorial State or the State or 
nationality of the accused was a State party or had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, a non-
party would not be able to invoke the same grounds to refuse the Court’s jurisdiction over 
the crime in question’.
100
 
             The Chinese opposition to the ICC centred heavily on Article 12, which grants the 
ICC automatic jurisdiction over the crimes listed in Article 5 without the additional consent 
of states parties, and occasionally without the consent of non-states parties in certain 
circumstances. There were several points made by China in supporting its objections in both 
regards, these two types of concerns about state consent in the context of the ICC will be 
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Section II Concerns of China and States Consent  
 
1. Consent of States Parties  
 
While the 1994 ILC Draft Statute had envisaged mandatory ICC jurisdiction only for 
genocide involving states parties to both the Genocide Convention and the Statute, in the Ad 
Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee, states warmed to the idea of inherent 
jurisdiction. Under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Court has inherent jurisdiction over 
all the crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction, with only the possibility of opting out of 
war crimes for a limited period of seven years. 
101
 The original state consent regime or opt-in 
procedure favoured by the Chinese authorities has been dropped. In fact, China’s objection 
towards the automatic jurisdiction of the ICC can find some resonance with its traditional 
concerns about the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies.  
            As demonstrated in the previous Chapter, the question as to whether state consent 
is expressed by way of ratification (system of automatic jurisdiction) or in a more specific 
form of consent (an opt-in system) has been of great importance in China’s traditional 
approach towards international adjudicative bodies. In this connection, China’s concern 
towards the automatic jurisdiction of the ICC seems to echo its traditional approach towards 
compulsory jurisdiction. In the 1990s, contemporary with or even after the ICC negotiation, 
China’s primary traditional concern towards compulsory jurisdiction has been seen to be 
obviated in the contexts of the WTO, the ICSID, the UNCLOS and (to a lesser but still 
noticeable extent ) the ICJ with the only exception being the human rights treaty bodies. 
Should the ICC be considered along the same line with China’s greater engagement with 
various international judicial bodies, its automatic jurisdiction should no longer be regarded 
as an impediment to China’s accession to the Rome Statute. However, as noted in Chapter II, 
the subject areas of the respective international judicial bodies have also played a significant 
role in China’s deliberation of its engagement with these bodies. While there is a great 
willingness on the part of China to accept international adjudication in economic and 
technical areas, there is still a reluctance to do so in certain fields, including military 
activities and human rights. The key thus lies in the subject areas that the ICC covers. On 
first appearance, the subject matter of the ICC seems to be highly relevant to human rights, 
and the probable involvement of military activities under the crime of aggression would tend 
to heighten this sensitivity. While the prerogatives of states to choose whether to adjudicate 
disputes in these areas are protected in the ICJ Statute, the UNCLOS, or even the UN human 
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rights treaties, which all give states a second layer of protection of state consent, such 
prerogatives seem to have been overlooked in the Rome Statute. Considering the fact that 
China has opted out of the jurisdiction in these sensitive areas under the relevant treaties, it is 





2. Consent of Non-States Parties  
 
According to Article 12, the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction if the state of the territory 
where the crime was committed or the state of nationality of the accused are parties to the 
Rome Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC ad hoc with respect to the crime in 
question.
103
 The crucial aspect of this provision is that no consent of the state of nationality 
of the accused is required for the purpose of perfecting the Court’s jurisdiction. The issue of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties without state consent has been 
officially one of the main reasons for the Chinese government’s opposition to the Court, 
which is also shared as the ‘principal American legal objection.’
104
 Though this objection 
cannot be a self-standing argument as the problem could presumably be solved as far as 
China and the US are concerned by simply ratifying the Statute, a close analysis of this 
shared concern will bear great importance in evaluating the justification for these two 
permanent members of the UN Security Council staying outside the ICC.  
          Both US and Chinese objections to the ICC’s jurisdiction over non-states parties 
was based on the view that by purporting to confer upon the Court jurisdiction over nationals 
from non-consenting non-states parties, the Treaty would impose obligations upon non-
parties and bind non-parties in contravention of the law of treaties.
105
 More broadly, with 
regards to the relationship between the ICC and non-states parties, China raised two further 
points. Firstly, China argued that the provisions concerning jurisdiction in the Statute could 
create a situation in which non-states parties assumed more obligations than states parties.
106
 
Secondly, the Statute had granted universal jurisdiction to the Court over the core crimes.
107
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Whether these arguments can be substantiated requires a close study of the legal basis for the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals from non-states parties without state consent.  
 
2.1 Misunderstandings between Obligations and Interests 
The charge by both China and the US that it is a breach of international law to purport to 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals of non-states parties on the territory 
of states parties, advanced at the Rome Conference and defended subsequently by some 
academics,
108
 has been examined intensively and has generally been thought to be weak.
109
  
            It is true that, according to the general rule of international law, codified in Article 
34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
110
 ‘a treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent’ (pacta tertiis).
111
 However, 
the argument that the Rome Statute is radically flawed because it violates the pacta tertiis 
rule is considered by most scholars to be based on confusion between the notions of 
obligations and interest.
112
 To untangle this confusion, it is important to make a distinction 
between the concepts of obligations of non-states parties and the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the nationals of such states. Although the prosecution of nationals from a non-state party 
might affect the interests of that state, this is not the same as saying that obligations are 
imposed on the state. Therefore, China’s objection is not really that the Rome Treaty 
imposes obligations on China as a non-state party, but that it affects the sovereignty interests 
of China – an altogether different matter that does not come within the Vienna Convention’s 
proscription. Likewise, whilst the provisions of the Statute, particularly those dealing with 
complementarity,
113
 create incentives or pressures for non-parties to take certain action (such 
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as the prosecution of their nationals), 
114
 this is not the same as imposition of an obligation 
upon them as no legal responsibility arises from the failure to take such action.  
              It was due to this confusion between the interest of states and obligations of states 
that China further maintained that Article 124 and Article 121(5) could create a situation in 
which non-parties assumed more obligations than parties.
115
 While Article 12(1) of the 
Statute provides for a system of automatic jurisdiction, a state party may however opt out 
from this automatic jurisdiction over war crimes for a limited period of seven years 
according to Article 124.
116
 Non-states parties may not similarly opt out. While Article 121(5) 
allows states parties to exempt their own nationals from jurisdiction over new crimes added 
to the Statute under the amendment procedures, non-states parties may not likewise shield 
their nationals.
117
 To some extent, Article 124 and Article 121(5) will create a situation that 
the nationals of non-states parties would be more vulnerable to the ICC jurisdiction, but this 
is not the same as saying that obligations are imposed on these states. Even though the 
nationals of non-states parties may be subjected to the ICC’s jurisdiction, these states are 
under no obligation to cooperate with the Court. There is therefore no provision in the ICC 
Statute that requires non-states parties (as distinct from their nationals) to perform or to 
refrain from performing any obligations without their consent.  
              The Rome Statute is unambiguous in its language that the obligation to cooperate 
with the ICC extends only to state parties.
118
 The ICC’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-states parties does not in any way connote the imposition of an obligation 
on those states, or the application of the Rome Statute to those states without their consent. 
Article 87(5) of the Rome Statute is a provision on co-operation by non-states parties with 
the ICC. It stipulates that the Court ‘may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide 
assistance under this Part on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such 
State or any other appropriate basis.’ Unlike the state parties which are obligated to co-
operate, the word ‘invite’ shows that co-operation by non-states parties with the ICC is in the 
legal category of co-operation of a ‘voluntary nature’ alone. Non-state parties can agree to 
cooperation with the Court by way of a declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the 
Court or an ad hoc arrangement or agreement with the Court. 
119
 It is true that states not party 
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to the Statute may also be brought under an international obligation to cooperate with the 
Court by ‘any other appropriate basis,’
120
 which could be provided by a Security Council 
resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
121
 However, the binding nature of such a 
cooperative obligation stems from the UN Charter rather than the Rome Statute per se.
122
 
Even though it is perfectly conceivable that the Security Council could adopt a resolution 
having as its sole object the decision that all UN member states shall cooperate with the 
Court, the Council has been reluctant to do so in practice.
123
 Therefore, the Statute does not 
impose cooperative obligations upon non-states parties as with states parties, not to mention 
the non-States Parties would undertake more obligations than states parties.  
              While the Statute does not impose any obligations on non-states parties, it does 
create some rights and privileges for states parties. Both Article 124 and Article 121(5) 
collectively accord more rights to states parties than non-states parties, but non-states parties 
cannot protest for not being given the same rights. Even though these provisions do not put 
all states on the same footing, there is nothing at odds with treaty law. Rather, it should be 
regarded as an incentive for states to become parties to the Rome Treaty. In addition, there 
have been developments in relation to both provisions at the Review Conference, which will 
be discussed later in the context of war crimes
124




2.2 The Legal Basis of the ICC’s Jurisdiction over Nations from Non-
Consenting Non-States Parties  
 
International law governing jurisdiction ‘describes the limits of the legal competence of a 
State… to make, apply, and enforce rules of conduct upon persons. It concerns essentially 
the extent of each state’s right to regulate conduct or the consequences of events.’ 
126
 In 
general, jurisdiction refers to powers to legislate in respect of the persons, property, or events 
in question (prescriptive jurisdiction or legislative jurisdiction); the powers of a state’s courts 
to hear cases concerning persons, property or events in question (judicial or adjudicative 
jurisdiction); or powers of physical interference exercised by the executive, such as the arrest 
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of persons, seizure of property (enforcement jurisdiction).
127
 In the criminal context, the most 
common approach is to distinguish between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. 
128
 As 
observed by Michael Akehurst, in criminal law legislative jurisdiction and judicial 
jurisdiction are one and the same.
129
 This is because the application of a state’s criminal law 
by its criminal courts is simply the exercise or actualisation of prescription: both amount to 
an assertion that the law in question is applicable to the relevant conduct. 
130
 In fact, the PCIJ 
in the Lotus Case premised its treatment of national criminal jurisdiction on the simple 
binary distinction between the jurisdiction to prescribe and the jurisdiction to enforce.
131
 In 
an obiter dictum, the Court stated that ‘far from laying down a general prohibition to the 
effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their 
courts to persons, property, and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a 
wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as 
regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best 
and most suitable.’ 
132
 In other words, a state is entitled to extend its prescriptive jurisdiction 
outside its territory, subject to any rules prohibiting such prescription in certain cases.  
             On the other hand, the PCIJ made it clear that, subject to a permissive rule to the 
contrary, a state may not exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state 
without the second state’s consent.
133
 This means that the enforcement of a state’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction is confined to its own territory and must not, without special 
agreement, be exercised in any form in the territory of another state. 
134
 It appears from the 
Lotus case that there are two competing general principles of jurisdiction that apply to 
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prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction respectively. Whereas a state is 
virtually free to exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction so long as not prohibited by a contrary 
rule of international law, the enforcement of that jurisdiction can generally take place only 
within its own territory unless some special permission has been granted to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction in an area under the sovereignty of another state.  
               The most common and accepted basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is that of 
territoriality: that is, a state has the competence to criminalise conduct performed on its 
territory.
135
 For example, Article 6 of the Criminal Law of China, which provides that ‘the 
law shall be applicable to anyone who commits a crime within the territory and territorial 
waters and air space of the People’s Republic of China, except as otherwise specifically 
provided by law’,
136
 is based on territorial jurisdiction. The ICC represents no more than the 
delegated exercise by the states parties to its Statute of their prescriptive territorial 
jurisdiction. By ratifying the Rome Statute, each state party has delegated to the ICC their 
adjudicative jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
on that state party’s territory. The states parties to the Rome Statute merely give effect 
through the medium of the ICC to the prescriptive jurisdiction that international law permits 
them.  
                The US raised its objection that international law does not yet entitle a state, 
whether as a party or as a non-party to the ICC Treaty, to delegate to a treaty-based 
international criminal court its own domestic authority to bring to justice individuals who 
commit crimes on its sovereignty territory or otherwise under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, without first obtaining the consent of that individual’s state of nationality either 
through ratification of the Rome Treaty or by special consent.
137
 However, in the context of 
the ICC, the application of the Lotus Principle on prescriptive jurisdiction would mean that 
sovereign states are free to collectively establish an international jurisdiction applicable to 
the nationals of non-state parties unless it can be shown that this violates a prohibitive rule of 
international law.
 
 The continuing vitality of the Lotus principle per se has been confirmed 
by the ICJ and its respective judges.
138
 Therefore, the question is not whether international 
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law or precedents exists permitting an ICC with this type of jurisdictional reach, but rather 
whether any international legal rule exists that prohibits it.  
                As observed by many scholars, there is no identifiable rule of international law that 
prohibits a state from delegating, whether to another state or to an international judicial 
organ, the adjudication of crimes that are committed on its territory.
139
 States have a 
sovereignty interest in their nationals, but international law does not generally grant states 
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by a state’s national in a foreign country unless 
otherwise specified.
140
 Nor is a state compelled to give effect to its prescriptive criminal 
jurisdiction through its own police or its courts.
141
 By no means does a foreign indictment of 
a state’s nationals for acts committed in the foreign country constitute an impermissible 
intervention in the state’s internal affairs. More importantly, the very objection raised by 
both China and the US that the Rome Statute violates the VCLT, as discussed earlier, 
appears unsubstantiated.  
           If there is any other objection from the state of nationality towards the delegated 
jurisdiction, in all likelihood, it would be raised on the basis of human rights concerns 
regarding its national. In a sense, by analogy, the concept of delegated jurisdiction is akin to, 
or might have some echoes of, transferring individuals from one jurisdiction to another, and 
there have been very occasional human rights concerns which have intruded into the latter 
kind of cases. For example, in the Soering Case, the ECtHR held that the extradition of an 
individual from the UK to the US to stand trial for a first degree murder charge, if it was not 
accompanied by an assurance from Washington that the death penalty would not be imposed, 
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in violation of Article 3 of the 
ECHR.
142
  Although inapplicable to this case, the Court acknowledged that ‘an issue might 
exceptionally be raised under Article 6 (art. 6) by an extradition decision in circumstances 
where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the 
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 Similarly, in the most recent case involving Abu Qatada, the ECtHR 
held that the UK could not lawfully deport him to his native Jordan because there the 
individual would face a trial at which evidence obtained by torture would be used, falling 
short of the standards set by Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial).
144
  
            If applied analogously to the concept of delegated jurisdiction, the human rights 
concerns raised in these cases, an argument could be made that the delegation of jurisdiction 
from one state to another may subject the individuals concerned to torture, or risk their rights 
to fair trial. In either case, the transfer would violate international law, either the CAT or the 
ICCPR. However, this kind of human rights concerns arising from delegation of territorial 
jurisdiction between individual states could be almost negated where jurisdiction is 
transferred not to an individual state, but, rather, to an international court. These concerns are 
inapplicable to the ICC because of the nature of the relevance of human rights protection for 
individuals afforded by the Rome Statute.
145
 The ICC is obliged to respect human rights 
itself when operating,
146
 even though it does not have the mandate to scrutinise human rights 
standards conducted during national trials.
147
 
          It is worth noting that the idea of delegation of jurisdiction to another state or to a 
treaty-based international judicial body is not foreign to state practice. In the context of the 
development of the domestic application of international criminal law, delegation of 
jurisdiction from one state to another through treaty agreements is very common. A number 
of multilateral treaties which are primarily concerned with fighting against transnational 
criminality allow adjudicative or prescriptive jurisdiction to be delegated in such a way.
 
 
These conventions create an obligation to prosecute or to extradite the accused and thereby 
confer jurisdiction under the provisions of the relevant treaty.
148
 They empower states Parties 
who have custody of an alleged wrongdoer to prosecute him if they do not extradite the 
suspect to a state that has primary jurisdiction over the crime irrespective of whether the state 
of the wrongdoer’s national state is also a party to the treaty.
 
The possibility of the state of 
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custody to prosecute when it has no connection to the crime is best explained in terms of 
delegation of jurisdiction by a state with primary jurisdiction (mostly territorial jurisdiction) 
to the state of custody.
149
  
         This mode of delegation of adjudicative jurisdiction was not protested but 
encouraged and actively supported by China, which is a state party to most of these 
conventions.
150
 Another example is the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings 
in Criminal Matters. 
151
 The possibility of transfer of prescriptive jurisdiction where the 
defendant is a national of a third state is provided by Article 2(1), according to which, ‘for 
the purposes of applying this Convention, any Contracting state shall have competence to 
prosecute under its own criminal law any offence to which the law of another Contracting 
state is applicable.’
152
 Even though an argument could be made that there is a difference 
between delegating criminal jurisdiction to another municipal court and turning a defendant 
over to an international body, 
153
 there have also been precedents where states pooled their 
individual jurisdictional authority and vested it in an international judicial body. The 
Nuremberg Tribunal concluded over half a century ago that states can, in jurisdictional terms, 
do together what any one of them could do individually. The relevant and often quoted 
passage of the Nuremberg Judgment reads: ‘the Signatory Powers created the Tribunal, 
defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the trial. 
In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is 
not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer 
law.’ 
154
  It is therefore within the sovereign power of a state to allow an international body 
to exercise jurisdiction in the same way in which that state may itself exercise jurisdiction. 
There is no rule in international law prohibiting a state from delegating its adjudicatory 
authority to an international court.  
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              China, however, considered that the Rome Statute had granted universal 
jurisdiction to the ICC over the core crimes, 
155
 which was one of its objections to the Statute. 
Universal jurisdiction provides every state with jurisdiction over a limited category of 
offenses generally recognised as of universal concern, regardless of where the offence 
occurred, the nationality of the perpetrator, or the nationality of the victim.
156
 In fact, 
universal jurisdiction itself is not very securely founded in international law. Not only have 
states not yet reached agreement upon a set of written standards (ideally in the form of a 
treaty
157
), but also the ICJ failed to settle this issue in the Arrest Warrant Case. 
158
 Judge ad 
hoc Wyngaert suggested, in her dissenting opinion, that ‘there is no generally accepted 
definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional or customary international law’. 
159
 It is 
not surprising that ‘much confusion and uncertainty reigns over universal criminal 
jurisdiction’.
160
 Although there have been scholarly contributions published lending weighty 
support to the existence of universal criminal jurisdiction over crimes enumerated in the 
Rome Statute, 
161
 the legality of the exercise of universal jurisdiction over such crimes is 
probably still not entirely resolved in international law.
162
  
       It should be noted that universal jurisdiction has not been generally recognised by 
states. David Scheffer, the former US ambassador claimed that: ‘any effort to identify a 
universally acceptable definition of universal jurisdiction…remains a largely futile 
exercise.’
163
In the 1990s, China clearly rejected granting the ICC universal jurisdiction. 
However, its view about whether states themselves could exercise universal jurisdiction was 
ambiguous at that time. This can be seen from the confusing statements made by China. At 
the debates on the establishment of the ICTR, China argued ‘the establishment of an 
international tribunal…is only a supplement to domestic criminal jurisdiction and the 
current exercise of universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes.’
164
 During 
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negotiations on the ICC Statute, China stated that ‘the proposed court should not replace or 
override systems of national criminal or universal jurisdiction.’
165
 Similarly, ‘national 
criminal jurisdiction and the prevailing system of international universal jurisdiction should 
take precedence’.
166
 These curious statements indicate that China acknowledged the 
existence of universal jurisdiction.   
            In recent years, the Chinese position has been constantly challenged by Spanish 
Courts, which made charges against former Chinese leaders based on universal jurisdiction. 
For example, one of the investigations in respect to China which was opened in 2006 
involves the alleged commission of genocide during the occupation in Tibet in 1950. 
167
 In 









 China elaborated at length about its objections 
towards universal jurisdiction. In 2010, the Chinese government also submitted written 
comments on the ‘Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ to the 
General Assembly.
172
 On all these occasions, China consistently maintained that ‘universal 
jurisdiction was currently only an academic concept and did not yet constitute an 
international legal norm. On the basis of the principle of sovereign equality, it was well 
established in international law that a State could exercise jurisdiction within its own 
territory and was entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of other States.’
 173
 It pointed out 
that ‘apart from piracy there was no unanimity among States and therefore no established 
customary law about which crimes were subject to universal jurisdiction.’ 
174
 It cautioned 
that ‘so-called “universal jurisdiction” was a sensitive legal issue, and States should avoid 
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exercising it over other States until a common understanding of the concept and its 
application was reached.’ 
175
  
            China not only doubted the customary law status of universal jurisdiction over 
crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute, but also rejected the proposition that multilateral 
treaties (mainly) on transnational crimes could create universal jurisdiction. It argued that 
‘the obligation of extradite or prosecute had been incorporated into a number of 
international conventions in order to enhance cooperation in combating international crimes. 
While that obligation was sometimes invoked as the basis for exercising universal 
jurisdiction, it was not equivalent to such jurisdiction; it was a treaty obligation applicable 
only to States parties to the instrument in question’.
176 
 
             It is comprehensible that China has reservations about universal jurisdiction in 
general, but it is important to clarify that the ICC per se does not wield universal jurisdiction. 
Under the universal jurisdiction, the ICC would have been able to prosecute and try any 
person suspected of committing grave international crimes notwithstanding any other 
recognised jurisdictional link to a state party to the Rome Statute other than perhaps presence 
(or custody).
177
 However, according to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction over any alleged conduct only if there is a nexus between such conduct and the 
state where the crime was committed or the state of the accused person’s nationality, and 
only if one of these states is a party to the Rome Statute or has accepted the jurisdiction of 
the ICC ad hoc with respect to the crime in question. 
178
 This provision therefore rejects the 
basis of universal jurisdiction by specifying that the consent of either the territorial state or 
the state of nationality of the accused is a pre-condition, except for those referred under the 
authority of the UNSC.
179
 This is indeed a very conservative stance that does not depend 
upon the principle of universal jurisdiction. This interpretation is also supported by the 
travaux preparatoires. During the Rome Conference, Germany introduced a proposal that 
would have granted the Court universal jurisdiction over all core rimes.
 180
 It was argued that 
under international law all states have universal jurisdiction over crimes defined by the 
Rome Statute and that the ICC should be in the same position. 
181
 This would have allowed 
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the Court to prosecute a crime without securing the consent of any state. However, the 
German proposal was rejected.
 182
 If this approach had been accepted, the ICC would have 
had jurisdiction over any suspect regardless of whether the territorial state, state of 
nationality or any other interested state was a party to the Rome Statute. However, the ICC 
did not utilise universal jurisdiction as a basis for its authority over the enumerated crimes, 
therefore the Chinese argument could not be sustained.  
             Although an argument could be made that the jurisdictional regime in the Rome 
Statute is based on delegated universal jurisdiction by states,
183
 this work does not intend to 
go down this route. It seems highly unlikely for China, which rejected universal jurisdiction 
over crimes except piracy, to accept that universal jurisdiction may be delegated, without the 
consent of the state of nationality, to an international court. Similarly, Scheffer criticised the 
delegated theory based on universal jurisdiction as follows: ‘we do not accept the 
proposition that a national government can delegate universal jurisdiction it may not even 
have in its national legal system – a kind of phantom universal jurisdiction – to an 
international court and require official personnel of non-parties to be covered by it without a 
government’s consent.’ 
184
  However, it is worth noting that, in practice, both the US and 
China have de facto accepted the mode of delegated jurisdiction in the context of piracy. In 
2010, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to present within three months a 
report on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning pirates, 
including, in particular, options for the creation of special domestic chambers, possibly with 
international components, a regional tribunal, or an international tribunal to that end.
185
 By 
voting in favour of the Council Resolution, China accepted the possibility of delegated 
universal jurisdiction over piracy, not only to national courts, but also to a regional or 
international tribunal. In response, the Secretary-General set up a commission to look into 
the legally available options for dealing with piracy. There were seven options proposed in 
the Secretary-General’s report,
186
 which seemed to be based on the assumption that 
delegation of jurisdiction in relation to a universal crime was entirely appropriate and 
unrestricted. In 2011, China voted in favour of the Security Council resolution, which 
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decided to set up a specialized Somali anti-piracy court to try suspected pirates both in 
Somalia and in the region. 
187
 Even though there may be difficulties for China in accepting 
delegated universal jurisdiction in relation to the crimes enumerated under the Rome Statute, 
delegated territorial jurisdiction, if properly viewed in the context of the ICC, would be 
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                                       Chapter IV  
China’s Concerns regarding the Relationship between the 
Jurisdiction of the ICC and Complementarity  
 
Section I. Introduction to the Principle of Complementarity and the 
Concerns of China 
 
A fundamental question facing the drafters of the Rome Statute was the role of the institution 
with respect to national courts.
1
 The difficulties encountered in the process of adoption of the 
ICC Statute are to be mainly attributed to the concern that the jurisdiction of the Court could 
infringe upon state sovereignty.
2
 The debate about the proper relationship between the ICC 
and national criminal jurisdiction evolved with two principal considerations in mind: 
accommodating state sovereignty and ensuring the criminal accountability of perpetrators of 
the international crimes.
3
 The Rome Statute seeks to strike a balance between these two 
considerations. Proposed as an option by the ILC, the concept of complementary jurisdiction 




           Preambular Paragraph 10 and Article 1 of the Rome Statute affirm that the ICC 
‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.’
5
 While these references state that 
the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction, they do 
not reveal how that complementarity is to be achieved. In fact, the Statute does not explicitly 
use or define the term ‘complementarity’; the term has only been used by many negotiators 
of the Statute, and later on by commentators to refer to the entirety of the norms governing 
the complementary relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions.
6
  
           As a key element of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared 
by the ILC, the principle per se was never seriously questioned during the debates first in the 
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two Committees or subsequently in the Rome Diplomatic Conference.
7
 However, it proved 
very difficult to achieve a consensus on how this principle should be applied,
8
 including the 
obvious questions of how best to articulate complementarity criteria to ensure their impartial 
application, and who decides whether these criteria are satisfied. 
9
 The solutions developed 
were both politically sensitive and legally complex,
10
 reflecting the concerns of states over 
national sovereignty and the potentially intrusive powers of an international institution.
11
 
One of the outcomes of the negotiation process of the establishment of the ICC was to give 
the notion of complementarity a degree of specificity. As a result, the principle of 
complementarity is given substance by Article 17 of the Rome Statute entitled ‘Issues of 
Admissibility’, which sets out the substantive criteria for a determination of admissibility.
12
  
             China by and large supported the principle of complementarity,
13
 and regarded it as 
‘a fundamental basis for the establishment of the Court’.
14
 However, China had reservations 
over the implementation of the principle at a very early stage of establishing the ICC.
15
 It 
insisted that the principle of complementarity had not been fully implemented in the 
operative part of the Statute and that some provisions appeared to be contrary to it,
 16
 in 
particular, the automatic jurisdiction (Article 12) and the criteria of admissibility (Article 17).  
 
1. Complementarity and State Consent  
 
As was noted in the state consent chapter, the Rome Statute grants the ICC automatic 
jurisdiction over the core crimes without a requirement for the additional consent of states 
parties, and occasionally without the need for the consent of non-states parties in certain 
circumstances.
17
 China considered the concept of inherent jurisdiction to be inconsistent with 
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the principle of complementarity. The Chinese delegation pointed out that ‘the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court, when extended to cover all core crimes, would accord precedence 
to the court over national courts; that was clearly at variance with the principle of 
complementarity…’ 
18
 With regards to non-States Parties, China pointed out that ‘under the 
current rules of international law, far more States than those in the two categories referred 
to under Article 12 of the Rome Statute had equal and parallel jurisdiction over the crimes 
concerned, including States detaining the suspects and States of which the victims were 
nationals. Article 12 in effect negated the equal jurisdiction of the latter States, thus 
infringing on their judicial sovereignty. In other words, States not parties to the Statute 
which had jurisdiction over the relevant crimes under current international law would no 
longer be able to invoke their non-acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in order to prevent 
the Court’s interference with their judicial sovereignty.’ 
19
 
              The logic of China’s proposition can be found in the argument by Professor James 
Crawford, who noted that, under Article 12, the requirement of separate consent to 
jurisdiction is removed for states parties to the Statute; at the same time, the lack of consent 
of non-states Parties is irrelevant to jurisdiction, provided that either the state of the 
accused’s nationality or the state on whose territory the crime was committed are parties or 
have accepted its jurisdiction ad hoc (by contrast, the custodial state has no specific role in 
determining jurisdiction).
20
 As a corollary, he pointed out that, ‘the principle of 
complementarity would have no effect in determining the existence of [the ICC’s] 
jurisdiction,’
21
 it would only retain its force in terms of the exercise of jurisdiction, which is 
to be given effect by the prosecutor in deciding whether to take forward an investigation, and 
by the Court in deciding whether to authorise a prosecution at the level of admissibility.
22
 
While the ILC draft gave effect to complementarity at both levels, the Rome Statute defines 
the question of complementarity as pertaining to the admissibility of a case rather than to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
23
 In other words, under the opt-in system provided by the ILC draft, 
the principle of complementarity had effect on both levels: the existence of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, which was determined by the state consent regime; and the exercise of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, which was effectuated by the admissibility system.  
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            It should be noted from the outset that even if the ‘term “admissibility”…is 
frequently used in close relationship with jurisdiction’,
24
 both terms have to be distinguished. 
Jurisdiction refers to the legal parameters of the Court’s operation, in terms of subject matter, 
time, and space as well as over individuals.
25
 The question of admissibility, which is about 
the exercise of jurisdiction rather than its existence, concerns whether matters over which the 
Court has jurisdiction should be litigated.
26
 The situation may arise in which the ICC has 




2. The Criteria of Complementarity  
 
Although the principle of complementarity was generally endorsed, the questions of whether 
national authorities or the ICC should decide the admissibility of a case before the Court, and 
of the criteria to be applied, remained contentious.
28
 The core of the complementarity test is 
whether the states with jurisdiction are unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute.
29
 
‘Unable’ is defined as the incapacity to obtain the accused or necessary evidence and 
testimony, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of the national judicial 
system.
30
 In order to determine ‘unwilling’ in a particular case, Article 17(2) declares that 
‘having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law’, the Court is 
to consider whether the purpose of the national proceedings was to shelter an offender 
(Article 17, Paragraph 2(a)), whether they have been unjustifiably delayed (Article 17, 
Paragraph 2(b)), and whether they were not conducted independently or impartially, and they 
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice (Article 17, Paragraph 2(c)).   
            During the negotiation process, inability was not controversial in principle and was 
added to the draft article.
 31
 The issue of unwillingness was a much more contentious issue to 
resolve, especially when some delegations were opposed to any inclusion of the concept 
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from a state sovereignty standpoint.
 32
 While most delegations agreed that the ICC could take 
jurisdiction where no national proceedings were underway, there was disagreement about 
whether the ICC should have the power to step in where a national investigation or 
prosecution was underway, but was in reality a ‘sham’ proceeding designed to thwart 
international justice.
33
 China, in particular, expressed the view that ‘the International 
Criminal Court had only a complementary role to play in the event that a State’s judicial 
system collapsed’,
34
 but ‘its jurisdiction should not apply when a case was already being 
investigated, prosecuted or tried by a given country.’
35
 Many delegations, including China,
 36
  
were sensitive to the potential for the Court to function as a kind of court of appeal, passing 
judgments on the decisions and proceedings of national judicial systems.
37
 They were 
therefore opposed to the ICC being empowered to ‘judge’ national judicial systems. 
38
 Others 
were convinced that such a power was essential, as States would otherwise be able to shield 
perpetrators through sham investigations and trials.
39
 At the beginning of the negotiations, 
China cautioned that ‘the international criminal court should not supplant national courts, 
nor should it become a supranational court or act as an appeal court for national court 
judgments, otherwise it would violate the principle of complementarity.’
40
 As negotiations 
continued, resistance to the inclusion of the concept of willingness started to decline. The 
majority view was that a failure to include unwillingness as a ground for the ICC to assume 
jurisdiction could amount to an invitation to states to block the Court’s jurisdiction by 
initiating investigation or prosecutions merely to protect the perpetrators.
41
 
             The controversy also focused on the subjective versus objective nature of the test to 
be used by the Court.
42
 In attempting to allay the concerns that the ICC would become an 
appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts, the delegations agreed that the criteria 
permitting ICC intervention should be as objective as possible. 
43
 Yet it is clear that the 
Court has to maintain the necessary subjectivity in order to have a degree of ‘latitude’ when 
                                                          
32
 Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, p.48.  
33
 Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference’, in Cassese et 
al, (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, p.69. 
34
 Statement by Mr. Wensheng Qu (1998), para.42; Statement by Mr. Shiqiu Chen (1995), para.69. 
35 
Statement by Mr. Guangya Wang (16 June 1998), para.37.  
36
 Statement by Mr. Shiqiu Chen (1995), para.69. 
37
 Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, p.49. 
38
 Jeffrey L. Bleich, ‘Complementarity’, 25 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (1996-
1997), 281-292, p.284. 
39
 Kirsch and Robinson, ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference’, p.69.  
40
 Statement by Mr. Shiqiu Chen (1995), para.69. 
41
 Williams and Schabas, ‘Article 17’, p.610; Holmes, ‘Principle of Complementarity’, p.48. 
42
 Ibid, Holmes, p.49.  
43





deciding on the unwillingness of states. 
44
 In Rome, delegates continued a debate that had 
taken place in the Preparatory Committee, entering into further discussions so as to clarify 
the concepts of ‘unwillingness’ by way of more detailed and objective parameters.
45
 For 
example, the phrase ‘undue delay’ in the Preparatory Committee’s version was criticised by 
some delegations as being too low a threshold, the Committee of the Whole replaced it in the 
final draft with ‘unjustified delay’, the current text of article 17(2)(b). 
46
 This change has 
merit since the word ‘unjustified’ sets a higher standard than the word ‘undue’, in that it 
implies the right of states to explain any delay before the Court determines that a case is 
admissible.
47
 Otherwise the Court’s finding of ‘undue delay’ could occur without 
considering the views or rationalisations of the state concerned.
48
 The word ‘unjustified’ was 
also thought to increase the objectivity of the assessment. This would assist both the 
Prosecutor and the Court to determine in a more objective manner whether the state was 
acting in bad faith.
49
 
             In addition, the phrase ‘principles of due process recognized by international law’ 
was added to the Chapeau of Paragraph 2 of Article 17 in response to concerns raised by 
some delegations, including China, that the three subparagraphs gave the Court unduly broad 
discretion to determine unwillingness and insufficient objective criteria on which the Court 
should base its ruling.
50
 This language was originally intended to be added to the paragraph 
that dealt with the independence and impartiality of the national proceedings in order to 
ensure greater objectivity.
51
 As the negotiations continued, several delegations favoured the 
idea, yet indicated their concern that this still left other criteria relating to unwillingness less 
objective. Accordingly, it was added to the chapeau that the phrase ‘unwillingness’ would 
serve all the subparagraphs.
52
 This solution, however, was not to the satisfaction of China, 
who had proposed a different approach in order to make the criteria more objective. The 
suggestion made by the Chinese delegation was that in Paragraph 2(a) the words ‘in 
violation of the country’s law’ be added after the words ‘the national decision was made’. In 
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Paragraph 2(b), a reference to ‘national rules of procedure’ should be included, and in 
Paragraph 2(c) a reference to ‘the general applicable standards of national rules of 
procedure’.
53
 However, China’s preference for making reference to national law and 
procedure in determining the unwillingness of a state to carry out an investigation was 
eventually rejected by the Rome conference. Instead, whether the state attempted to ‘shield’ 
the offender, the proceedings were subject to ‘unjustified delay’, or the proceedings were not 
conducted ‘independently or impartially’ would be measured against ‘the principles of due 
process recognized by international law’.
54
 
             After the adoption of the Rome Statute, China reiterated its concerns about how the 
term ‘unwillingness’ as defined by Article 17 would be measured and by which authority. 
According to the Chinese delegate, ‘some provisions of the Statute, however, hardly reflected 
the principle of complementarity; on the contrary the Court seemed to have become an 
appeals court sitting above the national court. As stipulated in article 17, the Court could 
judge ongoing legal proceedings in any State, including a non-party, in order to determine 
whether the trial was fair, and could exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of that decision. In 
other words, the Statute authorized the Court to judge the judicial system and legal 
proceedings of a State and negate the decision of the national court. What was worse, the 
criteria for determining whether a trial was fair or whether a state had the intention to 
shield a criminal were very subjective and ambiguous. For instance, under article 17, 
paragraph 2, the normal legal proceedings of a State might be determined to be unfair or 
intended to shield the criminal. It was highly possible that such a provision would be abused 
for political purposes. In Rome, his delegation had worked hard for the adoption of a more 




Section II An Examination of China’s Concerns: Complementarity in 
Context and in Practice  
 
As discussed above, China’s concern about complementarity is partly attributed to the ICC’s 
automatic jurisdiction. It is true that state consent as a first layer of protection for state 
sovereignty has been removed in the Rome Statute, and accordingly, the legal significance of 
the principle of complementarity at the level of determining the existence of jurisdiction has 
been reduced to some extent compared to what was envisaged in the ILC draft. It should be 
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recalled in this context that complementarity only comes into play at the admissibility stage. 
To allay China’s concerns, it is important to examine to what extent the reduced role of state 
consent in determining the existence of the ICC’s jurisdiction is effectively addressed by the 
way that the principle of complementarity is factored into the Statute as part of the 
admissibility regime in limiting the exercising the ICC’s jurisdiction and protecting state 
sovereignty.  
 
1. Complementarity and State Sovereignty  
 
In the quest for agreement on the Statute, the relationship between the ICC and national 
criminal jurisdiction proved to be a pivotal issue at the heart of states concerns about their 
sovereignty. Under general international law, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction can indeed 
be said to be a central aspect of sovereignty itself.
56
 Some states, including China, while 
supporting the establishment of international criminal tribunals, were reluctant to create a 
body that could impinge on national sovereignty.
57
 This kind of concern can be traced back 
to the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, which raised for the first time the question of the 





1.1 From Primacy to Complementarity  
The ICTY and ICTR were created ad hoc as responses to crises in the two regions concerned 
and represented a dramatic step forward for international institutions. While the Statutes of 
these Tribunals recognise that national courts have concurrent jurisdiction
59
 over crimes 
within the competence of these Tribunals, they endow the international bodies with primacy 
over national courts.
60
 China raised its concern that the adoption of the Statute of the ICTY 
by a Security Council resolution had given the Tribunal both preferential and exclusive 
jurisdiction, and that was not in compliance with the principle of state judicial sovereignty.
61
 
Taking into account the particular circumstances in the former Yugoslavia and the urgency 
of restoring and maintaining world peace, the Chinese delegation voted in favour of the UN 
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SC resolution. However, the Chinese delegation insisted that this political position should 
not be construed as their endorsement of the legal approach involved.
62
 Regarding the 
establishment of the ICTR, China reiterated that ‘the establishment of an international 
tribunal for the prosecution of those who are responsible for crimes that gravely violate 
international humanitarian law was a special measure taken by the international community 
to handle certain special problems. It is a supplement to domestic criminal jurisdiction…’ 
63
 
It emphasised that the targeted state’s (Rwanda Government’s) attitude and position on the 
establishment of such a Tribunal was of vital importance.
 64
 Considering the legal approach 
to establishing the Tribunal and the absence of consent from the Rwanda government, China 
eventually chose to abstain in the vote on the Security Council’s resolution regarding the 
establishment of the ICTR.
65
  
            A broad manifestation of the primacy of the ad hoc tribunals is the obligation of 
states to cooperate with it.
66
 Due to the primacy of the ad hoc tribunals, national courts may, 
at any stage of the procedure, be formally requested to defer to the competence of the 
International Tribunals.
67
 It was in the Tadić case that the ICTY’s primacy jurisdiction 
proved most effective in securing state cooperation with the ICTY.
68
 However, the 
cooperative obligations were challenged in the Blaskić case, 
69
 in which the OTP requested 
the Court to issue to Croatia a binding order to cooperate.
70
 Croatia argued that under 
international law, sovereign states are not bound to cooperate given that the Statute 
referenced only ‘voluntary cooperation’.
71
 On appeal, numerous states, including China, 
submitted briefs amicus curiae on this question.
72
 The Chinese submission noted that the 
ICTY is constrained by its Security Council mandate, which does not expressly empower it 
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to issue legally binding orders to states or to assume jurisdiction over states.
 73
 The Appeals 
Chamber ultimately ruled that it was in fact empowered to issue binding orders upon states.
74
 
           China’s position was not without its merits, as primacy compromises states’ 
sovereign prerogatives by requiring them to defer to an international tribunal, and more 
generally, to cooperate with the international court and to obey its orders. The Tribunals’ 
primacy over national courts was even challenged in practice on the ground of state 
sovereignty.
75
 While the intrusion upon sovereignty of states under the primacy model could 
be accommodated in very specific instances, states were unwilling to yield their jurisdiction 
to an international criminal court permanently.
 76
  
          In 1994, China cautioned that, ‘the proposed court [the ICC] should not replace or 
override systems of national criminal or universal jurisdiction: the relationship must be a 
complementary one. It was only on that basis that the court would receive universal 
acceptance and function effectively.’
77
 In 1996, China maintained that ‘States must bear the 
primary responsibility for the prevention and punishment of international crimes. In the 
majority of cases, the judicial system of a State played a leading role which could not be 
superseded. An international criminal court could function only as an adjunct to national 
courts. In order to prevent or minimize unnecessary jurisdictional conflicts between the 
international criminal court and national courts, the future convention should delineate 
clearly their respective jurisdiction.’
78
 At the Rome Conference, China reiterated that ‘the 
proposed international criminal tribunal should not be a substitute for the state’s criminal 
jurisdiction and should not replace the criminal justice system of a state.’ 
79
 
 Complementarity then became the major legal device to overcome these 
concerns.
80
 Whereas the two Ad Hoc Tribunals have ‘primacy’ over the national jurisdiction, 
the ICC’s Statute’s principle of complementarity provided for the primacy jurisdiction of 
states. 
81
 Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Statute shows that the permanent Court is 
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intended to supplement the domestic punishment of international violations, rather than 
supplant national jurisdictions in repressing the most serious crimes of international 
concern.
82
 Different from primacy, under the complementarity regime, non-states parties are 
not obliged to cooperate with the Court. Complementarity can be seen as the result of a 
delicate balance between state sovereignty and the need for the ICC to step in as an agent of 




            The principle of complementarity has been described as essential for the 
acceptance of the Statute by states,
84
 and is often referred to as the underlying principle,
85
 
and the key concept of the ICC, which permeates the entire structure and functioning of the 
Court.
86
 It is clear that the creation of the ICC was an exercise of sovereignty, and 
complementarity was designed to protect sovereignty.
87
 However, as the legal significance of 
the principle of complementarity at the level of the existence of jurisdiction has been 
removed by the Rome Statute, the role of complementarity as part of the admissibility 
regime in protecting sovereignty is important in allaying China’s concerns.   
 
1.2 The Admissibility Regime  
In assessing the admissibility of a case, three tests are imposed by Article 17: 
complementarity, double jeopardy and gravity.
88
 Even though the principle of 
complementarity does not affect the existence of the jurisdiction of the ICC, as one of the 
formal legal requirements of admissibility, it still regulates whether the jurisdiction may be 
exercised by the Court.
89
  
            A case is inadmissible where one of the factors enumerated in the first paragraph of 
Article 17 is present.
90
 Complementarity as one of the factors thus functions as a barrier to 
the exercise of jurisdiction.
91
 In connection to this, it has been observed that 
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complementarity is designed to serve as a restrictive principle rather than an empowering 
one.
92
 This provision preserves a careful balance between maintaining the integrity of 
domestic adjudication and authorizing the ICC to exercise power where domestic systems 
are inadequate.
93
 While Article 17 is central to the interpretation of complementarity, there 
are other provisions in the Statute regulating the procedural regime and its application, 
94
 
which provide another layer of protection for state sovereignty. At a number of points in an 
investigation or prosecution, the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) are called 
upon to engage in a determination of complementarity.  
             Both Article 15(3) and Article 53(1) instruct the Prosecutor to determine whether 
there is a reasonable basis to ‘proceed with’
95
 or ‘to initiate’ an investigation.
96
 Article 
53(1)(b) provides that, in making that determination, the Prosecutor shall consider whether 
‘the case is or would be admissible under article 17’.
97
 These provisions suggest, in short, 
that complementarity as part of admissibility has to be considered by the Prosecutor at the 
pre-investigative phase regardless of the trigger mechanism.
98
 Even after the initiation of an 
investigation, the Statute further requires the Prosecutor to evaluate national judicial efforts 
and inform the PTC that there are no grounds for prosecution because a case is inadmissible 
due to a genuine national proceeding.
99
  
             The sovereignty-protecting aspect of the procedural framework relating to 
complementarity is strengthened by the possibility for states to pre-empt the ICC from acting, 
either by requesting a deferral under Article 18 or by challenging admissibility in accordance 
with Article 19. Article 18 provides for a system of notification to states of the Prosecutor’s 
intention to initiate an investigation.
100
 The primary function of the notification is thus to 
alert states, to allow states that have jurisdiction to assert their right to investigate or 
prosecute domestically, and, consequently, to make it superfluous for the ICC to act.
101
 In 
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such cases, the Prosecutor must defer the investigation or prosecution to the national 
authorities, unless the PTC allows the Prosecutor to proceed.
102
  Article 19 allows a 
challenge to admissibility of a case by the accused or by a state with jurisdiction ‘on the 
ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted’.
103
 
Besides challenges to admissibility, the Court may, on its own motion, determine the 
admissibility of a case;
104
 the OTP may also seek a ruling from the Court regarding the 
question of admissibility.
105
 It should be noted that Article 19 not only endowed a state but 
also the accused or suspect with standing to raise an issue that relates to state sovereignty.
106
 
While such a right of an individual to invoke the judicial sovereignty of a state is not 
completely unknown to international criminal proceedings,
107
 its express incorporation into 
the Statute of an international criminal court or tribunal is a novelty.
108
 Therefore, 
complementarity can be considered by the PTC both on its own accord
109
 and in response to 
particular challenges to admissibility by states that might have jurisdiction over the case or 
by the accused himself.  
             To sum up, complementarity as a limitation on the powers of the ICC is most 
apparent with respect to the statutory language addressing when and how often the OTP and 
the PTC should make admissibility determinations. Add to the fact that the decisions on 
admissibility can be appealed, and it becomes clear that the Statute provides many 
opportunities for the complementarity issue to be raised.
110
 Such a continuing obligation to 
scrutinise complementarity suggests that the Court has no power to act when a genuine 
national investigation or prosecution is underway or has occurred, even if the admissibility 
requirements might have been initially satisfied. To some extent, China’s concern about the 
proprio motu power of the Prosecutor
111
 should be partly assuaged by the complementarity 
regime, as any state with jurisdiction over a case has the ability to divest the ICC of 
jurisdiction if it chooses to investigate or prosecute the case itself.   
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           However, this might not be sufficient to allay the concerns of China when 
examining the concept of complementarity in purely abstract terms. As the Rome Statute 
leaves interpretative leeway for the ICC in determining the parameters of the concept, the 
practice of the relevant organs of the Court is enormously important in fleshing-out the 
principle.
112
 In addition, even if the norms governing abstract complementarity were 
designed to be very respectful for state sovereignty, through delineation and adjudication of 
mutual competencies, the Court still complements domestic jurisdiction in a ‘negative’ 
sense.
113
 Professor William Schabas has observed that the norms governing complementarity 
were conceived to address the confrontation between domestic and international justice, 
which function in opposition and to some extent with hostility vis-à-vis each other.
114
 
However, the Chinese authorities may find some comfort in the ICC’s practice in relation to 
complementarity.  
 
1.3 Prosecutorial Development of Positive Complementarity 
To temper state’s fears about the ICC, a concept described as ‘positive complementarity’ 
was gradually developed by the OTP, by which a more benign relationship with national 
justice systems is encouraged.
115
 Positive complementarity suggests a far more active role for 
the Court, not merely stepping in where national courts fail to prosecute, but actively 
encouraging prosecutions by national governments of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction.
116
  
             Positive complementarity was first introduced in the 2003 OTP Informal Expert 
Paper on Complementarity as a policy concept.
117
  It underlined that ‘the Prosecutor’s 
objective is not to ‘compete’ with States for jurisdiction, but to help ensure that the most 
serious international crimes do not go unpunished and thereby to put an end to impunity.’
118
 
Along somewhat the same lines, in the Prosecutor’s first strategy document in 2003, the 
view was expressed that ‘a major part of the external relations and outreach strategy of the 
Office of the Prosecutor will be to encourage and facilitate States to carry out their primary 
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responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crimes.’
119
 The establishment of the 
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division (JCCD) as a specialised division 
within the OTP reflects this approach.  One of the functions of JCCD is to ‘contact the 
relevant State or Sates to alert them to the possibility of conducting domestic proceedings, to 
encourage and assist national proceedings where possible, and to verify that national 
proceedings are genuine’.
120
 In 2006, this approach was officially formulated as a policy 
principle in the report of the OTP on Prosecutorial Strategy.
121
 Positive complementarity was 
further consolidated in the Prosecutor’s 2009-2012 Prosecutorial Strategy Paper as one of the 
‘fundamental principles’ of the OTP’s prosecutorial strategy.
122
 States too have discovered 
the virtues of positive complementarity. Delegations viewed the concept as an opportunity to 
take greater ownership of the ICC and its proceedings. These changes in perception 




           The concept of positive complementarity inherent in the Prosecutor’s Strategy 
papers differs considerably from the understanding of the term articulated at the time of the 
drafting of the Rome Statute in 1998. As envisioned in 1998, the complementarity provisions 
highlight the Court’s role as a backdrop to national jurisdictions.
124
 The logic of 
complementarity expressed at Rome was that the Court, where seized of jurisdiction, would 
merely step in where national courts fail to act.
125
 In contrast, the model of complementarity 
expressed by the Prosecutor suggests that the Rome Statute does far more than merely define 
the limits of the Court’s power. The Prosecutor argues that complementarity has two 
dimensions: an admissibility dimension and a second, related dimension, positive 
complementarity.
126
 Complementarity not only serves as an admissibility limitation, but at 
the same time guides prosecutorial discretion.
127
 Though the Rome Statute does not 
expressly reference a policy of positive complementarity, it does provide for a number of 
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specific interactions between the OTP and states that may directly serve the goals of positive 
complementarity.
128
   
                This positive approach to complementarity has been gradually consolidated in 
practice over the last seven years by engaging with a variety of national and international 
networks. For example, in the Darfur situation, the OTP engaged in an ongoing monitoring 
of the Sudanese Governments efforts to provide accountability.
129
  All of the Prosecutor’s bi-
annual reports to the Council have included evidence that the ongoing evaluation of 
complementarity by the OTP may promote judicial initiatives within Sudan.
130
 In the Kenya 
situation, the OTP held consultations with domestic interlocutors, including an agreement on 
timelines for genuine proceedings to be undertaken by the Kenyan authorities or, in the 
alternative, by the ICC.
131
 The office has followed a similar approach in Colombia and 




                More importantly, this positive approach to complementarity has been highly 
supported by China. As early as in 2003, when the positive approach first appeared in the 
Prosecutor’s policy document, China expressed its support by stating: ‘we welcome the 
practical and transparent approach adopted by the Prosecutor in formulating this policy. 
This document is of interest to us, in particular those areas on how to interpret and 
implement the principle of complementarity.’ 
133
 One year later, China further endorsed the 
OTP’s implementation of positive complementarity by stating:  ‘the stated policy of the 
Office of the Prosecutor was to take a positive approach to cooperation and to the principle 
of complementarity and encourages State jurisdiction over international crimes in order to 
enable the Court to devote its energy to the most serious crimes. To implement this policy, 
the Office of the Prosecutor had established a Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division. His delegation hoped that the Prosecutor will maintain that 
pragmatic spirit, so that the principle of complementarity would form a genuine basis for the 
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functioning of the Court…His delegation hoped that the Court would succeed in wining 
broad international trust and support through impartial and effective work.’
134
 
             Re-evaluation of the emerging practice of complementarity was a key aspect of the 
Stocktaking Exercise undertaken by states parties at the Kampala Review Conference in 
2010, 
135
 and the positive approach to complementarity was confirmed by the Kampala 
Declaration.
136
 The Review Conference also adopted a resolution on complementarity 
emphasizing ‘the primary responsibility of States to investigate and prosecute the most 
serious crimes of international concern’, 
137
 and calling on ‘the Court, states parties and 
other stakeholders to further explore ways in which to enhance the capacity of national 
jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute serious crimes of international concern.’ 
138
 
            In addition, the application of complementarity has not only been elaborated 
through the policy paper published by the OTP, the ICC Chambers also have a role in 
making complementarity determinations.  
 
1.4 The ICC Chambers and Complementarity  
While the issue of complementarity has thus to be addressed by the Prosecutor at this early 
stage of deciding whether or not to initiate an investigation irrespective of the trigger 
mechanism, that determination of the Prosecutor is not conclusive. Rather, it is subject to 
review, in varying degrees and depending on the trigger mechanism, by the PTC.
139
 When a 
situation has been referred to the Court by another state or by the Security Council, the 
Prosecutor must inform the PTC of the exercise of his discretion not to proceed with an 
investigation due to admissibility limitations.
140
 Where the Prosecutor seeks to proceed with 
an investigation initiated under his proprio motu powers, the PTC shall take 
complementarity into account in deciding whether to authorise the investigation. 
141
 The 
PTC’s role with respect to complementarity is to prevent the Prosecutor from acting where a 
genuine national investigation or prosecution is underway or has occurred.
142
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             Direct efforts by the OTP to encourage national prosecutions do not, however, 
interfere with the authority of the PTC to make final determinations of admissibility.
143
 As 
noted earlier, admissibility can be considered by the PTC both on its own accord
144
 and in 
response to particular challenges to admissibility by states
145
 that might have jurisdiction 
over the case or by the accused himself.
146
 Thus far the Court has developed an active line of 
jurisprudence in determining whether cases are admissible in both contexts. The emerging 
practice suggests that this discretionary power is exercised at the stage of issuing an arrest 
warrant against a particular individual, with the PTC making an initial determination on 
whether the case against a particular individual is admissible as part of the prerequisites to be 
satisfied to issue a warrant. For example, in the Lubanga Case, even though neither the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) nor the accused challenged admissibility, the PTC 
noted that it had to consider admissibility on its own accord before issuing arrest warrants: 
‘an initial determination on whether the case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo… is 
admissible is a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant of arrest for him.’
147
  
                More significantly, the jurisprudence of the Court has demonstrated that the 
complementarity test is an on-going process and may be revisited several times before the 
commencement of the trial. 
148
 The Kony Case PTC made the continuing nature of the test 
clear by stressing the possibility of ‘multiple determinations’ of and ‘multiple challenges’ to 
admissibility in a given case. 
149
 In a decision of 8 July 2005 on the issuance of an arrest 
warrant, PTC II concluded that the case against Joseph Knoy and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) ‘appears to be admissible’.
150
 However, the following three years brought significant 
developments in the northern Uganda conflict. The government of Uganda and the LRA 
signed a peace agreement, which provided for the establishment of a Special Division of the 
High Court of Uganda in order to try those alleged to have committed serious crimes during 
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the conflict, and also contemplated the use of traditional or other alternative justice 
mechanisms.
151
 In 2008, the PTC decided to initiate proprio motu proceedings to examine 
the impact of these developments on the admissibility of the case,
152
 even though the PTC 
had already assessed admissibility on its own motion upon deciding on the prosecutor’s 
application for a warrant for arrest under Article 58.
153
 The PTC thereby scrupulously 
examined the admissibility of the case on its own accord and ensured that the Court was not 
stepping beyond the limited powers provided in the Statute or encroaching on the rights of 
states.  
 
2. The Criteria of Complementarity 
 
The Rome Statute places on the Court, rather than individual state, the right to determine 




has expressed the 
concern that – as presently written – the ICC could unilaterally determine that it has a 
superior capacity to prosecute crimes already being prosecuted by domestic courts.
155 
In fact, 
reservations about permitting the Court to decide its own jurisdiction may derive less from 
structural notions about the appropriateness of conferring this power on the ICC, than from a 
lack of confidence in the Court generally, or in the adequacy of specific rules to limit the 
ability of the Court to overreach itself. 
156
 China indeed repeatedly expressed its reservations 
about how the term ‘unwillingness’ as defined by Article 17 of the Rome Statute was to be 
measured. It argued that ‘the criteria for determining whether a trial was fair or whether a 
state had the intention to shield a criminal were very subjective and ambiguous, and might 
be subject to political abuse. In order to determine whether the trial was fair, the Statute 
authorized the Court to judge the judicial system and legal proceedings of a State and negate 
the decision of the national court’.
157
 In this connection, China raised its concern that ‘the 
Court seemed to have become an appeals court sitting above the national court’.
 158
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             Without the possibility of assigning the ICC’s competence in determining 
admissibility elsewhere, the better approach to allaying these concerns is to first examine 
whether the complementarity criteria, which set out the circumstances when the Court should 
assume jurisdiction, are objective enough to protect states’ sovereign rights.  
 
2.1 Objective versus Subjective Criteria  
As noted earlier, one of the outcomes of the negotiation process was to give the criteria for 
determining ‘unwillingness’ greater objectivity. However, this does not mean that the 
Prosecutor or the Court would not be granted any subjective latitude. The remaining question 
is whether these subjectivities would become loopholes subject to political abuse.  
            Under Article 17(2), all three criteria for determining unwillingness require the 
Court to be satisfied as to the intent of the state in the circumstances. The state must be 
shielding the person from criminal responsibility 
159
 or the proceedings must be inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person to justice.
160
 The first criterion obviously embodies an 
element of subjectivity. As one commentator puts it, this condition requires the Prosecutor to 
prove ‘a devious intent on the part of the State, contrary to its apparent actions’.
161
 By 
contrast, the second and third criteria incline more towards objective than subjective 
assessment. The reference to the key issues ‘unjustified delay’ and not carrying out the 
domestic proceedings ‘independently or impartially’ draws some sort of objective 
boundaries to the assessment–making the test less subjective.
162
   
          Though Article 17(2) as a whole is still associated with some subjectivity, there is a 
high threshold to be met, especially in proving a states’ hidden intent to bring the alleged 
perpetrators to justice.
163
 Article 17(2)(a) requires proof of a purpose of shielding, which is a 
considerable threshold and raises the question of how such intent is to be proved before the 
Court. To establish a purpose of shielding, it is not sufficient to find that a state only initiated 
proceedings in order to prevent the Court from acting, since this is clearly permissible under 
and envisaged by the complementarity regime.
164
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             The Statute also provides that ‘the principles of due process recognized by 
international law’ is the paramount standard against which the ICC has to carry out its 
discretionary judgment concerning the ‘unwillingness’ of a state. Thus, whether the state 
attempted to ‘shield’ the offender, the proceedings were ‘unjustifiably delayed’, or the 
proceedings were not conducted ‘independently or impartially’ should be measured against 
‘the principles of due process recognized by international law’. Even though China opposed 
using international standards to determine the quality of domestic proceedings, its efforts of 
making reference to national standards failed in Rome. A possible weakness lies in the fact 
that neither the Statute nor its drafting history identifies the ‘principles of due process 
recognized by international law.’
165
 Over the years, China’s doubts about the ‘the principles 
of due process recognized by international law’ have not disappeared. This can be seen from 
its October 2012 statement at the Security Council: ‘we believe that the ICC should respect 
the judicial traditions and requirements of the various realities existing in different countries 
and regions, including their choice of the timing and modality of seeking to enforce 
justice.’
166
 The uncertainties surrounding the concept of ‘the principles of due process 
recognized by international law’ have somehow added to China’s concern that the ICC 
would become an appeal Court.  
 
 2.2 Is the ICC an Appeal Court?  
Some delegations, including China, were sensitive to the potential for the Court to function 
as a kind of court of appeal, passing judgments on the decisions and proceedings of national 
judicial systems.
167
 In particular, China raised its concern with regard to the determination of 
‘unwillingness’. The view was expressed that authorizing the Court to judge the judicial 
system and ongoing legal proceedings of a state and negate the decision of the national court 
may in effect render the ICC an appeal Court.
168
 To answer whether the ICC has become an 
appeal court, it is important to first examine whether the criteria of ‘unwillingness’ would only 
permit the ICC to intervene when national proceedings are conducted for the purpose of shielding 
perpetrators of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC or if it would allow the Court to examine 
all issues in relation to ‘due process’. In the latter situation, the ICC’s role with respect to 
national criminal jurisdictions would be more analogous to that of a ‘super’ international 
appellate court, vested with de novo review authority, passing judgments on the decisions 
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and proceedings of national judicial systems. 
169
 If this is in fact the case, the relationship of 
the ICC with respect to national criminal jurisdiction is substantially more than to serve as a 
complementary court that fills the gap when a state is unwilling to prosecute perpetrators of 
serious international crimes, and perhaps the concerns voiced by China are warranted.  
             With regards to China’s argument that ‘the Statute authorized the Court to judge 
the judicial system and legal proceedings of a State’, the Prosecutor has pointed out that an 
admissibility determination is not a judgment on a national justice system as a whole, but 
rather, an examination of relevant national proceedings in relation to the person and the 
conduct which forms the subject of a case hypothesis.
170
 It is however true that the 
admissibility tests entail an assessment of the existence of the relevant national proceedings 
and their genuineness.
171
 Under Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute, if demonstrated by 
evidence that the proceedings were a sham or involved an unjustified delay suggesting a lack 
of intent to bring the perpetrators to justice, the ICC should find the case admissible and 
exercise its jurisdiction. In determining whether states are conducting genuine proceedings, 
the question remains as to whether the ‘due process standards recognized by international 
law’ is applicable to all questions of due process. For example, is fairness or compliance 
with international human rights law relevant to an analysis of whether an accused should be 
tried in national court?  
            Scholars’ views are divided on this issue. On one hand, some have argued that the 
phrase ‘the principles of due process recognized by international law’ requires that the 
assessment of the quality of justice, as reflected in Subparagraphs (a)-(c), takes into 
consideration ‘procedural’ as well as ‘substantive’ due process rights enshrined in human 
rights instruments and developed in the jurisprudence of international human rights treaty 
bodies.
172
 It was pointed out that the ICC is a model of due process, guaranteeing defendants 
all of the procedural protections required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).
173
 Therefore a state’s failure to guarantee a defendant due process rights, 
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most notably fair trial rights as recognised in international human rights law, makes a case 
admissible under Article 17 of the ICC’s Statute.
174
 
            On the other hand, the view was expressed that the ICC will not equally be entitled 
to step in when such violations of the due process occur to the detriment, rather than to the 
benefit, of the person subjected to the proceedings.
175
 It was pointed out that the delay or 
lack of independence is relevant only in so far as either of them indicates an intention to 
shield the person concerned from justice.
176
 The ICC was established to address situations 
where a miscarriage of justice and a breach of human rights standards work in favor of the 
accused and he or she benefits from this irregularity by evading a just determination of his or 
her responsibility.
177
 The purpose of the complementarity principle (and the main purpose of 
the Rome Statute) is to prevent impunity and not to secure the suspect’s fair trial.
178
 Article 
17(2) will encourage national authorities to comply with principles of due process 
recognized by international law, but it does not require the national law to conform to these 
standards as such. Rather, it makes a case admissible where particular national proceedings 
fall short of such standards and show a ‘purpose of shielding’ or ‘inconsistency’ intent.
179
  
             The latter view seems more persuasive, as it can find support in the text of Article 
17(2) and its drafting history. The general rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the 
VCLT
 
 does not allow establishing an abstract ordinary meaning of a phrase, divorced from 
the place which that phrase occupies in the text to be interpreted.
180
 Accordingly, the 
Chapeau and the three subparagraphs under Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute should be 
interpreted conjunctively: the Court can only find a state unwilling if the national proceeding 
both violates international due process and satisfies one of the three conditions specified in 
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article 17(2). In addition, Article 32 of the VCLT provides that: ‘recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty’, which 
is commonly referred to as ‘travaux préparatoires’.
181
 According to the drafting history of 
Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute, the ‘principles of due process’ clause was specifically 
added to ensure that the Court would use objective criteria to determine whether one of the 
three subparagraphs applied.
182
 Therefore, the Chapeau referring to principles of due process 
cannot be read independently from the additional conditions enumerated in Subparagraphs (a) 
to (c), which also include the requirement of shielding the person concerned from justice. 
However, violations of norms protecting the rights of the accused do not emanate from the 
intent to shield, but rather to convict the accused. 
             This interpretation may send the confusing message about how national judicial 
system should do justice: while it is unacceptable for a state to use legal proceedings that are 
designed to make the (alleged) perpetrators of serious international crimes more difficult to 
convict, it is perfectly acceptable for a state to use legal proceedings that are designed to 
make those (alleged) perpetrators easier to convict. However, this anxiety should be relieved 
by the fact that international law provides other, more suitable remedies to address breaches 
of human rights of the accused in the context of other instruments and institutions. The key 
question is whether it is for the ICC in its course of a determination of complementarity to 
secure fairness at national proceedings or is it for other international human rights bodies 
such as the ICCPR Committee to do so?  
             The recent practice of the Prosecutor seems to have provided an answer. The 
former ICC Prosecutor Ocampo suggested at a press conference that the assessment of 
national proceedings was whether they were genuine not fair. As he put it: ‘we are not a 
human rights court. We are not checking the fairness of the proceedings. We check the 
genuineness of the proceedings. So maybe other organs, maybe the High Commission for 
Human Rights could be involved in helping Libyan authorities, but it is not the role of the 
ICC to monitor in this sense the fairness of the trial’.
183
 This indicates that the ICC cannot be 
a forum to redress human rights breaches of an accused.  
              It is true that the admissibility scheme under the Rome Statute is analogous to the 
approach taken by international human rights bodies, which gives national systems priority 
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in terms of resolving their own human rights problems, and only when they fail to do so may 
the international bodies proceed.
184
 The similarity between the ICC and the human rights 
bodies is that both types of international bodies will not proceed with a case unless domestic 
adjudication or remedies are unavailable. However, the substantive criteria for determining 
whether the international body in question should step in are different. With regards to 
human rights treaty bodies, domestic jurisdictions enjoy primacy to deal with their own 
alleged human rights violations, and only when ‘available’ and ‘effective’ domestic remedies 
have been exhausted,
 
the international body can proceed.
 185
 Under the Rome Statute, the 
ICC will only take over if the national judicial system is ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to take legal 
action.
186
 In essence, the different criteria are due to their different mandates.
187
 To assert 
that the ICC will examine the compliance of a national judicial process with international 
human rights standards in the course of the Court’s determination of complementarity and 
thus will act as an appeal court in a certain form is clearly a confusion about the two kinds of 
international bodies’ different mandates.
188
 The ICC, however, is not an institution entrusted 
with the protection of human rights of the accused in the national enforcement of 
international criminal justice. The failure of states to comply with the international standards 
for the protection of the human rights of the accused in national jurisdictions therefore 
should not result in the ICC legitimately stepping in.
  
The admissibility regime only 
addresses the particular aspects of the proceedings which are referred to in Article 17, 
whereas international law provides alternative remedies to address breaches of human rights 
of the accused in the context of traditional international human rights bodies, such as the 
Human Rights Committee.
189
 Even the OTP observed that ‘the ICC is not a human rights 
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             Admittedly, however, the Rome Statute still endows both the Prosecutor and the 
ICC Chambers with a limited degree of discretion in deciding complementarity, the 
decisions of the PTC in its first cases may provide some insights into how the ICC Chambers 
understand complementarity.  
 
2.3 The ICC’s Practice in Relation to Unwillingness  
There was no challenge to the admissibility of a case either by a state or an individual in the 
first six years of the Court’s operations. In 2009, Katanga in the situation of the DRC, 
lodged the first admissibility challenge, as an individual under Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute.
191
 Katanga argued that the case was still inadmissible because the DRC actually had 
been investigating him for the attack which was the basis of the ICC case.
192
 Trial Chamber 
II examined the intent of the DRC to bring Katanga to justice, and considered that the 
statements of the DRC authorities and the evidence before it demonstrated that the DRC was 
unwilling to prosecute Katanga.
193
 The unwillingness did not reflect a desire to shield 
Katanga from justice, as contemplated by Article 17(2), rather it was a ‘second’ form of 
‘unwillingness’ which reflected a desire to see Katanga brought to justice, albeit not before 
the national courts. 
194
 Trial Chamber II thus dismissed Katanga’s challenge and found that 
the case was admissible.
195
 The interpretation of ‘unwillingness’ by the Trial Chamber has 
been criticised for expanding the definition beyond the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
196
  In 
this connection, Katanga lodged an appeal against Trial-Chamber II’s decision, arguing that 
the Chamber had erred in its interpretation of ‘unwillingness’.
197
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             The Appeal Chamber dismissed Katanga’s appeal and affirmed the admissibility of 
the case. 
198
 In doing so, the Appeals Chamber did not endorse the way in which Trial 
Chamber II interpreted the meaning of ‘unwillingness’. Rather, it shifted the focus of 
admissibility assessments squarely back to whether the state was taking any action.
199
 The 
Appeals Chamber clarified that the admissibility assessment was based on two-tier test, 
requiring an examination of action or inaction prior to the assessment of unwillingness and 
inability.
200
 The first challenge by Katanga was followed just one year later, when Jean-
Pierre Bemba also filed a challenge to the admissibility of the case against him.
201
 In 
dismissing the challenge, Trial Chamber III did not endorse the interpretation of 
‘unwillingness’ in the Katanga Case by the Trial Chamber, but followed and applied the 
two-step test set out by the Appeal Chamber in that case. Trial Chamber III held that because 
the first limb of Article 17(1)(b) was not met, it was not required to examine unwillingness 
and inability.
202
 This approach confirmed the consistent practice of the PTCs.
203
 The first 
question that each has looked at is whether the relevant national jurisdiction has taken any 
action in respect of the case. As PTC I set out, a case would be admissible before the ICC ‘if 
those States with jurisdiction over it have remained inactive in relation to that case’.
204
 
Accordingly, ‘in the absence of any acting State, the Chamber need not make any analysis of 
unwillingness or inability’.
205
 This is fully aligned with the approach taken by PTC II in its 
review of admissibility in the Kony Case, which found that the case was admissible on the 
basis that the situation ‘remains… one of total inaction on the part of the relevant national 
authorities.’
206
 In the Kenya Situation, the PTC II again adopted the very same approach.
207
 
The Chamber concluded that it was not necessary to proceed to the second step in the 
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             Therefore, based on the jurisprudence of the ICC’s two-prong test, unwillingness 
and inability are not positive allocation rules, but negative principles which come into play in 
specific circumstances, namely, once domestic proceedings are ongoing. 
209
 The issue which 
had caused most controversy in Rome (‘unwillingness’) has had hardly any noticeable 
impact in the jurisprudence to date. Instead, attention has been paid to the structure of Article 
17. This trend of the jurisprudence sits comfortably with the central concern of China, which 
was anxiety about the ICC acting as an appeal court to review its on-going legal proceeding. 
The Court’s jurisprudence shows that the Court was designed to intervene when no national 
proceedings are in action. The ICC only reviews the intent of states as an alternative.  
            The Libya situation presents a very timely opportunity to test whether the ICC will 
scrutinise in its course of a determination of complementarity a state’s compliance with 
international human rights law, and intervene where a state’s action leads to breaches of 
human rights of the accused. On 1 May 2012, the government of Libya filed a submission 
under Article 19(2)(b), to challenge the admissibility before the ICC of the case concerning 
Saif Gaddafi and the case concerning Al-Senussi. 
210
 In accordance with the principle of 
complementarity set forth in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, Libya submitted that this case is 
inadmissible on the grounds that its national judicial system is actively investigating both 
individuals for their alleged crimes.
211
 It also argued that ‘it is not the function of the ICC to 
hold Libya’s national legal system against an exacting and elaborate standard beyond that 
basically required for a fair trial.’
212
 In December 2012, the PTC made a decision requesting 
further submissions from the Libya government on issues related to the admissibility of the 
case. 
213
 In accordance with this decision, Libya made a submission in January 2013.
214
 
However, so far the PTC has not yet made a final decision regarding the Libyan 
government’s challenge to the admissibility of the case. 
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             In response to the fair trial concern raised by the Office of Public Counsel for the 
Defence (OPCD),
 215
 Libya argued that ‘it is critical to remember that the ICC is not called 
upon to act as a human rights court. In any event, any minimal threshold criteria required by 
Article 17 cannot be interpreted such that Libya is held to higher standards than those 
achieved at the international criminal tribunals or those which were envisaged by the 
drafters of the ICC Statute for States contesting admissibility to meet.’
216
 As this is still an 
on-going process, the Court’s decision will be crucial to examining whether China’s anxiety 
about the ICC becoming a human rights court is realistic or illusive.  
            To conclude, it is true that due to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the 
principle of complementarity has no effect in determining the existence of the jurisdiction, 
but it still plays a decisive role at the level of the exercise of jurisdiction. As illustrated above, 
to the extent that state consent as a first layer of sovereignty protection has been removed, 
the principle of complementarity, which is given operational expression by the provision of 
admissibility, can still act as a second layer of protection for sovereignty. However, different 
from the absolute protection provided by a separate state consent requirement, 
complementarity is an implicit restriction of state sovereignty to some extent. This is because 
it takes away the possibility for states to remain inactive. If states insist upon preserving the 
totality of their sovereign prerogatives, no effective international criminal jurisdiction can be 
created. Any international criminal jurisdiction capable of vindicating the interests of the 
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                                        Chapter V  
        Interactions between the Security Council and the ICC   
                                                                            
Section I. Introduction  
 
The concerns of China in relation to the principle of complementarity, state consent and the 
role of the Security Council, in one way or another, all revolved around limiting the ICC’s 
jurisdiction from the perspective of the Court’s external relationships. Complementarity 
deals with the relationship between the ICC and national judicial systems; state consent 
concerns the relationship between ICC and states, and the role of the Security Council 
involves the relationship between the ICC and Security Council. None of these relationships 
are isolated from others. In the dynamic interactions of all these relationships, the Council-
ICC relationship is pivotal in shaping the whole picture. 
 
1. Tense and Cooperative Relationship between the Security 
Council and the Proposed International Criminal Court  
 
The relationship between the Security Council and the proposed international criminal court 
was a central and controversial part of the negotiations leading up to and at the Rome 
Conference.
1
 As observed by Sir Franklin Berman, ‘the most important of them [the Court’s 
relationships] will prove to be the developing relationship with the Security Council.’ 
2
 The 
difficulties in the negotiations came from two sources: one legal and one political, 
3
 which 
were intertwined with each other.  
            From a legal point of view, the tension stems from the different mandates the 
Security Council and the proposed ICC have whilst operating in the same area. 
4
 In the case 
of a permanent international criminal court that mandate is relatively clear, the achievement 
of justice by means of an international criminal process in relation to the crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction.  In the case of the Security Council, however, its overriding objective 
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under the UN Charter is the maintenance or restoration of peace and security,
5
 which may or 
may not include in a particular case the achievement of justice.
6
 However, there is an 
intimate link between breakdowns in international peace and security and the commission of 
international crimes.
7
 Situations dealt with by the ICC will always involve atrocities that 
amount to the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’, 
which will frequently challenge international peace and security in a manner that triggers the 
responsibility of the Council to serve as the primary guardian of the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
8
  Even though tension exists where the achievement by the 
Council of its peace and security mandate may require a different approach from that being 
pursued by the ICC as part of its justice mandate, this does not rule out the possibility that 
the achievement of these mandates will be complementary. Ideally, the ICC prosecuting an 
indicted war criminal may assist the Council to restore or maintain peace in a particular 
country or region, and in turn, the use by the Council of its Chapter VII powers can 
considerably assist the ICC in its work.  In other words, the ICC and the Security Council are 
separate operators with different but partially overlapping mandates in the same area.
9
 
Politically, the clash between the two institutions could be explicitly exhibited from the 
inherent antagonism between the common will in the proposed ICC and the centralisation of 
the powers in the Security Council, particularly with respect to the use of the veto exclusive 
to the P-5. It was clear from the start that the ICC-Security Council relationship was one of 





2. Relationship Built on Three Pillars  
 
In both Rome and Kampala, compromises were made on the privileges of the P-5 in order to 
strike a legal balance in the tense relationship between the Security Council and the 
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permanent international criminal court. The nature of this relationship has now been defined 
in the Rome Statute and its Amendments, which are built around three pillars; 
11
 namely, the 
triggering of prosecutions, the deferral of cases and the determination of aggression. The 
tension between the privileges of the P-5 and the common will of the majority of states 
penetrated the whole negotiation process in these spheres.  
          The positive pillar of the role of the Security Council in the exercise of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is constituted by its power to refer to the Prosecutor situations in which 
international crimes appear to have been committed.
12
 China considered ‘it was essential that 
the Security Council be empowered to refer cases to the Court, since otherwise it might have 
to establish a succession of ad hoc tribunals in order to discharge its mandate under the 
Charter.’
13
 The main purpose of Article 13(b) is to make the ICC available to the Council to 
investigate situations posing a threat to international peace and security. The antagonism 
underlying this provision is between the dangers posed by this specific ‘trigger’ to other 
states and the privileges of the P-5 to veto referrals impinging on their own interests.
14
 Thus 
Article 13(b) was deemed by some delegations as an inequitable provision,
15
 which might 
result in selective justice in practice.
16
 
           The second contentious issue relating to the role of the Security Council in the ICC 
undertakings is the Council’s power of deferral, which permits the Council to intervene in 
the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction in a ‘negative’ way.  By virtue of Article 16, the 
Security Council is entitled to defer investigations or prosecutions before the Court for a 
limited (though renewable) period of twelve months.
17
 The antagonism, again, exists in the 
issue of inequality for the P-5’s privileges. The initial 1994 ILC Draft Statute had defined the 
relationship between the proposed ICC and the Security Council very differently. 
18
 Under 
the ILC text, Article 23(3) prohibited the commencement of a prosecution if it arose from a 
‘situation’ which was being dealt with by the Council ‘as a threat to or breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression’ under Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Council permitted 
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otherwise.  This would have meant that any P-5 state could unilaterally use its veto power to 
avoid the Court’s scrutiny if a situation on the agenda of the Council developed in their 
country or involved their nationals,
 
a ‘privilege’ of putting their nations above the law that 
was not enjoyed by the other states. 
19
 The search for a compromise formulation then became 
known as the ‘Singapore Proposal’,
20
 pursuant to which, the ‘negative veto’ given to the 
Council by the ILC text would be replaced by a ‘positive’ arrangement where the Court 
could exercise its jurisdiction unless it was directed not to do so by the Council.
21
 The 
importance of the Singapore proposal, as incorporated in Article 16, is that it transfers the P-
5 privileges to a broader common will in stopping the Court from acting.  
            Finally there was the most controversial issue of the role of the Security Council 
with respect to the crime of aggression. As no consensus could be reached on two 
outstanding issues in Rome, there emerged a placeholder solution as to the crime of 
aggression under which the Court would exercise jurisdiction over it only once state parties 
could agree upon a definition and a jurisdictional trigger for this particular crime.
22
 The 
ongoing negotiations on aggression until the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010 reveal 
that the strongest antagonism between the P-5 and other states rested with the privileges of 
the P-5 in ‘filtering’ the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The Kampala 
resolution on the crime of aggression reflected the strongly felt preference of the 
overwhelming majority of states parties, granting the ICC prosecutor the ability to proceed 
with an investigation of an alleged crime of aggression without a prior Security Council 
determination.
23
   
            Even though the Rome Statute envisages a close and cooperative relationship 
between the ICC and the Security Council, as well as framing the tensions into three pillars 
by striking a compromise between the two camps, it was realistic to expect that the tension 
inherent in these two bodies would continue after the ICC has been established. This is 
especially so when some of the P-5 states, including, China and the US, are sceptical about 
the fledgling ICC.  
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3. Concerns of China regarding the Relationship between 
the Security Council and ICC  
 
In general, in this context, China took the view that the ICC should be ‘independent and fair’, 
and ‘not be subject to political or other influence’. At the same time the Court ‘should not 
compromise the principal role of the Security Council in safeguarding world peace and 
security’.
24
 As shown in the earlier discussions of the establishment of the ICC, the major 
concern of China towards the Council-ICC relationship centres on the power allocation 
between the Security Council and the ICC. After the adoption of the Rome Statue, two 
scenarios emerged offering opportunities for China to reshape the relationship between the 
Security Council and the ICC.  
              The first scenario has surfaced from the Security Council practice with respect to 
the ICC, which casts a light on limiting the Court’s jurisdiction and negating the concerns of 
China in a practical way. The opportunities in the second scenario derived from the Kampala 
Review Conference, which was conducted on a twin-track basis, namely, stocktaking of the 
Court’s performance and amendments to the Rome Statute.
25
 The three issues on the 
amendment agenda,
26
 in particular, the crime of aggression, directly touched on China’s pre-
existing concerns about the Rome Statute. This Chapter seeks to explore all the possibilities 
that exist under both scenarios in which the concerns of China regarding the Rome Statute 
could be negated. 
 
Section II. Referral Power and Deferral Power of the Security Council 
vis-à-vis the Concerns of China   
 
As observed by Professor Robert Cryer, ‘action by the Security Council since Rome has 
attempted to alter this compromise [the Rome Statute] with respect to both pillars [referral 
and deferral], granting itself greater authority than the Rome Statute envisaged over its 
proceedings.’ 
27
 Needless to say, the practice of the Council has proved highly controversial. 
However, the purported usage of its powers of referral and deferral has cast some light on 
negating China’s concerns about the ICC.  
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1. From ‘Pre-emptive’ Deferral to ‘Selective’ Referral to 
‘Post’ Deferral  
 
1.1 ‘Pre-emptive’ Deferral and the Concerns of China  
By the very meaning of Article 16, deferral is supposed to apply to an existing situation, 
which might give rise to investigations or prosecutions by the ICC. As there were a series of 
preventative deferral resolutions passed before identifying any situation, it is thus submitted 
that it is more appropriate to characterise them as ‘pre-emptive’ deferrals as opposed to 
‘post’ deferrals, which exclusively applies to cases in the context of a particular situation.  
             When, in July 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted, hardly anyone would have 
expected that Article 16 would be applied long before the Court became operational.
28
 
Nevertheless, on 12 July 2002, that is, at a time when the Rome Statute had been in force for 
less than two weeks, the Council adopted Resolution 1422, by which it took action pursuant 
to Article 16. This was mainly due to the fact that US was unable to exert its influence on the 
Draft Statute to the effect of resolving its concern about the ICC’s jurisdiction over the 
nationals of non-states parties during the Rome Conference and the subsequent Preparatory 
Commission.
29
 The US consequently shifted the focus of its efforts to the Security Council, 
where its position as a permanent member gave it a veto over any action by that body, and 
thus enhanced negotiating strength.
30  
           Resolution 1422 basically yielded to the demand of the US, which threatened that 
the renewal of the mandates of peacekeeping missions would be vetoed unless its ‘concerns 
about the implications of the Rome Statute for nations that are not parties to it’ were 
addressed.
31
 Whereas many states in their capacities as signatories or parties to the Rome 
Statute criticised the US proposal,
32
 China, a state not party to the Rome Statute, lent its 
support to the US by stating that ‘the concerns and requests of countries sending 
peacekeepers regarding jurisdiction over crimes committed by such peacekeepers should be 
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 This did not come as a surprise considering the shared concern of China 
and US towards the ICC’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis non-state parties.
34
 However, it is curious to 
note that despite the extensive debates and various objections from so many UN member 
states, Resolution 1422 was passed unanimously. It gets down to business in Operative 
Paragraph 1, which deserves quotation in full. In that paragraph, the Council: ‘requests, 
consistent with the Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving 
current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a party to the Rome 
Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized 
operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting from 1 July 2002 not commenced or 




           Resolution 1422 precludes the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC over 
peacekeepers from non-states parties for a renewable period of 12 months with the only 
exception being authorisation by the Security Council. Although its adoption was a result of 
the requirement for the renewal of UNMIBH’s mandate, Resolution 1422 is not limited to 
that situation. China properly pointed out that ‘the item under discussion is far beyond the 
renewal of the mandate in UNMIBH per se’, but a major question about the exclusive 
jurisdiction of countries contributing peacekeepers over crimes committed by their personnel 
since the entry into force of the Rome Statute.
36
 It should be noted that China was the only 
state at that stage making reference to the term of ‘exclusive jurisdiction’, which became part 




            Article 16 proved to have, de facto, the opposite effect to that which its drafters 
originally intended – namely, reducing the Security Council’s exclusive power under Article 
23 of the ILC Draft.
38
 However, Operative Paragraph 6 of Resolutions 1422 and 1487 
actually brought back the deferral power allocated to the Security Council under the ILC 
Draft.
39
 According to Article 23(3) of the ILC text, the ICC would not have been able to 
                                                          
33
 Ibid, Statement by Mr. Yingfan Wang (China), p.17.  
34
 See Chapter III, Section I.  
35
 SC Res.1422(2002), Operative Para.1.  
36
 Statement by Mr. Yingfan Wang (2002). 
37
 SC Res.1497 (2003), Operative Para.7; SC Res.1593 (2005), Operative Para.6; SC Res.1970 (2011), 
Operative Para.6.  
38   
Mohamed M. El Zeidy, ‘The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422,’ 35 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (2002), 1503-1544, p.1517.  
39





proceed without a prior UNSC authorisation in certain situations being dealt with by the 
Council. Needless to say this was to the liking of the P-5, including China, but heavily 
criticised by other countries.
40
 The compromise reflected in the final version of Article 16 
effectively diminished the authority of the UNSC by requiring it to act to prevent a 
prosecution rather than to act to authorise one. 
41
 However, by pushing through Resolution 
1422, the US indirectly attained the intended goal – namely, the same authorisation power 
provided in the former ILC draft albeit it did so through Article 16.
42
 In this way, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties, to a significant extent, was kept under the 
control of the Security Council, either by trigger or by authorisation. To safeguard this pre-
emptive deferral, Resolution 1422, in particular, emphasises that ‘member states shall take 
no action inconsistent with paragraph 1’.
43
  
           One year later, the Council adopted Resolution 1487 which repeated the request to 
the Court for another 12-month period with the same expression of intention to continue the 
request.
44
 This time, several states abstained. China, however, supported it virtually in the 
same pattern as it had done for Resolution 1422.
45
 Even though, at that stage, the US and 
China did not achieve their long-lasting goal of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis 
nationals from non-states parties by state consent, the alternative choice of turning to the 
Security Council for authorisation might in fact achieve the same effect of assuaging their 
concern in this regard. 
           After Resolution 1487, the next action by the Security Council was Resolution 
1497,
46
 which was passed in response to the conflict in Liberia. Unlike Resolution 1422 and 
Resolution 1487, this new resolution followed a different modality; one which conferred on 
states that are not party to the Rome Statute the exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed 
by their troops serving under a multinational force or UN stabilisation force in Liberia, 
except where such jurisdiction has been explicitly waived.
47
 It is interesting to note that this 
scenario, which was partly addressed by the Chinese delegation during the discussions of 
Resolution 1422, appeared itself in the new resolution and turned out to be the pattern 
followed by the subsequent referral resolutions. There was no doubt that this resolution 
would win a favourable vote from China, as it conferred exclusive jurisdiction on non-states 
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parties with regard to the crimes committed by their nationals. Though it has been argued 
that without a time limit, this resolution is tantamount to the termination of the jurisdiction of 
the ICC,
48
 this view obviously ignored the weight which has been given to state consent in 
determining the Court’s jurisdiction.  
 
1.2 Selective Referral and the Concerns of China  
The creation of the ad hoc tribunals had been criticised by some on the basis that they were 
examples of selective justice.
49
 However, the jurisdictional regime of the ICC, alongside its 
relationship with the Security Council, may mean that it may not fully escape claims of 
selectivity on the basis of its jurisdiction.
50
 The referral power of the Security Council under 
Article 13(b), among others, can be subject to such criticism.
51
 Although the idea underlying 
Article 13(b) was to render the creation of further ad hoc tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR 
unnecessary,
52
 the ICC’s jurisdiction, to some extent, is still subject to a decision of the 
Security Council, and thus in effect to the P-5. Taking advantage of Article 13(b), the 
Security Council’s referrals in practice of the situations in both Sudan and Libya were 
selective in various dimensions. These different forms of selectivity, however, in one way or 
another, cast light on how the concerns of China about the ICC may be negated.  
 
1.2.1 Selective Referral and China’s Concerns regarding the Relationship 
between the Court and Non-States Parties  
By virtue of Article 13(b), the Security Council can considerably enlarge the jurisdictional 
reach of the ICC by using its power of referral in relation to situations involving non-states 
parties.
53
 As noted in Chapter III, the issue of the jurisdiction of the ICC over nationals of 
non-states parties without state consent has been officially one of the main reasons for the 
Chinese government’s opposition to the Court.
54
 During the negotiation process of 
establishing the ICC, China expressed its concern about the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over nationals from non-consenting non-states parties, which it deemed to violate the 
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principle of state sovereignty and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
55
 It even 
disputed the propriety of acting in the absence of state consent where the Security Council 
triggered the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.
56
 China took the same position in practice 
as demonstrated from its statement that it was ‘not in favour of referring the question of 
Darfur to the ICC without the consent of the Sudanese Government’, and it could not ‘accept 
any exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction against the will of non-state parties’.
57
 This can be 
traced back to China’s objection to the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, which disregarded 
state consent of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
58
 In terms of the ICC’s jurisdiction vis-
à-vis nationals from non-states parties, China seemingly has not budged from its initial 
position on respect for state consent. However, China did not choose to thwart the passing of 





. This curious paradox can be explained in light of the selective nature of the referral 
resolutions and the dynamics between the Security Council and the ICC.    
 
1.2.1.1 Selectivity in Overriding State Consent  
Whereas the opposition of Sudan and Libya was not respected in the relevant referrals, both 
resolutions did give weight to the need for state consent in limiting the Court’s jurisdiction 
over certain nationals from other non-states parties. This selectivity in overriding state 
consent is based on Operative Paragraph 6 of both Resolutions, 
61
which grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to contributing states not party to the Rome Statute in relation to their ‘nationals, 
current or former officials or personnel’ unless they were Sudanese or Libyans or the 
exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the contributing states. This is one of the 
controversial aspects of the referral resolutions. Many scholars have addressed the issue of 
‘exclusive jurisdiction’,
62
 but ignored the role of state consent vis-à-vis the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Obviously, Operative Paragraph 6 keeps the possibilities open for non-states 
parties to opt-in to the Court’s jurisdiction if they consent to do so.  
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              The inclusion of Paragraph 6 is believed to have been at the behest of the US, as it 
can be logically linked to the pre-emptive deferral resolutions, which prevented the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction over US peacekeepers.
63
 However, the respect for state consent 
demonstrated by these resolutions resonates with China’s traditional propositions, which is 
possibly the reason why China voted in favour of all the resolutions shielding US 
peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the ICC.
64
 
            This selectivity in state consent made referrals pertaining to non-states parties more 
similar to the mechanisms of the ICTY and ICTR, which obviate the need for state consent. 
This in turn would be acceptable to China on an exceptional basis. As noted previously, 
China voted in favour of the establishment of the ICTY, but insisted that it should ‘not 
constitute any precedent’.
65
 In 1994, just a few days before the Security Council’s debate on 
the creation of the Rwanda tribunal,
66
 the ILC’s proposal for a permanent court was 
discussed at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
67
 China stated that ‘with respect 
to the creation of a tribunal to try persons who had committed crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia, some States had expressed some reservations as to whether the Security Council 
was authorized to set up a compulsory jurisdiction. It was therefore dubious whether it was 
wise to base the statute on such a controversial assumption. It was also dubious whether that 
provision was compatible with the character and basis of the court. The statute should 
provide for the possibility that the Security Council might make use of the court in specific 
circumstances, but it should do so only in ways that were compatible with the character of 
the court and the principle of voluntary State acceptance of its competence and that would 
not compromise its independence as an international judicial body. It would probably be 
helpful to provide, in cases where the Security Council decide to make use of the court, for 
prior acceptance by the States concerned of its jurisdiction.’ 
68
 China then abstained on the 
Security Council resolution establishing the ICTR partly because of the absence of the 
Rwanda government’s consent. 
69
 It should be noted that these ad hoc international judicial 
interventions without consent of the targeted states were only carried out as exceptions and 
did not possess any general character – this was presumably the only possible way that China 
could live with them. When it came to the general jurisdiction of the ICC over nationals from 
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non-states parties, China consistently argued for the need for state consent even in the case 
of referral by the Security Council.  In practice, the ‘selective’ Security Council referrals, 
which partially respected state consent, finally contributed to China’s decision on making a 
compromise. China emphasised that ‘when trying to ensure justice, it is also necessary to 
make every effort to avoid any negative impact on the political negotiations on Darfur’.
70
 
However, neither the abstention nor the favourable vote by China in these instances can lead 
to the conclusion that China has embraced the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals from non-
states parties without state consent.  
 
1.2.1.2 Selectivity in Imposing Cooperative Obligations  
The issue of cooperation between the ICC and non-states parties, to a significant extent, fits 
into the larger context of China’s position on the relationship between the ICC and non-
states parties. China recognised that while states parties are under an obligation to cooperate 
with the ICC, their assistance should not infringe on the interests of non-states parties,
71
 not 
to mention any imposition of obligations upon them in the absence of their consent.   
             Non-parties to the ICC Statute ordinarily have no obligation to cooperate with the 
Court, as the ICC Statute is a treaty and treaties may not impose obligations for third parties 
without their consent.
72
 The only three possibilities for cooperative obligations to be imposed 
on the non-states parties are ad hoc acceptance by these states either under Article 12(3), or 
under Article 87, or through a Security Council Chapter VII resolution, imposing obligations 
upon all member states to apply measures to give effect to the Security Council decisions.
73 
This the Council did when it created the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It there 
imposed obligations on all UN members to grant the international tribunals any assistance 
they needed. 
74
 It would seem natural that a decision to this effect be included in a resolution 
where the Security Council decides to refer a situation to the ICC. However, in the case of 
the Sudan referral, and even the more recent Libya referral, the Security Council only 
imposed explicit obligations of cooperation on one non-state party in question (Sudan and 
Libya respectively). For instance, there is no explicit obligation in Resolution 1593 for other 
states to cooperate with the Court. The referral is selective in imposing cooperative 
obligations between states parties and non-states parties to the Rome Statute as well as 
between Sudan and other non-States Parties. The Security Council ‘decides that the 
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Government of Sudan…shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to 
the Court’ but only ‘urges all states…to cooperate fully.’
75
A similar approach was adopted in 
the Libya situation. In the practice of the Security Council, an obligation is created by the 
use of the word ‘requires’ or ‘decides’, not by the mere use of the word ‘urge’. The word 
‘urge’ suggests nothing more than a recommendation or exhortation to take certain action.
76
 
While the obligations of states parties to cooperate with the ICC are automatically 
established by the Rome Statute, there are no cooperative obligations imposed by the 
Security Council on non-states parties except Sudan and Libya. This was made clear by the 
Security Council which ‘recognizing that states not party to the Rome Statute have no 
obligation under the Statute’. 
77
 The distinction between states parties and states not parties 
to the Statute as far as cooperation with the Court is concerned could have been blurred if the 
Security Council resolutions had been silent on this point.
78
 However, both Resolution 1593 
and Resolution 1970 expressly differentiated the two types of the cooperative obligations.  
This distinction, to some extent, negated China’s concern about ‘infringing the interest of 
non-states parties’.  
              The Security Council could have opted for the imposition of obligations for non-
States Parties (or all states), and the ICC referrals might be more effective had it done so, but 
it did not go down that path.
79
 As observed by some scholars, to require the Security Council 
to adopt an all or nothing approach is to deprive it of flexibility in taking action under 
Chapter VII. 
80
 At one level, this flexibility is used to build up consensus within the Council.  
In order to minimise objections from Council members, who are non-states parties of the 
ICC, to the adoption of the referral resolution, the Council may wish to authorise rather than 
obligate such non-parties as are willing to assist in arresting and otherwise cooperating with 
the Court to do so. 
81
 At another level, this approach also leaves the Council some political 
flexibility in dealing with the dynamic interactions between peace and justice. As there is no 
obligation on non-parties to the ICC Statute to arrest, they are merely permitted to do so, this 
may offer some possibilities and incentives for seeking political solutions to the Darfur crisis 
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at both regional and international level. To lose the political flexibility in dealing with the 
dynamic interactions between peace and justice would not be favoured by the permanent 
members of the Security Council. China, in particular, stated that ‘when trying to ensure 
justice, it is also necessary to make every effort to avoid any negative impact on the political 
negotiations on Darfur.’ This selective approach to imposing different state cooperative 





1.2.2 Selectivity in the Application of the Complementarity Principle 
As explained in Chapter II, China’s concern as regards the inadequacy of the principle of 
complementarity in limiting the Court’s jurisdiction consists of two dimensions: the ICC’s 
inherent jurisdiction, and the subjective criteria of complementarity.
83
 However, due to the 
role given to state consent in limiting the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals from non-states 
parties by selective referral, these two aspects of China’s concern about the principle of 
complementarity have been negated to an important degree.   
              The basis for this selectivity could also be logically linked to Operative Paragraph 
6 of the relevant resolutions, which states  that ‘nationals, current or former officials or 
personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan (or Libya Arab Jamahiriya) which is not 
a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions…, unless 
such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing state.’ It can be 
inferred from Paragraph 6 that the only way in which the Court could step in to exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals from other non-parties is by express state consent, which means 
giving the complementarity principle the effect of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction on both 
levels: the existence and the exercise of the jurisdiction.  
             This issue can be traced back to Chapter III’s discussion on the ICC’s automatic 
jurisdiction – the lack of consent of non-state parties is irrelevant to the Court’s jurisdiction 
in certain circumstances.
84
  China, it will be recalled, considered automatic jurisdiction to be 
incompatible with the principle of complementarity.
85
 In Rome, the opt-in procedure 
favoured by the Chinese authorities was eventually dropped and the principle of 
complementarity thus only retains its force in limiting the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
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China’s position about the principle of complementarity has never changed.  In its 
favourable vote for Resolution 1422 granting exclusive jurisdiction to non-states parties of 
ICC, China reiterated that, ‘a very important principle of the ICC is complementarity, which 
is that the jurisdiction of the ICC complements a country’s national jurisdiction. Therefore, 
if a country has brought a person to justice through its national justice system, then ICC has 
no jurisdiction.’
86
 Thus it was not a surprise to see China raise its concern about the principle 
of complementarity again in the case of Sudan, where it stated: ‘based on that position and 
out of respect for national judicial sovereignty, we would prefer to see perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights stand trial in the Sudanese judicial system. We have noted that the 
Sudanese judiciary has recently taken legal action against individuals involved…We are not 
in favour of referring the question of Darfur to the ICC without the consent of the Sudanese 
Government.’
87
 Whereas China compromised on the self-perceived misapplication of the 
complementarity principle to the situation of Sudan, the requirement of state consent for 
non-states parties to opt-in to the Court’s jurisdiction contained in the selective referral 
brings back the role of complementarity in limiting the existence of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
and is thus to the liking of China.  
             Even though for Sudan and Libya, the principle of complementarity has lost its first 
level role in limiting the Court’s jurisdiction, it retains force at the second level of 
admissibility. The question remains as to whether complementarity as part of the 
admissibility regime is sufficient to protect state sovereignty. The ICC Statute does not 
explicitly address the question whether or not the principle of complementarity is applicable 
if the UNSC refers a situation to the Prosecutor.
88
 Both Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute 
permitting the Security Council to refer a situation to the ICC and Article 17 containing the 
principle of complementarity remain silent on this point. Initially, as the Rome Statute did 
not include any explicit article on the application of complementarity regarding Security 
Council referrals, there were controversies over whether or not the regime should apply. 
Most scholars support the view that the complementarity principle is one of the fundamental 
principles of the ICC Statute, therefore the primacy of national proceedings must be 
respected and the legal regime governing complementarity should remain unaltered even 
upon referral by the Security Council.
89
 Opponents of this prevailing view argued that 
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according to Article 25 of the UN Charter, a Security Council resolution ‘effectively nullifies 
this right of complementarity’,
90
 therefore, that Security Council referrals can set aside 
complementarity and endow the Court with primacy over national courts. 
91
 The conclusion 
to this debate can be drawn from the Court’s practice. Before the referral of the situation in 
Sudan to the Court, the Security Council established a Commission of Inquiry,
92
 which 
published a substantial report. 
93
 The Commission noted that ‘complementarity...also applies 
to referrals by the Security Council.’ 
94
 As noted in the Complementarity Chapter, the 
Prosecutor, in his report to the Council, similarly expressed the view that the principle of 
complementarity applied to Security Council referrals, and engaged in an analysis of the 
admissibility of cases from Darfur.
95
 PTC I indicated clearly that ‘the Prosecutor also has an 
obligation to respect the principle of complementarity by monitoring any ongoing 
investigations and prosecutions by the GoS [Government of Sudan] itself.’
96
 The Chamber 
also confirmed the applicability of complementarity to a Security Council referral as a result 
of Libya’s admissibility challenge by stating ‘the Court has consistently held that the legal 
framework of the Statute applies in the situations referred by the Security Council in Libya 
and Darfur, Sudan, including its complementarity and cooperation regimes’.
97
 The practice 
suggests that not only does the Security Council take complementarity into account when it 
refers a situation, the Prosecutor and the PTC also apply the complementarity test to such 
referrals. Needless to say, the practice of selective referral by the Security Council has 
addressed the traditional concerns of China regarding the relationship between the ICC and 
national jurisdiction, in particular, state judicial sovereignty, in a practical fashion.  
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1.2.3 Selectivity between Peace and Justice  
The concern about the maintenance of peace, though not one of the five official objections of 
China to the Rome Statute, has played an important role in its engagement with the ICC 
through the Security Council. The reason why China did not block the Security Council 
referrals to the ICC could be interpreted from the selective nature of the Council referrals 
which keeps the jurisdiction of the Court within a scope acceptable to China.  However, a 
more direct factor contributing to the compromise of China may be considered in light of the 
incentive of using the ICC as an instrument to promote peace and security. 
              Through the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, the Security Council gave a 
new dimension to the exercise of its powers for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, which has been gradually characterised as international judicial intervention.
98
 The 
creation of the ICC was similarly inspired by the conviction that the prosecution of major 
international crimes constitutes a means to protect the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 
99  
With regard to the Council’s judicial intervention in the situation of Darfur, 
China faced a dilemma choosing between peace and justice. The Chinese authorities 
underscored the need to address impunity and to bring the perpetrators of international 
crimes to justice by means of referral,
100
 whereas it supported a deferral, contending that an 
arrest warrant would be ‘detrimental to the Darfur peace process and harm the fragile 
security situation’.
101
 There is a curious reference to Article 16 in the Preamble of the 
Security Council Resolution 1593, which gives the Council the power to suspend ICC 
investigations if it believes doing so would advance peace and security. This paragraph was 
also included in the Resolution 1970, which referred the Libya situation to the ICC. It is not 
obvious why a resolution referring a situation to the court would emphasise this deferral 
provision. It has been argued that the Security Council, in order to obtain unanimous support 
for referring the situation to the ICC, felt compelled to mention Article 16 as a possible 
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incentive for negotiating a peaceful deal. 
102
 Another explanation can be found in the context 
of the Rome Statute, which is silent over the applicability of Article 16 in the cases of 
Security Council referrals.
103
 By ‘re-interpreting’ Article 16 in the referral resolution, the 
Security Council is assuring the permanent members including China that the option of 
derailing the ICC’s involvement is still available to them in case of any conflict between 
peace and justice. 
 
1.3 ‘Post’ deferral  
The discussion over possible deferral of the situation in Darfur, which had already been 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council, came against the background that the OTP, on 
14 July 2008, submitted an application for an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Al-
Bashir to the PTC.
104
 In response to this application the African Union (AU) called upon the 
Security Council to apply Article 16 of the Rome Statute and ‘defer the process initiated by 
the ICC’.
105
 Article 16 was once again an issue before the Council, and the P-5 were split 
over this issue. While France and the UK issued statements against a deferral to the effect 
that the Security Council had endorsed the ICC and it needed to show consistency in its 
stance for international justice and against impunity,
106
 the US essentially held ambiguous 
views in this regard.
107
 China and Russia openly supported a deferral, contending that an 
arrest warrant would be detrimental to the Darfur peace process and harm the fragile security 
situation. In particular, China argued that ‘the indictment of the Sudanese leader proposed by 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is an inappropriate decision taken at an 
inappropriate time’ and it was of the view that ‘seeking to resolve the issue of impunity 
through the indictment of the Sudanese leader by the ICC will only derail the process of 
resolving the Darfur issue.’
108
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                As noted earlier, China remained neutral over the Security Council Resolution 
referring the Darfur situation to the ICC due to the selective nature of the referral itself, and, 
more importantly, because of its aspirations for peace. China believed that ‘the pursuit of 
international judicial justice should be carried out with the ultimate aim of putting an end to 
conflict and in the wider context of restoring peace’.
109
 In this context, China would not be 
neutral in permitting justice to run its course at the cost of peace. In response to the 
application for a possible indictment against the leaders of Sudan, China positively engaged 
in seeking a deferral due to its concern that this move would have a negative impact on peace 
in Sudan.
110
 In addition, Resolution 1593 already contained a Preambular reference to Article 
16 of the Rome Statute, which would leave the door open to a later deferral action by the 
Security Council.  
              China emphasised many times in its Position Paper submitted to the General 
Assembly that ‘The work of the International Criminal Court should be pursued in a way 
that does not impede or jeopardize the relevant peace process’.
111
 Most recently, the 
Security Council held its ‘first-ever’ debate on ‘Peace and Justice with a Special Focus on 
the Role of the International Criminal Court’.
112
 China explicitly expressed its opinion about 
the relationship between peace and justice. According to the Chinese delegate, ‘China 
believes that justice cannot be pursued at the expenses of peaceful process, nor should it 
impede the process of national reconciliation….The ICC, as an integral part of the 
international system of the rule of law, must abide by the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and play a positive role in maintaining international peace and security… Since the 
Charter entrusts the Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, we hope that the ICC will exercise caution in carrying out 
its functions and avoid impeding the work of the Security Council by seeking political 
settlements to international and regional conflicts’. 
113
 
              Above all, the pre-emptive deferral resolutions, the selective referral resolutions 
and (potentially) the post deferral resolution all carve out an exemption from the ICC 
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jurisdiction for a specific category of people from non-states parties in one way or another. 
This work, therefore, refers to these resolutions as ‘carve-out’ resolutions hereinafter. In 
order to understand whether these carve-out resolutions can achieve the effect of negating 
the concerns of China about ICC, it is necessary to first examine their compatibility with the 
Rome Statute.  
 
2. Compatibility of the Security Council ‘Carve-out’ 
Resolutions with the Rome Statute 
 
As both Resolutions 1422 and 1487 expressed fidelity to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, in 
scrutinizing these resolutions it is necessary to look into the drafting history and meaning of 
Article 16. Curiously enough, unlike Resolutions 1422 and 1487, Resolution 1497 does not 
make any reference to Article 16. The motivation of the Security Council not to 
acknowledge Article 16 in Resolution 1497 still remains a matter for conjecture, the 
examination of Resolution 1497 therefore will be pursued separately.  
             Resolutions 1422 and 1487 were criticised by a considerable number of 
government representatives at the time of adoption
114
 and generated a considerable amount 
of academic literature, which claims that the deferral resolutions do not invoke Article 16 in 
a manner envisaged by its drafters and are hence incompatible with the Rome Statute.
 115
 To 
sum up, there are two main points. Firstly, at the time of its adoption a number of states 
criticised Resolution 1422 because it provided for ‘blanket immunity’ rather than immunity 
on a ‘case-by-case’ basis.
116
 The language of Article 16 remains ambiguous as to whether it 
could be applied to any investigations and prosecutions that might, possibly, take place at 
any time in the future on a blanket basis. However, the travaux préparatoires of Article 16 
makes it quite clear that the founding fathers of the Statute intended to limit the use of the 
deferral possibility to case-by-case interventions by the Council;
117
 it also indicates that it 
was intended to apply to concrete cases where grievous crimes of international concern have 
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 A systematic interpretation of the provisions of the Statute can also reach 
the same conclusion. The logical sequence underlying the functioning of the Court under 
Articles 13 to 16 of the Statue is that such a situation must exist before the Council may 
make a request under Article 16.
119
  
 Secondly, one clear condition laid down by Article 16 is that the deferral request 
should be made by ‘a resolution adopted under Chapter VII’. It is generally understood that 
according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, any resolution adopted under Chapter VII should 
be prefaced by a determination that there exists a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression’.
120 
 Resolution 1422 and Resolution 1487 contain no such determination, 
which results in a perilous relationship with Article 39 of the Charter. This defect is 
substantially aggravated by the fact that such a determination could by no means have been 
included in the resolution, since there was, in connection with its subject matter, absolutely 
no factual basis for it except the threat that the UNMIBH would not be renewed. 
121
 The 
suggestion that this threat itself would constitute a threat to international peace and security 
is of doubtful validity.
122
 
              The situation in Resolution 1497, which was passed in response to the conflict in 
Liberia, is somewhat different, as the threat to international peace and security clearly 
existed.
123
 This time, although dealing with a specific situation, which is perhaps more of a 
candidate for an Article 16 request, the Security Council took another track. They granted 
exclusive jurisdiction.
124
 During the passage of this resolution, a number of states expressed 
doubts about the compatibility of the proposed exclusive jurisdiction with the Rome Statute 
and general international law.
125
 The lack of reference to Article 16 of the Rome Statute does 
not immunise Resolution 1497 from criticisms of its inconsistency with the Rome Statute as 
suffered by Resolutions 1422 and 1487.
126
 If viewed in light of Article 16, Resolution 1497, 
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which contains neither a time limit nor a renewal clause, clearly goes against the deferral 
requirements under the Rome Statute.
127
 
             When it comes to the referral, though Resolutions 1593 and 1970 referred the 
situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC,
128
 there is no explicit reference to Article 13(b) in 
either resolution. Arguably, the precise basis of these references has been shown to be much 
more opaque than a straightforward application of Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
129
 The 
drafters of both resolutions presumably intended to use the procedure provided for in Article 
13(b) as this is the only provision that would allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction.
130
 The 
most controversial aspect of both referrals is Operative Paragraph 6, which excludes the 
Court’s jurisdiction over certain nationals from a state other than Sudan or Libya that is not a 
member of the Rome Statute.
131
 This paragraph, as noted above, gave rise to the possibility 
of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction by state consent and complementarity on a selective basis. 
However, it is not entirely clear as to the provisional basis of the Rome Statute upon which 
Operative Paragraph 6 relies. As the preambles to both resolutions specifically recall Article 
16 of the Rome Statute and Paragraph 6 resembles the relevant provision of resolution 
1497,
132
 most of the literature thus follows the same path, which is to scrutinise Paragraph 6 
under the deferral provision.
133
 In this case, the focus on the legality of Resolutions 1593 and 
1970 will be discussed in the context of the Security Council’s usage of its deferral power 
and Article 16 of the Rome Statute. This approach, however, blurs the distinction between 
the Council’s referral power and deferral power as far as limiting the Court’s jurisdiction is 
concerned, though, to some extent, they achieve the same effect.  
             Given the frequently raised concern of both the US and China about state consent, 
a different possible interpretation can be submitted that Paragraph 6 reflects the Council’s 
wish to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC except insofar as it regards personnel of non-
states parties.
134
 The logic of this interpretation equally flows from the wording of Operative 
Paragraph 6 itself, which does not request the prosecutor to defer investigations for a year as 
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per Article 16, but grants the contributing countries exclusive jurisdiction over such 
personnel.
135
 The question then arises as to whether the Council’s selective referral ratione 
personae is consistent with the Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. The key in answering this 
question lies in the concept of a ‘situation’. The original ILC Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court set out that the Council could refer ‘matters’ to the Court, to 
avoid the impression that the Security Council could refer individual cases.
136
 During the 
negotiation process of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Commission, a suggestion 
was made to replace the word ‘matter’ with ‘case’. But the possibility of referring a ‘case’ 
had been rejected by the end of the preparatory negotiations, as many felt that the Council 
should only be empowered to refer a general matter or situation rather than a specific 
individual to the Court, in order to preserve the Court’s independence in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction.
137
 The final version of Article 13(b) refers to ‘situations’ rather than ‘matters’, 
as the former term was more general than the latter.
138
  
            In practice, the position adopted by the ICC Prosecutor seemingly suggests that a 
situation should not be salami-sliced by carving out some parties or persons from the 
jurisdiction of the Court. It will be recalled that Uganda first attempted to refer the situation 
of the LRA to the Court under Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor, 
nonetheless, opened an investigation into northern Uganda more generally, covering both 
parties (the government of Uganda and the LRA) to the conflict. 
139 . 
Similarly, a referral of a 
situation by the Security Council should not include limitations ratione personae either, as 
there is no reason to believe that the word ‘situations’ was not intended to mean the same 
thing in both Article 13(a) and Article 13(b).
140
 Therefore, both the drafting history and the 
ICC practice confound the compliance of a selective referral under the Rome Statute.  
             With regard to post deferrals, the wording of Article 16 does not explicitly exclude 
its applicability in cases of referrals made by the Security Council pursuant to Article 13 of 
the Rome Statute. The reference made to Article 16 in the selective referrals also give the 
impression that the deferral provision is capable of application in cases of a referral by the 
Security Council. However, prominent commentators such as Professor Scheffer, who led 
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the US delegation to Rome, regarded this as a technically manipulative reading of Article 
16.
141
 He has argued that the drafters of the treaty did not intend to allow Article 16 to be 
exercised in relation to situations that the Security Council itself had referred to the ICC, 
rather, the original intent underpinning Article 16 was to block premature state party 
referrals or proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor.
 142  
Yet, different views have been 
expressed by other commentators, notably Professor Cryer, who argued that the drafters of 
Article 13(b) intended the term ‘situation’ to exclude individual cases being sent to the Court. 
Article 16, on the other hand, was intended precisely to permit the Security Council to, if 
required, defer prosecutions that relate to that person.
143
 In other words, a systematic 
interpretation of the relationship between referral and deferral does not render the two 
incompatible.
144
 It is arguably problematic to deny that the Security Council has the power to 
suspend the Court’s investigations or prosecutions for a period of 12 months with respect to 
a situation it referred to the ICC Prosecutor.
145
 Nevertheless, the answer to this controversy 
cannot be found from the plain language of Article 16 or in its publicly available drafting 
history. In practice, the interpretation that Article 16 applies in cases of a Security Council 
referral has been consistently supported by the Security Council member states. The 
Preambular reference to Article 16 in referral Resolutions 1593 and 1970 is an affirmative 
signal. It can also be demonstrated from the fact that none of the states that addressed the 
possible deferral in the debates on the Al-Bashir Case argued that the Council did not have 
the power to invoke Article 16.
146
 However, the ultimate weight of the post deferral to 
Security Council referrals will depend on the reaction of the ICC if that scenario ever 
presents in practice.  
               Above all, most of the carve-out resolutions that the Security Council employed to 
limit the ICC’s jurisdiction are of dubious compliance with the Rome Statute. However, it 
should be noted that these resolutions may rely on the UN Charter directly as a source of 
legitimacy irrespective of their inconsistencies with the ICC Statute. It has been generally 
accepted that the Security Council enjoys a broad discretionary power both in deciding when 
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to act (Article 39) 
147
 and how to act (Article 40, 41, and 42)
148
 to maintain or restore 
international peace and security under Chapter VII. The Security Council’s discretionary 
power under Chapter VII remains untouched by the Statute.
149
 It could be argued that if 
Article 13(b) and Article 16 did not exist, the Council nonetheless could, in the exercise of 
its powers under Chapter VII, refer a case or a situation to the ICC, or require the ICC to 
suspend investigations or prosecutions. The crucial question here is whether the Security 
Council resolutions, which contradict the Rome Statute, are binding on the ICC. 
 
3. The Legal Effect of the Carve-out Resolutions on the ICC 
                
It is generally accepted that the Council can, pursuant to Article 25 and Chapter VII, impose 
a binding obligation on UN member states.
150  
On first appearance, the carve-out Security 
Council resolutions are not directly binding upon the ICC, which is neither a UN body nor a 
state, but another international organisation with a separate legal personality from its 
member states.
151
 However, the issue in question is more complex given the fact that the 
Rome Statute has envisaged different possible legal consequences generated by Security 
Council referral resolutions vis-à-vis its deferral resolutions upon the ICC.  
                Whereas the Security Council enjoys a discretionary power in determining and 
delimiting the situation to be referred to the Court, the ICC Prosecutor possesses a 
discretionary competence to decide how to deal with it.
152
 The Statute does not provide for 
any special treatment to be accorded a Security Council referral as opposed to the other two 
ways in which the Prosecutor can be confronted by a case.
153
 In other words, a Security 
Council referral does not necessarily mean the Prosecutor will actually prosecute that case. 
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The referral may get rejected if it fails to satisfy certain criteria, where consistency with the 
Rome Statute matters. Even if the Security Council acts in accordance with Article 13(b), 
which can trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC by alerting the prosecutor to situations in which 
one or more of the crimes listed in Article 5 ‘appears to have been committed’, the 
prosecutor still has wide discretion and can decide not to proceed in accordance with Article 
53.     
             Standing in contrast to Article 13(b), Article 16 does not appear to grant the 
Prosecutor any discretion in his decision over the suspension or continuation of proceedings 
before the Court after a Chapter VII deferral request. Any request made by the Security 
Council in strict conformity with Article 16 constitutes, for the purposes of the Rome Statute, 
an order rather than a request properly so-called.
154
 The Council may be viewed as the ruler 
that can block the ICC’s jurisdiction over any case simply by asserting that proceeding with 
a particular situation or case threatens international peace and security.
155
 Article 16 seems to 
render any request made by the Council pursuant to it binding on the ICC. Therefore, in 
short, a Security Council referral, regardless of its consistency with Article 13(b), has no 
binding force on the ICC Prosecutor, while Article 16 makes it perfectly clear that the 
requests for which it provides are meant to be binding on the ICC. The question still remains, 
however, as to the extent to which the ICC can disregard the Security Council resolutions if 
they are not in conformity with Article 16. Moreover, the overlapping nature of member 
states of the ICC and the UN would inevitably add another layer of complexity to this issue.  
             In fact, the perplexing situation caused by the carve-out Security Council 
resolutions is reminiscent of a series of cases dealing with norms conflicts between UN 
Security Council resolutions and human rights conventions, as well as the conflicting 
obligations for states parties under different treaty regimes. These cases include but are not 
limited to Kadi (European Court of First Instance, European Court of Justice), Al-Jedda 
(House of Lords, European Court of Human Rights), Sayadi (Human Rights Committee), 
and Nada ( European Court of Human Rights), among which the Kadi Case has the strongest 
resonance with the situation confronting the ICC. The Kadi Case directly raised the question 
as to the binding force of Security Council resolutions upon the EU/EC, which is not a 
member of the UN, although all EU members are UN members.  
              According to the European Court of First Instance (CFI) in Kadi, the binding effect 
of Security Council resolutions for the EC – even though it cannot directly derive from the 
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UN Charter (to which the EC is not a party) – can indirectly stem from the treaty that 
established the EC.
156
  The CFI made it clear that ‘unlike its [United Nations] Member States, 
the Community as such is not directly bound by the Charter of the United Nations and that it 
is not therefore required, as an obligation of general public international law, to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of that 
Charter.’ 
157
 However, the CFI ruled that ‘the Community must be considered to be bound by 
the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations in the same way as its Member 
States, by virtue of the Treaty establishing it’.
158
 The UN Charter obligations in question 
included obligations arising under binding decisions of the Security Council.
159
 In other 
words, the CFI considered that the EC was indirectly bound by obligations imposed by the 
Security Council resolutions on its member states by virtue of the provisions of the EC 
Treaty.
 
 The CFI acknowledged that, in accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter, the 
obligations of EU member states under the Charter prevailed over every other obligation of 
international law, including those under the EC Treaties. 
160
 The CFI, therefore, concluded 
that the EC is actually bound ‘by the very Treaty by which it was established, to adopt all the 
measures necessary to enable its Member States to fulfil those obligations [imposed by the 
UN Charter]’. 
161
 To borrow from the CFI approach, therefore, the ICC is not directly bound 
by the UN Security Council referral or deferral resolutions, but to some extent it is indirectly 
bound by those resolutions to act in a certain fashion by virtue of some provisions of the 
Rome Statute. In this sense, even though the Security Council enjoys a great discretionary 
power under Chapter VII, Article 13(b) and Article 16 of the Rome Statute should not be 
regarded as superfluous. This is because these provisions, in particular Article 16, ensure that 
calls by the Council, if taken in conformity with them, would generate some binding force on 
the ICC to act in a manner envisaged by the Rome Statute. 
               On appeal, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) reversed the CFI. The ECJ 
emphasised repeatedly the separateness and autonomy of the EC from other legal systems 
and from the international order more generally, and the priority that has to be given to EC’s 
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 Without specifically mentioning the UN Charter, the ECJ declared 
that ‘the obligation imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of 
prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty,’
163
 and that the EC is an 
‘internal’
164
 and ‘autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international 
agreement’.
165
 The ECJ, therefore, annulled the EC regulation implementing the Security 
Council resolution, which did not comply with EU’s own guarantees of fundamental rights. 
166
 The ECJ ruled that the annulment ‘would not entail any challenge to the primacy of that 
resolution in international law.’
167
 In fact, the ECJ saw no particular relevance in the 
applicability of Article 103 of the UN in this context. The Court took the view that its 
primary obligation is to protect the values of the EU’s constitutional legal order, even if this 
entailed a rejection of the Security Council resolution.
168
 Despite the ECJ’s Kadi decision, 
which annulled the EC regulation implementing the Security Council sanctions against Kadi, 
he was almost immediately relisted by the EU in a new regulation.
169
 In response Kadi 
brought a challenge against the Regulation before the General Court (as it is now known). 
The General Court rendered a decision which basically followed the ECJ’s reasoning in Kadi 
and confirmed a trend of defiance of Security Council sanctions.
170
 The case is currently 
under appeal before the ECJ.
171
 
              In theory, the approach adopted by the ECJ seems to offer some encouragement for 
the ICC to assert its own treaty regime over the UN Charter. Taking its cue from the ECJ, the 
ICC could claim that it is not bound by the trumping provision contained in Article 103 of 
the Charter in cases of inconsistency between the Security Council carve-out resolutions and 
the Rome Statute. However, in practice there do exist some difficulties for the ICC to do so.  
              In Kadi, the ECJ was solely looking at the EC Regulation that was adopted under 
the EC Treaty, rather than the measures adopted by the EU member states. Even though 
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Article 103 does not have relevance to the obligations of the EC, it does speak to the 
obligations of its member states. It is without controversy that the Council has the 
competence to impose a binding obligation on EU member states to act in a certain way 
which may, in the case of a conflict with the EC Treaty, require them to ignore the latter set 
of obligations.
 
It has been confirmed by the ICJ in the Lockerbie Case that obligations 
imposed by the Council take precedence over obligations under international treaties.
172
 In 
the Kadi Case, the ECJ robustly refused to bow to the authority of the Security Council even 
if that meant the EU member states would be held responsible as a matter of international 
law for any consequential breach of UN Charter obligations.  
              The ICC could take a similar approach and insist that the job of the ICC is to assess 
the conformity of the Security Council resolutions with the ICC statute, and that such a task 
remains unaffected by whether the member states in question are acting in conformity with 
their other obligations, including obligations under the UN Charter. In theory, the conflicts 
of the state parties’ obligations to the UN and that to the ICC will not prevent the ICC 
prosecutor from defying the will of the Security Council, However, the effective 
implementation of a Court’s judgment and sentencing decision will as a last resort depend on 
state participation, the Court is therefore unlikely to be able to function in any way at 
variance with the Security Council’s will. In addition, Article 48 (2) of the UN Charter also 
specifies that decisions of the Council shall be carried out by members directly and through 
their actions as members of international organisations. The UN’s almost universal 
membership guarantees that UN members can exert a commanding influence in (almost) all 
international organisations.
173
 What this requires, in this context, is that UN member states, 
when acting as states parties of the ICC Statute, are under an obligation to seek to ensure that 
the ICC follows the binding decisions of the Council. 
174
 Though the power still lies in the 
hand of the Prosecutor, in the first instance, to decide the fate of a carve-out resolution of the 
Council, the options are not as open as they appear to be. 
              In fact, apart from the Kadi case, all the other cases mentioned earlier directly dealt 
with the issue of conflicting state obligations under the UN Charter and other international 
instruments. In the Al-Jedda Case, the House of Lords held that the Security Council 
authorisation to detain the appellant did indeed bring Article 103 into play, and the Security 
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Council resolution could override the ECHR’s ban on preventive detention.
175
 However, 
when it comes to international or regional judicial bodies, there has been a reluctance on the 
part of these courts to refer to a state’s obligation under Article 103 of the Charter to give 
precedence to UNSC obligations in case of a conflict with other obligations under 
international law. In the case of Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium before the Human Rights 
Committee, 
176
 the HRC chose to sidestep Article 103 of the Charter, despite the fact that 
there was an apparent norm conflict that should be either avoided or resolved.
 
 The ECtHR 
Grand Chamber deftly avoided this issue in the case of Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, 
preferring to read down the UN resolutions and thus remove the conflict by means of 
harmonising interpretation.
177
 In the most recent case of Nada v Switzerland, the Grand 
Chamber completely avoided the whole Article 103 issue and left open whether the UN 
Charter did trump the ECHR or not.
178
  
                In stark contrast with the somewhat reluctant approach adopted by these courts, the 
ICC has explicitly acknowledged in its past practice that Article 103 gives precedence to 
Charter obligations over other treaty obligations. When addressing Sudan’s obligations to 
cooperate with the ICC, the ICC PTC made specific reference to Article 103 of the UN 
Charter, and emphasised that the obligations of Sudan to fully cooperate with the Court 
‘shall prevail over any other obligation that the State of Sudan may have undertaken 
pursuant to any other international agreement.’ 
179
 Given its previous position, it would be 
implausible if the ICC shifts to sideline Article 103 in its subsequent practice as the Human 
Rights Council did in Sayadi or the European Court of Human Rights in Nada. If the ICC on 
one hand declares to act in defiance of the Security Council resolutions, while on the other 
makes occasional reference to Article 103, it would find itself in a very unpleasant dilemma. 
With such complex issues at hand, if caught up in an inescapable situation to make a choice, 
the ICC has two options; either to acknowledge the primacy of the UNSC resolutions over 
the Rome Statute, or to engage in some sort of meaningful review of the lawfulness of the 
UNSC’s carve-out resolutions.  
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4.  Possibilities for the ICC to Challenge the Carve-out Resolutions 
                 
That the carve-out resolutions are not consistent with the Rome Statute does not necessarily 
mean that the ICC may actually act contrary to these resolutions or challenge the legality of 
them. In addition to the practical barriers mentioned above, the extent to which the conflicts 
between the Rome Statute and the Security Council resolutions would actually be triggered 
should also be taken into account. The analysis will commence with the inescapable 
circumstances for the ICC to make a choice between the Rome Statute vis-à-vis the carve-
out resolutions, and continue to the possible judicial review of the legality of these 
resolutions.  
 
4.1 Inescapable Circumstances for the ICC to Make a Choice between 
the Rome Statute and the Carve-out Resolutions 
The possibilities that the ICC would be faced with the conflicts between the pre-emptive 
deferral resolutions and the Rome Statute are fairly low. The scenario did not arise during 
the lifespan of Resolutions 1422 and 1487, but it is still necessary to envisage the 
possibilities in case there are any descendants of this kind of resolutions in the future. If a 
situation was referred to the ICC by a state party or the Prosecutor decided to initiate an 
investigation into a situation in which crimes falling under its Statute have been committed 
between 1 July 2002 and 1 July 2004 by, for instance, US peacekeepers, the ICC would 
indeed face such a conflict. It would have to review and examine whether these pre-emptive 
deferral resolutions were in line with Article 16 of the Rome Statute and hence were binding 
on it, and then decide whether it could proceed with the prosecutions by dismissing these 
resolutions. If the same situation were referred to the ICC by the Security Council, it would 
probably fall within the ‘unless the Security Council decides otherwise’ part of Resolutions 
1422 and 1487, unless the referring Resolution expressed that it was not to trump 1422 and 
1487. It is extremely unlikely that a credible allegation would be made against a person 
covered by paragraph 7 of Resolution 1497, which attempts to have a permanent effect but is 
only limited to the territory of Liberia.  
              The greatest likelihood for the ICC to be forced into making a choice between the 
carve-out Security Council resolutions and the Rome Statute lies with the selective referral 
resolutions. As far as the Prosecutor is concerned, the provisions clearly indicate that he or 
she would not be bound to entertain a referral of a situation from the UNSC. The competence 





a Security Council referral. 
180
 Despite the selective referral made by the Council, the 
Prosecutor has the discretion to open a case applying to all parties. This can be best 
demonstrated in light of the aforementioned self-referral case of Uganda, which was 
criticised for the selective nature of its referral
181
. The Prosecutor, nonetheless, opened an 
investigation into northern Uganda more generally as opposed to Uganda’s partial referral of 
LRA alone. In the same vein, the Prosecutor could subsequently decide to initiate an 
investigation against a person from a non-state party for alleged crimes arising out of 
operations authorised by the Council either in Sudan or in Libya, regardless of the relevant 
paragraph of the Security Council referral resolutions. This is indeed a realistic possibility 
considering the alleged killing of non-combatant civilians by NATO (notably the US and 
Turkey are non-state parties to the ICC) in its operations of implementing the Security 
Council Resolution 1973 in Libya. There is another remote possibility which rests with the 
potential post-deferral resolution. If the Security Council subsequently decides to request the 
ICC to suspend an investigation or prosecution in Darfur or in relation to the Libya situation, 
it would be the first test for the view of the ICC on the applicability of Article 16 to Security 
Council referral.  
            Above all, when the possible conflict circumstances as identified above arise, the 
ICC would have to make a review of the carve-out resolutions in light of the requirements of 
Article 13(b) or Article 16 of the Rome Statute in order to commence or to defer exercising 
its jurisdiction. The term ‘review’ here is used loosely to denote the competence of the Court 
to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction or it is competent to exercise jurisdiction over a 
situation or a case.
182
 It does not mean that the ICC would pronounce on or undertake a 
‘judicial review’ of the legality of these Security Council resolutions at this stage. 
Nevertheless, the ICC may act contrary to the carve-out resolutions, relying on the 
provisions of the Rome Statute.  
 
4.2 Possible Judicial Review of the Security Council Carve-out 
Resolutions 
If the Prosecutor decides to investigate a person or persons covered by the progeny of the 
pre-emptive deferral resolutions, or Paragraph 6 of the selective referral resolutions, the 
challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction would be raised, in all likelihood, under Article 19 of 
the Rome Statute.  
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              Whereas Article 19(2) specifies that ‘challenges to the admissibility of a case on 
the grounds referred to in article 17’ may be made by certain individuals or states, it does not 
define the basis for making a challenge to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
183
 Some argue that a 
challenge could be made to jurisdiction on any ground,
184
 so, presumably, for the purpose of 
this work, the basis includes the requirements in the Security Council resolutions. Even 
though the burden of proof of demonstrating the absence of jurisdiction necessarily falls on 
the person or state making the challenge, it would not be difficult to claim that the limitations 
imposed by the Security Council resolutions bars the ICC from exercising jurisdiction. There 
is no doubt that the accused is entitled to make such a challenge, but which states may 
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction is quite ambiguous under Article 19(2) of the Rome 
Statute.
185
 Presumably, a non-state party, such as the US, can make a challenge to the Court’s 
jurisdiction if it feels itself entitled to demand a deferral of a case before the ICC or exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction vis-à-vis any of its nationals carved out by these Security Council 
resolutions. 
              In response to these challenges, the Rome Statute offers the option to the 
Prosecutor to ‘seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or 
admissibility’.
186
 If the prosecutor turns to the Court for its ruling, the Court would not be 
able to make a ruling about the compatibility of the carve-out resolutions with the Rome 
Statute without inquiring into the legality of the these Security Council resolutions under the 
UN Charter. This is because a resolution made under Chapter VII is an explicit requirement 
of both Article 13(a) and Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Considering the fact that these 
carve-out resolutions are of dubious compliance with the requirements of the Rome Statute, 
a challenge to the ICC's jurisdiction would likely trigger the possibility of undertaking a 
judicial review of the Security Council resolution by the ICC.  
              The complexities and peculiarities of the debate over the question whether an 
international court is able to engage in judicial review of the decisions of the Security 
Council has already generated an abundant literature.
187 
It is well known that the Charter 
does not expressly provide for judicial review by a judicial body of the decisions of the 
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political organs of the UN and the proposals specifically to grant the ICJ this power were 
rejected at the San Francisco Conference. 
188
 Lack of an express power of review is not, 
however, determinative.  
                The legality of the creation of the ad hoc tribunals was challenged by the first 
indicted persons to appear before them: Tadić (ICTY) and Kanyabashi (ICTR). The 
Chambers in both cases took the view that they were competent to address the preliminary 
objections concerning the lawful establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, and neither of them 
rejected its own competence to inquire into the validity of Security Council resolutions, even 
if there is no express provision in their constitutive instruments giving them the power to do 
so.
 189 
The ICJ, however, has been very cautious about arrogating to itself the power to 
review for validity or invalidity the decisions of the political organs of the UN. In the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stated that it ‘does not possess power of judicial review 
or appeal in respect of the decision taken by the United Nations organs.’ 
190
 However, de 
facto the Court did review these resolutions.
191  
                 
In the Kadi Case, the CFI concluded emphatically that ‘the resolutions of the 
Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court’s judicial review 
and that the Court has no authority to call in question, even indirectly, their lawfulness in 
the light of Community Law,’ 
192
 Nonetheless, it insisted ‘the Court is empowered to check, 
indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to 
Jus Cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all 
subjects of international law.’
193 
 The judgment by the CFI attracted some criticism on the 
bold claim of jurisdiction to review the resolutions of the Security Council.
194
 The ECJ on 
appeal took a more cautious approach by denying that its review of the EC regulation 
implementing the UN resolution would amount to any kind of review of the resolution itself, 
or of the Charter.
195 
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              The approach adopted by these precedents sends a message to the ICC that 
international judicial bodies are not debarred from engaging in judicial review of the 
decisions of the Security Council in a specific case to satisfy its judicial function. The Rome 
Statue does not prevent the Court from considering challenges to its jurisdiction. However, 
what appears to be uncertain is the extent to which the ICC may question the discretionary 
competence of the Council under Chapter VII.  It is widely accepted that while the Security 
Council has a wide margin of discretion under Chapter VII its power is not totally 
unfettered;
196
 the extent to which the Security Council’s discretion under Chapter VII is 
subject to limitation is a hotly debated issue among scholars.
197
 
               As noted earlier, the most obvious characteristic of the pre-emptive deferral 
resolutions is the lack of an explicit Article 39 determination. It is not clear whether the 
invocation of Chapter VII is strictly predicated on an explicit determination of a specific 
threat of the peace. In practice, the Security Council has adopted several resolutions in which 
it has explicitly acted under Chapter VII, without first having determined the existence of a 
threat to the peace.
198
 It is clear in Resolutions 1422 and 1487 that by reference to the 
purpose of the deployment of the UN operations, the Council was trying to fulfil the 
conditions stipulated under Article 39 of the UN Charter. It could be argued that the 
existence of such determination can be implied from the fact that the resolution is adopted 
under Chapter VII and that some vague references have been made to peace and security. 
The Charter and its travaux preparatoires do not address this issue. It can be recalled that the 
Security Council resolution on Namibia
199
 did not make any reference to the existence of a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. In the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion, the majority judges implicitly acknowledged the ‘implicit Article 39 
determination’,
200
 though this was not accepted by all.
201
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             Apart from the procedural requirement, the pre-emptive deferrals may also suffer 
from the accusation that there did not exist any breach or threat to international peace and 
security which would guarantee an Article 39 determination. Given the breadth of the 
discretion afforded to the Council, it is questionable whether the Security Council’s Article 
39 determinations are justiciable.
 202
 While the ICJ has not itself expressed a view on the 
matter, individual judges have. Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht said ‘it is not for the Court to 
substitute its discretion for that of the Security Council in determining the existence of a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, or the political steps to be 
taken following such a determination.’
203
 The ICTR, similarly, clearly declared that ‘such 
discretionary assessments are not justiciable since they involve the consideration of a 
number of social, political and circumstantial factors which cannot be weighed and 
balanced objectively by this Trial Chamber’. 
204
 As far as the ICC is concerned, the Rome 
Statute ought not to be interpreted as limiting in any way the Council’s discretionary power 
to examine each specific situation and to label it under the categories described in Article 39, 
a power that remains subject to its political evaluation in each particular circumstance. 
205
 
Therefore, the ICC is unlikely to examine the basis for the UNSC coming to an Article 39 
determination or the grounds on which the Council has made its request to the Court.
206
 
              With regard to the carve-out referral resolutions, it is doubtful whether the ICC 
would challenge the legality of these resolutions, which have already triggered its 
investigations into the referred situations. Having already made an explicit Article 39 
determination, the referral resolutions may possibly be reviewed by the ICC with regard to 
the Security Council’s discretionary power in deciding what measures shall be taken to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. This is exactly what the ad hoc tribunals 
have done in order to support their legal establishment or judicial function. However, 
contrary to the ad hoc tribunals, in order to justify its jurisdiction over such personnel as are 
protected by the Security Council carve-out resolutions, the ICC has to present a sound 
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limitation to the Chapter VII power, which may render the referral resolution ultra vires. 
This may be difficult, if not impossible. Various international decisions such as the Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Case
 207 





illustrate that the Council’s powers are not limited to those stated in the Charter.
209
 
Through the doctrine of implied power, new powers may be implied from existing 
provisions if necessary for the fulfilment of the purposes of the organisation.
 210
 By the time 
the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of the ICC started its work in 1996, the 
Security Council’s discretionary power to undertake international judicial intervention 
through ad hoc tribunals was generally recognised as a Council faculty firmly rooted in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
211
 The Security Council retains, of course, its competence to 
establish ad hoc criminal tribunals on a selective basis, which has by no means been affected 
by the Rome Statute. If setting up an ad hoc criminal tribunal is within the range of powers 
that can be implied from Article 41 of the Charter, the power to make a ‘selective’ referral, 
which simply limit the extent to which the Council decides to intervene, could arguably be 
justified along similar lines.  
              Another possible route for these carve-out resolutions being judicially reviewed 
leads to the ICJ, which might inquire into the legality of the Security Council resolutions 
through an advisory opinion. According to Article 96(1) of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council or the General Assembly may require the World Court to give an advisory opinion 
‘on any legal question.’
212
 If the ICC opens an investigation over the personnel carved out by 
the Security Council referral resolutions, it is possible that some states may refuse to 
cooperate with the ICC in relation to these cases by virtue of their obligations under the 
carve-out resolutions and Article 103 of the UN Charter. If the ICC refers failures of its 
member states to cooperate with the Court to the Security Council,
213
 the Council may wish 
to ask for an advisory opinion to verify the validity of these carve-out resolutions. However, 
the Council would not do so if the risk of embarrassment were too great or the possibility of 
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an adverse opinion unacceptable.
214
 An initiative coming from the Council is thus very 
unlikely, although not totally impossible. The Namibia Advisory Opinion
 
resulted from the 
Security Council’s only request to date for an advisory opinion.  
               There is also a possibility that certain states which either wish to dispute the 
validity of the carve-out by the Security Council or to question the ICC's jurisdiction over 
the carved-out personnel, may try to persuade the General Assembly to challenge or verify it 
before the ICJ in an advisory opinion. In the Nuclear Weapons Case, the ICJ concluded that 
the General Assembly has the competence to request an opinion relating to any question 
within the scope of the Charter.
215 
 Again, it depends on the political will of the states within 
the General Assembly to take such an initiative. It should be noted that advisory opinions are 
not invested by the Charter or the ICJ Statute with legally binding force,
216
 though a finding 
of illegality might give encouragement to the ICC to dismiss the carve-out resolutions.   
                Above all, the circumstances in which Court will be able to act contrary to the 
carve-out resolutions are very rare, and the possibilities for the legality of these carve-out 
resolutions being challenged are even lower. The absence of some authoritative body 
external to the Security Council willing and able to review the conformity of these carve-out 
resolutions with the Council’s legal powers would render any legal limits to its power 
illusory. The inconsistency between the carve-out resolutions and the Rome Statute may 
never be resolved, because real conflicts will simply not arise and judicial review will 
therefore not be required. The merits of adopting these carve-out resolutions lie in the 
establishment of a precedent of shaping the ICC’s jurisdiction by the Security Council, and 
the possible normalisation of this practice.
217
 This approach has already been admitted by the 
US authorities: ‘the power of the Security Council to refer situations enables the Council to 
shape the ICC’s jurisdiction … such referral can be tailored to minimise the exposure to ICC 
jurisdiction of military forces deployed to confront the threat. The Chapter VII resolution 
would define the parameters of the Court’s investigations in the particular situation’. 
218
 
More importantly, to some extent, the carve-out resolutions may achieve the effect of a de 
facto ‘rewrite’ of the Rome Statute.   
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5. The Carve-out Resolutions of the Security Council and the ‘Rewrite’ 
of the Rome Statute  
 
Prior to the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1422 and 1487, several states argued 
that providing a blanket immunity in advance in this way would in fact amount to an attempt 
to amend the Rome Statute without the approval of its states parties, and that the Council did 
not have the power to take decisions under Chapter VII to modify international treaties. 
219
 In 
particular, the representative of New Zealand referred to Resolutions 1422 and 1487 as 
‘generic resolutions’, which means ‘a resolution not in response to a particular fact 
situation.’
220
 It has been submitted that obligations imposed by a generic resolution are akin 
to obligations entered into by states in international agreements, is thus equal to a ‘legislative 
resolution’
221
. This relates to whether the Security Council has the competence to legislate or 
rewrite international law.  
              It seems that there has been an increasing tendency on the part of the Council in 
recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislation.
222
 Through interpreting and 
applying the UN Charter in a number of innovative ways, the Security Council has showed 
that it is willing to lay down rules and principles of general application, binding on all states, 
and taking precedence over other legal rights and obligations.
223
 The pre-emptive deferral 
resolutions are not the only ‘generic resolutions’ innovatively created by the Security 
Council. Two other striking examples are the Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 
1540 (2004).
224
 With these resolutions, the Council imposed general and abstract obligations 
on all member states in a context not limited to a particular country, which is arguably an 
exercise of a law-making process by the Council. 
225
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              Nevertheless, whether the Council has the power to create law still remains 
controversial.
226
 It is not necessary to explore this debate in depth here, but it should be noted 
that the Security Council does have the power to create rights and obligations for the 
member states of the UN.
227
 These new rights and obligations will sometimes supplant pre-
existing rights and obligations.
228
 The principle that binding Security Council decisions taken 
under Chapter VII supersede other treaty commitments seems to be generally recognised. 
229
 
In the 1984 Nicaragua Judgment, the ICJ observed that ‘all the regional, bilateral and even 
multilateral arrangements … must always be subject to the provisions of Article 103 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.’
230
 The ICJ similarly held in the Lockerbie Case that 
obligations imposed by the Council take precedence over obligations under international 
treaties.
231
 It is also generally accepted that the priority which Article 103 affords to the 
Charter over international agreements is equally applicable to rules of customary 
international law (general international law).
232
 In other words, under most circumstances, 
obligations under the Charter, being treaty obligations, would supersede obligations under 
customary law in the event of conflict.  
              The Charter’s requirement that all states comply with the decisions of the Council, 
notwithstanding any contrary obligations under other treaties or customs, means that the 
Council has the extraordinary power to alter the international legal landscape 
instantaneously.
233
 Under Article 103 of the Charter, valid and binding decisions of the 
Council not only affect all states, but also override inconsistent international law.
234
  In effect, 
the capacity to override other treaties and general international law amount to a claim to 
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 This clearly applies to the adoption of the carve-out resolutions. 
The UN peacekeeping personnel that were carved out by the Security Council resolutions 
would have been subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the territorial state, the national state, 
any other state exercising universal jurisdiction over international crimes, and the ICC. The 
carve-out resolutions not only exempted the peacekeepers in question from the jurisdiction 
of the ICC under the Rome Treaty, but also from the host state’s territorial jurisdiction in 
customary law. As discussed in Chapter III, international law does not generally grant 
exclusive jurisdiction to any state. However, by virtue of the carve-out resolutions, these 
peacekeepers may thus be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of their national state. This 
clearly shows how the Council has used its power to rewrite or dispense with customary law 
and applicable treaties. While challenges to their validity may be a tenable response, as noted 
previously, the possibility of challenging the legality of the Council's action is limited and 
the scope of judicial review is uncertain. Insofar as the Council’s reading of the Charter is 
accepted by states, the potential for law-making is readily apparent.
236
  
                To sum up, even though the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council 
in terms of any limitation on the jurisdictional reach of the Court is clearly spelled out in 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the actual deferrals made by the Security Council in practice 
to limit the ICC’s jurisdiction were seemingly incompatible with this provision. In addition, 
Article 16 does not represent the sole mechanism by which the ICC’s jurisdiction may be 
limited by the Security Council. As noted earlier, Article 13(b) allows the Council to enlarge 
the jurisdictional reach of the ICC by using its power of referral in relation to situations 
involving non-state parties. However, in the Council’s practice of referral, it has elected to 
limit the enlargement of the Court’s jurisdiction to a certain extent. In this way, the power of 
referral has been used by the Council as a ‘positive limitation’ on the Court’s jurisdiction as 
opposed to the ‘negative limitation’ posed by the deferral power. In fact, both Article 13(b) 
and Article 16 do not take away any power from or give any power to the Council, but 
merely echo the powers which the Council already possesses under the UN Charter. 
Nevertheless, these provisions should not be regarded as redundant, as they obliged the ICC 
to react in the ways set out in the Statute if the Security Council acts in a certain fashion. In 
other words, Article 13(b) and Article 16 are the sources of the ICC’s obligations rather than 
the powers of the Security Council. Actually, whether the purported usage of Article 13(b) 
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and Article 16 by the Council through its carve-out resolutions would indeed achieve the 
effect of limiting the ICC’s jurisdiction largely depends on the reaction from the ICC.  
              The exercise of the Security Council powers, if conducted in conformity with the 
relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, would trigger the ICC’s obligations. On the other 
hand, the ICC is not bound to accommodate the requests of Security Council resolutions if 
they are inconsistent with its own founding document. However, if caught in the rarely 
occurring conflicts between the Security Council Resolution and the Rome Statute, it is 
highly unlikely that the ICC would act in defiance of the Security Council resolutions. One 
of barriers for the ICC to act in contrary to the carve-out resolutions is Article 103 of the UN 
Charter. Even though the ICC itself is not bound by the trumping provision, its member 
states clearly are. Were the ICC to act contrary to the Security Council resolutions, its 
member states would then be faced with two conflicting decisions, one adopted by a political 
organ and the other by a judicial body. Although, in theory, the conflicting state parties’ 
obligations will not defer the ICC prosecutor from acting contrary to the will of the Security 
Council, the ICC is ‘a giant without arms and legs – it needs artificial limbs to walk and 
work. And those artificial limbs are state authorities.’
237
 In practice, the ICC is unlikely to 
act in a way contrary to the carve-out resolutions given the importance of state cooperation 
in the Court’s operation. Furthermore, asking states to fulfil the cooperative obligations 
under the Rome Statute would be in tension with the ICC’s previous position regarding the 
primacy of Article 103.
238
  
              A possible solution to this dilemma is the judicial review of the Council’s carve-
out resolutions. However, as observed above, the circumstances under which a judicial 
review process could be triggered are limited, and the possibility that the ICC or the ICJ 
would actually undertake such a judicial review is even more remote. In addition, there has 
been an attempt to normalise this kind of practice. If this trend gains momentum, it would 
achieve the effect of de facto rewriting the Rome Statute. The implications for China is that 
the insufficiency of the complementarity principle and the reduced role of state consent in 
limiting the Court’s jurisdiction, which have been of concern to China, could be improved 
through the exercise of the Security Council’s purported usage of its deferral and referral 
powers. 
                                                          
237
 Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trend towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998), 2-17, 
pp.2, 13. 
238
 The ICC emphasised that the obligations of Sudan to fully cooperate with the Court ‘shall prevail 
over any other obligation that the State of Sudan may have undertaken pursuant to any other 









Section III.  China and the Crime of Aggression  
 
The crime of aggression has been regarded as the most important piece of unfinished 
business from the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998,
239
 when the crime was included as 
one of the four core crimes in Article 5 (1) of the ICC Statute, but its form was not fully 
agreed upon, when the Statute entered into force. Article 5(2) provided that the Court shall 
not exercise jurisdiction over the crime, until ‘a provision is adopted in accordance with 
Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
240
 
              Two distinct, but interrelated considerations, inter alia, produced this result: the 
role of the Security Council in its relation to the application of the crime by the Court and the 
definition of the crime.
241
 During the Rome Diplomatic Conference most states expressed a 
strong desire that the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC included the crime of aggression, 
a minority of states, including the US, maintained reservations on it.
242
 China was in favour 
of the inclusion of crime of aggression under the Rome Statute, subject, however, to two 
conditions: firstly, there should be a precise definition of the crime, and secondly, there 
should be a link with the Security Council.
243
 It expressed the need for prudence in dealing 
with both issues at the beginning of the negotiations by stating that ‘as the UN Charter 
entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility of determining whether aggression has 
occurred and in light of the need for a legal definition of the offence as well as the 
advisability of avoiding political stalemate, the inclusion of aggression in the Court’s 
jurisdiction should be handled with the utmost circumspection.’ 
244
 The ongoing negotiations 
on these two issues until the Kampala Review Conference have revealed the divergent views 
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among delegations and the great difficulties of reaching an agreement. This section examines 
the concerns of China regarding both issues, which are in fact intrinsically linked to each 
other. 
 
1. The Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction: The Role 
of the Security Council  
 
1.1 The Negotiating Process and the Engagement of China  
Although Paragraph 2 of Article 5 does not make explicit reference to the Security Council, 
the provision that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court shall ‘be consistent with the 
relevant provision of the Charter of the United Nations’ implies the involvement of the 
Council.
245
 This is the logical and necessary link between the Rome Statute and the UN 
Charter: the first deals with crimes, from the perspective of establishing individual criminal 
responsibility under international law; the second addresses state behaviour, from the 
perspective of the obligation of states to respect the general prohibition to use force against 
another state.
246
 The crime of aggression is intrinsically linked to the commission of 
aggression by a state.
247
 This clearly concerns the respective findings by the Security Council 
and the Court whether an act of aggression has been committed. 
248
 Coordinating the roles of 
the Security Council and the ICC was the question that the ILC had attempted to resolve in 
its draft Statute by making a determination by the Security Council a condition for the Court 
to be able to try an individual for aggression.
249
  
               In the following discussions during the Ad Hoc Commission and the Preparatory 
Commission, 
250
 views were divided between those supporting a role for the Council in light 
of its responsibilities under the UN Charter, and those opposing the politicisation of the 
judicial regime if the Council’s approval were to be made a pre-condition for the exercise of 
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 Unsurprisingly, this provision was strongly supported by the P-5.
252
 In 1997, 
China clearly expressed its position at the General Assembly Sixth Committee by stating: ‘as 
to the role of the Security Council, his delegation felt that the draft provisions prepared by 
the International Law Commission were quite balanced and that the importance of 
maintaining the independence of the court should be taken into full account. It would 
therefore support any proposal that would ensure the independence of the court and at the 
same time reasonably reflect the special role of the Security Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’
253 
 
               At the 1998 Rome Conference, the positions on the role of the Security Council 
vis-à-vis the crime of aggression seemed to have hardened. While some states from the non-
aligned movement opposed any role for the Council, the P-5 regarded the role of the Council 
as a condition sine qua non for the inclusion of the crime of aggression.
 254 
China pointed out 
that the ‘ICC should not compromise the principal role of the United Nations, and in 
particular the Security Council, in safeguarding world peace and security, the provisions of 
the Statute should not run counter to those of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
Conference should be prudent in dealing with the relationship between the Court and the 
United Nations and the role of the Council.’
255
 China insisted on a link between the crime of 
aggression and the Security Council as a precondition for the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression under the Rome Statute; 
256
 however, China did not specify the nature of ‘the 
link’ at that moment. By way of contrast, the US had clearly insisted on an exclusive 
Security Council role in first determining that an act of aggression had occurred before the 
ICC could exercise jurisdiction in any particular situation.
257
 China insisted in principle that 
‘the operation of the Court should not impede the Council in carrying out its important 
responsibilities for maintaining peace and security’ and ‘the Council should also have the 
power to determine whether act of aggression had been committed’.
258
  
               As negotiations over the jurisdictional conditions for the crime of aggression 
remained in deadlock at Rome, the parties chose to shelve this issue. The result, as we 
already seen, is that aggression was included in the text of the Statute, but the Court could 
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not exercise its jurisdiction until the Statute is completed, in accordance with the procedures 
contemplated by Articles 121 and 123. When voting against the Rome Statute, China 
reiterated its position that ‘Crime of Aggression is a state act, and there is no legal definition 
of the crime of aggression. To avoid political abuse of litigation, it is necessary to have the 
UN Security Council first determine the existence of aggression before pursuing individual 
criminal responsibility, as is stipulated in Article 39 of the UN Charter.’
259
  
             The Final Act of the Rome Conference instructed the Preparatory Commission for 
the Court to ‘prepare proposals for a provision on aggression, including... conditions under 
which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this 
crime.’
260
 Accordingly, there emerged some proposals, which tried to bridge the gap between 
positions that defended the Council’s exclusive responsibility as a pre-requisite for deciding 
on individual criminal responsibility, and those arguing that the Security Council should 
have no role at all in this matter.
261
  
              One of the proposals as presented at the Sixth Session of the Preparatory 
Commission in 2000 considered that the primary responsibility for determining state 
aggression lay with the Security Council but that a failure by that organ to fulfil this 
responsibility should not render the jurisdiction of the ICC inoperative and non-existent in 
practice. It provided that the Security Council would be requested by the Court to determine 
whether in a given situation the crime of aggression had been committed. In the absence of a 
decision by the Council within a given period of time, the Court could proceed with its 
investigations or prosecutions.
262
 If the Council was not able to reach any such determination 




              China, however, did not seem to be willing to compromise its position. It asserted 
in its intervention at this session of the Preparatory Commission that ‘since the precondition 
for an individual to bear the criminal responsibility is that the state commits an act of 
aggression. In the absence of a determination by the Security Council on the situation of 
aggression, the court lacks the basis to prosecute the individual for his criminal liability. 
Besides, allowing the court to exercise jurisdiction before the Security Council makes the 
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determination was practically bestowing on the court the right of determination on the state 
act of aggression. This runs counter to the provision of the Charter.’
264  
 It is clear that China 
insisted on assigning the Security Council an exclusive role – in the absence of a prior 
Security Council determination that the state in question had committed an act of aggression, 
prosecution would be barred. In addition, China was against the proposals for permitting the 
determination of aggression by the General Assembly. It further argued that ‘there was no 
relevant foundation in the Charter. Though the General Assembly could discuss affairs 
related to international peace and security, on the question of the determination of 
aggression, the exclusive power the Charter confers on the Security Council is explicit.’
265
  
              During the meetings of the Eighth Session of the Preparatory Commission in 2001, 
the coordinator for the crime of aggression reintroduced a discussion paper which included a 
series of options aiming at reconciling the prerogatives of the Security Council regarding the 
crime of aggression with the independence of the Court.
266
 It offered an additional option, 
which provided that if the Council did not act within a certain time, the issue could go to the 
ICJ. 
267
 China was not in favour of this new option. This can be seen from its statement at the 
Sixth Committee shortly after the Preparatory Commission’s discussions. China pointed out 
that ‘if, as some countries were proposing, the Court was left to determine whether a State 
had committed an act of aggression after the Security Council had failed to do so within a 
given period of time, the Court would run a high risk of being politicized. His delegation 
also doubted whether the advisory opinions or judgments of the International Court of 
Justice should be used as basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, as proposed by some countries. 
According to the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, the latter’s advisory role was limited to giving its opinions on any legal question; it 
had no mandate to make findings of fact. Moreover, it took a long time to give an advisory 
opinion, and that run counter to the requirement of criminal justice.’ 
268
  
              Regardless of these efforts to find ways to balance the prerogatives of the Council 
with the independence of the Court, there was an obvious resistance from the P-5 to accept 
any solution that would allow the Court to proceed without a previous decision by the 
Council. The ‘primary’ responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
given to the Council by Article 24(1) of the UN Charter was interpreted as an ‘exclusive’ 
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 The Preparatory Commission was unable to reconcile the supremacy of the 
Council and the independence of the Court. Its work was continued by the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, set up under the auspices of the ASP in 2002.
270
 The 
work of the SWGCA was still being based on the option paper elaborated by the Preparatory 
Commission.
271
 In a discussion paper proposed by the Chairman in 2007, the Security 
Council continued to have ‘the first bite of the cherry’ for determining whether an act of 
aggression had occurred. If the Council declined or failed to make such a determination, 
there were four options, which were similar to the ones presented at the Preparatory 
Commission.
272
 The Chinese delegation expressed its preference for the option, which gave 
the final say exclusively to the Council. It reinforced its assertion of an exclusive Security 
Council role in determining an act of aggression by making reference to several UN Charter 
provisions. China insisted that ‘it is a precondition for the Security Council’s determination 
of aggression to judge whether the International Criminal Court shall have jurisdiction over 
aggression, and no other organs may make such determination in place of the Security 
Council. This results from article 24 and article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
which confers the primary power and responsibility of maintaining international peace and 
security on the Security Council. This is also consistent with the current effective mechanism 
of the collective security. Meanwhile, article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations 
provides that the obligation under the Charter prevails over the obligations of the member 
States under international agreements, including the Rome Statute. Therefore, with regard to 
aggression, all member States, whether they are State parties to the Rome Statute or not, 
have the obligation to respect the authority of the Security Council in terms of international 
peace and security.’
273
 At the same time, it also showed some flexibility in its position by 
stating that ‘China is also actively considering other constructive proposals,’
274
 which 
indicated that China might possibly modify its view on an exclusive Security Council role. 
               The SWGCA’s final effort on provisions and conditions was contained in its 
Report to the Assembly in February 2009.
275
 The draft comprised articles for addition to the 
Statute, including Article 15bis, which dealt with the conditions for the exercise of 
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jurisdiction. Article 15bis (1) stated that ‘the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression in accordance with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article,’ which 
means that the SWGCA has already agreed that the Council would not be the only organ that 
could provide the Court with a basis for its exercise of jurisdiction. That basis could be a 
state referral
276
 as well as an investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu.
277
 The 
question of the role of the Security Council was therefore not (or not anymore) a question of 
the trigger mechanism, but a question of a ‘jurisdictional filter’.
278
 Article 15bis divided the 
options into two categories, each of them imposing a ‘jurisdictional filter’ upon the Court for 
prosecution of the crime of aggression.
279
 The first of the two alternative categories imposed 
a ‘red light’ (denial of the right to go forward) on the Court’s right to prosecute until the 
Council acts.
280
 The second of the alternatives would become operational if the Council had 
not acted for six months. It contained options by which a ‘green light’ (permission to go 
forward) from a PTC, the ICJ, or the General Assembly, was a prerequisite to prosecution.
281
  
               At the Eighth Session of the ASP, China again emphasised that ‘the ICC must, first 
and foremost, observe the guiding principles of the UN Charter, ensure that it will not 
undermine the core value of the Charter in maintaining world peace and security’
282
. China 
also cautioned that the ICC states parties ‘should not haste (sic.) to insert into the Rome 
Statute those amendments on which no international consensus has been reached. Otherwise 
it will give rise to more misgivings and bring more uncertainties to the healthy development 
of the ICC.’
283
 Similarly, the US argued that ‘should the Rome Statute be amended to include 
a defined crime of aggression, jurisdiction should follow a Security Council determination 
that aggression has occurred’.
284
 
               At Kampala, by and large, the P-5 took the position that Article 39 of the Charter 
confers on the Council the exclusive power to make determinations of the existence of an act 
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of aggression and thus a Security Council pre-determination of aggression is an essential 
precondition to exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction.
285
 On the other hand, there was a 
tremendous resistance by a solid group of states which were strongly behind the proposition 
that it was necessary to preserve the principle of independence of the Court from interference 
by a political body.
286
 The resolution of the divergent positions in Kampala was partly 
facilitated by a move to split the SWGCA’s draft Article 15bis into two parts, one dealing 
with state referrals and referrals made by the prosecutor proprio motu, and the other which 
deals with Security Council referrals. These became, respectively, Articles 15bis and 
15ter.
287
 Article 15ter applies when the Council, pursuant to Article 13(b) refers to the 
Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes of aggression appear to have been 
committed. The power of the Council to trigger aggression proceedings has always been 
uncontroversial.
288
  However, the issue of how to deal with the other trigger mechanisms, as 
enshrined in paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 13 of the ICC Statute, was extremely 
contentious.  
                With regard to the trigger by either a state referral or the Prosecutor proprio motu, 
the question of the role of the Security Council remained a question of jurisdictional filter in 
Kampala. The P-5 favoured designating the Council as an exclusive and determinative filter–
in the absence of a prior Security Council determination that the state in question had 
committed an act of aggression, prosecution would be barred. Others disagreed strongly 
about this proposed exclusivity.
289
 In contrast, the P-5 camp was not so resolved. France and 
the UK, both of which possessed a vote in Kampala, finally moved from their initial position, 
and their commitment to the ICC trumped their loyalty to their P-5 allies.
290
 The Kampala 
compromise reflected the strongly felt preference of the overwhelming majority of the states 
parties, for granting the ICC Prosecutor the ability to proceed with an investigation of an 
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alleged crime of aggression without a Security Council monopoly, albeit only with the 
approval of the ICC Pre-Trial Division.
291
  
              The jurisdictional filter, as finally set forth in Article 15bis, is a combination of 
consent-based and Security Council-based filters. The first layer of the filter is state consent. 
According to Article 15bis(4), the Court must first determine whether the crime of 
aggression arises from an act of aggression by a state party that had previously declared to 
the Registrar of the Court that it does not accept the Court’s jurisdiction on aggression.
292
 If 
such a declaration had been filed, then the Court may not proceed against the nationals of 
such a state party. In addition, pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article 15bis, the Court cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by non-party nationals or 
on a non-party territory. 
293
 The next stage of the jurisdictional filter has been set forth by 
Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of Article 15bis which concerns the role of the Security Council. If the 
Prosecutor decides that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation of a crime 
of aggression following an Article 13(a) referral by a state party or on the Prosecutor’s own 
initiative under Article 13(c), he or she must first ‘ascertain whether the Security Council 
has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the state concerned’.
294
 If 
the Council has so determined, then the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation of a 
crime of aggression. 
295
 If a Council determination is not made within six months after the 
date on which the Prosecutor notifies the UN Secretary-General that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation of an alleged crime of aggression, then the Prosecutor 
may proceed with an investigation, provided the Pre-Trial Division of the Court first has 
authorised the commencement of the investigation in accordance with the procedure 
contained in Article 15 of the Rome Statute.
296
 Thus the ‘filter’ in the ordinary case is not the 
Security Council, instead, prosecutions initiated through state referrals or proprio motu 
action would be subject to a Pre-Trial Division filter involving all of the PTC judges in the 
event that the Security Council had not already made an affirmative aggression 
determination, unless the Security Council wished to put on a ‘red light’ by acting under 
Article 16.
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                When the consensus decision was reached in Kampala, the P-5 declared their 
dissatisfaction with the rejection of a Security Council monopoly with respect to the conduct 
of proceedings for the crime of aggression before the ICC. 
297
 As reiterated by the Chinese 
Deputy Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Jian Guan, after the adoption the Amendment, ‘the amendment does not completely 
reflect the relevant provisions and requirement of the Statute and the Charter’ as ‘it is the 
exclusive power of the Security Council to determine the act of aggression, which is provided 
in the UN Charter’.
298
 The US also declared, in its concluding statement at the review 
conference, the unacceptability of this usurpation of the Security Council’s authority under 




1.2 Concerns of China regarding the Role of the Security Council   
To sum up, China’s legal arguments on the crime of aggression were Charter-based and 
turned on, inter alia, the language in Article 24(1), Article 39 and Article 103 of the UN 
Charter. Given the textual mandate in the Charter, China argued that ‘on the question of the 
determination of aggression, the exclusive power the Charter confers on the Security 
Council is explicit’.
300
 Accordingly, ‘it is a precondition for the Security Council’s 
determination of aggression to judge whether the International Criminal Court shall have 
jurisdiction over aggression, and no other organs may make such determination in place of 
the Security Council’.
301
 Notwithstanding these textual arguments, the Security Council 
exclusivity thesis has come under fire for being without foundation in the text of the UN 
Charter and as inconsistent with UN practice.
302
 In particular, China’s legal arguments in 
favour of Council exclusivity in the aggression realm proved unconvincing in light of past 
UN practice supported by China itself.  
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1.2.1. Practice of the United Nations   
Indeed, Article 39 of the Charter has empowered the Security Council to determine, among 
others, the commission of an act of aggression. However, this does not mean no other body 
can ever determine the existence of aggression. The Security Council priority follows from 
Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter, according to which, the Council has the ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.
303
 This is further 
elaborated in Article 12(1), which provides that the General Assembly shall not make 
recommendations in relation to a case while the Council is exercising its function in that 
case.
304
 However, the responsibility placed upon the Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security is primary rather than exclusive.
305
 This issue has been 
addressed in the General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution, which gives a role to the 
General Assembly where the Council is stalemated by the use of veto. 
306
 In Operative 
Paragraph 1 of that resolution, the General Assembly ‘resolves that if the Security Council, 
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where 
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security…’ 
307
  
               In the course of the debate prior to the adoption of this resolution, even the US 
acknowledged that while ‘primary’ responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security rests with the Security Council, its responsibility was not exclusive.
308
  Aimed 
primarily at overcoming any hurdle posed by Article 12(1), the resolution clearly implies an 
ability of the General Assembly to determine the existence or occurrence of acts of 
aggression. If it did not have this power, the General Assembly could not properly determine 
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whether or not it was appropriate to make a recommendation relating to the use of armed 
force to maintain or restore international peace and security.
309
 
               The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been invoked several times to convene 
emergency special sessions of the General Assembly. A notable example is found in 
Resolution 498 of 1 February 1951, in which the General Assembly condemned the actions 
of China in Korea as aggression.
310 
 In addition, the Security Council itself on a number of 
occasions has invoked the resolution and called for emergency special sessions of the 
General Assembly.
311
 There has been no recorded protest of the Security Council in relation 
to this practice. Notably, China voted in favour of a Security Council resolution calling for 
an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the situation in 
Afghanistan.
312
 The basis for the requested convening of the General Assembly, as expressed 
in the Security Council resolution itself, was the ‘lack of unanimity of [the Security Council’s] 
permanent members’ which ‘prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.’
313
 This request was predicted upon a direct 
allusion to the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 
314
 Even though the Chinese government was 
not co-sponsor of the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution like the other permanent members, 
China has voted pursuant to that resolution when it suited her.  
              In addition, there is significant practice on the part of the General Assembly in 
making determinations that aggression has occurred. The General Assembly has in six 
situations qualified certain acts as ‘aggressive acts’, ‘acts of aggression’, or ‘aggression’.
315
 It 
should be noted the practice of the General Assembly have been supported by the Chinese 
government since it took up the Chinese seat in New York. Without questioning the 
competence of the General Assembly to determine whether or not a state has committed an 
act of aggression, China consistently voted in favour of the General Assembly resolutions 
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characterizing certain situations as aggression.
316
 The support of China in the General 
Assembly practice therefore confirms that, while it is true that the Security Council has a 
priority power to determine whether or not an act of aggression has been committed, this is 
not an exclusive power of the Council that would preclude the General Assembly or other 
organs from making aggression determinations.  
 
1.2.2  ICJ Practice  
The argument that the Security Council does not have exclusive power in this area also gains 
substantial support from the ICJ in various cases. In the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion 
(1962), the ICJ stated, although in relation to Article 24 of the Charter, that while the 
responsibility of the Security Council in the matter was ‘primary’, it was not ‘exclusive’.
317
 
Similar readings of Article 24 (1) can also be found in the ICJ’s subsequent cases, including 
the Nicaragua case
318
 and the Palestinian Wall Advisory Opinion.
319
 The ICJ also observed 
in the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion that ‘the Charter made it abundantly clear that 
the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security.’
320
 The 
competence of the General Assembly in making determinations of aggression was further 
clarified by the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory Opinion where it stated that ‘it would not be 
correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with 
recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the 
framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative 
design.’
321
 In response to the argument that by virtue of Article 12 the Assembly could not 
make a recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of international peace 
and security while the matter remained on the Council’s agenda, the ICJ pointed out that to 
the extent that there may once have been a Charter prohibition of simultaneous action, it has 
been superseded by subsequent practice. 
322
 Thus, any argument as to the need for the ICC to 
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be subservient to the Council based on Article 12(1) may be considered to be somewhat 
nullified by the practical interpretation of the provision.
323
 
              Apart from confirming the competence of the General Assembly in making 
determinations of aggression, the ICJ itself is experienced at making legal determinations 
related to violations of Article 2(4), though the ICJ has been leery of actually using the word 
‘aggression’. Undoubtedly, there is considerable overlap between aggression and a use of 
force in violation of Article 2(4), even though aggression is generally taken to be a narrower 
category than unlawful use of force.
324
 In practice, the ICJ is asked to find that a state has 
violated the prohibition of the use of force or has committed aggression, as for example, in 
the 1986 Nicaragua Case,
325 
 and the 2005 Armed Activities Case.
326
 In these instances, the 
ICJ has generally framed the issue as whether a state had used force in violation of Article 
2(4) of the Charter. The ICJ was reluctant to frame the issue as whether a state had 
committed aggression, but it equated armed attacks with acts of aggression in distinguishing 
between the most grave and the less grave forms of the use of force.
327
 In the Nicaragua 
Case, the Court emphasised that it is necessary ‘to distinguish the most grave forms of the 
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms’,
328
 an 
approach that was also utilised in the Oil Platforms Case.
329
 In both cases, the applicant 
states did not request the Court to find that acts of aggression had been committed by the 
defendant state, and the Court’s judgment did not contain such findings. However, it can be 
understood that the Court’s considerations concerning aggression were made in the context 
of its examination of whether the defendant state could invoke the right of self-defence.
330
 In 
the Armed Activities Case, when the ICJ was confronted with the request by the applicant 
state for an aggression finding, the Court did not make such a finding, but confined itself to 
qualifying these facts as ‘a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force.’
331
 
However, the Separate Opinions of the individual judges acknowledged without ambiguity 
that the ICJ is able to determine the occurrence of an act of aggression.
332
 It is obvious that 
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the ICJ did not shy way from performing its judicial role in the field of the use of force and 
aggression. Even though the ICJ has so far never actually applied the phrase ‘act of 
aggression’ to any state, it clearly has the competence to do so.
333
  
              Not only has the practice of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the 
ICJ challenged China’s proposition for an exclusive Security Council power in determining 
an act of aggression, but the P-5’s insistence on exclusivity has not been very solid. Though 
in Kampala, by and large, the P-5 argued for a mandatory Security Council role in first 
determining that an act of aggression has occurred before the Court could exercise 
jurisdiction in any particular situation, both the UK and France did not insist on an exclusive 
Security Council role at the final moment. This was counted as a big blow to their P-5 allies’ 
position.  
              Actually, China’s insistence on an exclusive Security Council role in the question 
of aggression has not been consistent and uncompromising. Back in 1974 in defining 
aggression, regardless of its permanent membership of the Security Council, China alone 
expressed doubts about the wisdom of expecting the permanent members of the Security 
Council, with their veto power, to decide which acts would be condemned as aggression. 
334
 
China explicitly pointed out ‘the super-Powers were arguing very hard for their idea that it 
was only up to the Security Council to decide whether a specific act constituted an act of 
aggression. Obviously, what they had in mind was invariably their veto power in the Security 
Council. In the event of their aggression against other countries, they could remain 
unpunished by casting a single negative vote. Consequently it may well be asked whether the 
whole text of the definition of aggression would not become a mere scrap of paper.’ 
335
  
              China believed it is ‘absolutely impermissible for the few imperialist Powers to 
have the final say, because the aggressors would never bring themselves to trial.’
336
 Thus 
China suggested the UN determination of the objective facts on aggression should be made 
by all the member states, big or small, not by the superpowers in the Security Council.
337
 It is 
clear that China was against the exclusive Security Council role at the beginning of its 
engagement in the UN. It is thus not difficult to understand why China was reluctant to claim 
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a monopoly role for the Security Council during the early negotiation process of the Rome 
Statute. More significantly, on many occasions China has lent its support to the General 
Assembly’s determination of acts of aggression. Even though China hardened its position for 
an exclusive Security Council determination at a later stage of the negotiations on the crime 
of aggression, it did not rule out the possibility that this position could be compromised and 
changed, as China has previously shown in theory and practice that the Security Council 
should not have a monopoly over the question of aggression. As noted above, in the 
SWGCA, even though China was inclined to support the option of an exclusive Security 




              It is therefore a natural conclusion that China’s insistence on an exclusive Security 
Council role in the determination of an act of aggression is not one of a fundamental legal 
character but rather a policy preference. Even though the Kampala amendment did not grant 
an exclusive role to the Security Council in filtering the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, it should not be regarded as a legal barrier impeding China's accession to the ICC.  
             In fact, the Security Council is not necessary in filtering the ICC’s jurisdiction, as 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is conditional on state consent. Even 
though in Rome the opt-in procedure favoured by the Chinese authorities was eventually 
dropped, and the opt-out mechanism was restricted to war crimes for a limited period of 
time,
339
  this opt-in or opt-out approach was reintroduced in Kampala. Article 15bis(4) opens 
the opportunity for state parties to opt-out of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression.
340
 In addition, it will be recalled from Chapter III, when the Rome 
Statute was adopted, China argued that there was an apparent drafting flaw in Article 121(5) 
of the Statute in which only a state party could declare its non-acceptance of a new crime 
while oddly leaving non-states parties exposed to the Court’s jurisdiction for such newly 
added crimes.
341
 Nevertheless, in the SWGCA, a strong preference was expressed not to 
discriminate in the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression between 
states parties which have not accepted the amendment and non-states parties.
342
 This 
approach was subsequently reflected in the text of Article 15bis(5), which bars the ICC from 
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exercising jurisdiction in respect of the crime of aggression over the nationals of countries 
that are not party to the Rome Statute.
343
 Under the original Rome Statute, any country, even 
non-states parties, whose nationals committed a crime in the territory of one of the states 
parties, can be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction.
344
 This has been officially one of the main 
reasons for the Chinese government’s opposition to the ICC. However, China succeeded in 
addressing its concerns by excluding non-states parties from the Court’s jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression in Kampala. In a significant way, China’s endeavour in Rome to limit 
the Court’s jurisdiction by state consent has been partly achieved in Kampala.  
 
 
2. The Definition of the Crime of Aggression  
 
2.1 The Negotiating Process and the Involvement of China  
In its Draft Statute, the ILC left the question of the definition of the crime of aggression open. 
During the Preparatory Committee negotiations, there were two main schools of thought. 
One group of countries favoured an approach which was largely based on the ‘Definition of 
Aggression’ annexed to the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX).
345
 That definition, 
adopted by consensus in 1974, was intended to serve as guidance for the Security Council in 
determining the existence of an act of aggression by a state.
346
 However, the definition of 
aggression as an international crime differs greatly from the definition of aggression for the 
purposes of a political determination by the Security Council, if for no other reason than that 
the principles of legality in international criminal law require that crimes be specifically 
defined and their elements clearly stated.
347
 Therefore, a majority of countries attempted to 
present a definition of the crime of aggression which would be both precise and narrowly 
tailored.
348
 At the Rome Conference, most of the states maintained their previous position, 
and no generally acceptable definition of the crime of aggression could be agreed upon.
349
 
           The following search for a definition of the crime of aggression was carried out in 
the Preparatory Commission set up by the Final Act of the Rome Conference and the 
subsequent SWGCA created by the ASP. There continued to be significant debates around 
the question of whether the list of acts contained in General Assembly Resolution 3314 
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should indeed serve as a basis for the definition of the crime of aggression, and whether a 
qualifying element should be added.
350
 In 2007, at the Fifth Session of the ASP in 
discussions regarding the reference to General Assembly Resolution 3314 in paragraph 2 of 
the 2007 Discussion Paper, broad support was expressed for the retention of that reference.
351
 
The remaining challenge was how exactly to make use of the resolution in the new context: 
to refer to Resolution 3314 in its entirety or to ‘pick and choose’.
352
  
              The ‘Definition of Aggression’ annexed to Resolution 3314 contains a Preamble, 
reaffirming the fundamental principles upon which it is based, followed by eight operative 
articles. It employs two approaches at the same time: a deductive approach in Article 1 in 
which it proposes a general formula based on Charter Article 2(4);
353
 and an inductive 
approach in which it enumerates acts which constitute aggression in a non-exhaustive 
manner which appears in Article 3.
354
 Article 2 provides that the first use of armed force by a 
state in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression. The Security Council may, however, in conformity with the Charter, conclude 
that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in 
the light of other relevant circumstances.
355
 Article 4 confirms that the prohibitions listed in 
Article 3 are not exhaustive. The permanent members of the Security Council, with their 
veto power, retain the power to decide which acts would be condemned as aggression.
356
  
              At the ASP’s Fifth Session, some delegations expressed support for an explicit 
reference to Articles 1 and 3 of Resolution 3314, as reflected by the inclusion of the phrase 
‘Article 1 and Article 3’, in brackets, in the 2007 Discussion Paper.
357
 These delegations 
argued that these paragraphs were pertinent and concrete references, whereas a reference to 
the resolution as a whole would violate the principle of legality, since it would also entail 
references to unspecified acts in Article 4.
358
  Other delegations, including China, favoured a 
reference to Resolution 3314 in its entirety, since that text had been drafted as a careful 
                                                          
350
 Ibid, pp.138-139.  
351
 Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/35(2007), para.19 
[‘2007 SWGCA Report’].  
352
 Barriga, ‘Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression’, p.630.  
353
 GA Res.3314(1974), Art.1.   
354
 Ibid, Art.3.  
355
 Ibid, Art.2.  
356
 Ibid, Art.4.  
357
 2007 Discussion Paper, Art. 2. ‘For the purpose of paragraph 2, act of aggression means an act 
referred to in [article 1 and 3 of] United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974.’ 
358





compromise after lengthy negotiations.
359
 China expressed its support for the ‘general 
reference to the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314’,
360
 but rejected the ‘pick and 
choose’ approach. It suggested the ‘deletion of the content in the square brackets’, arguing 
that ‘it is well known that it was not easy to define aggression in Resolution 3314, and it is 
the product of comprehensive considerations of various factors and balancing of various 
concerns. Article 8 of the Resolution 3314 particularly stresses that every article is 
interlinked in the interpretation and application. Therefore, China considers it highly 
necessary to retain the integrity of Resolution 3314.’ 
361
 China particularly pointed out that 
‘it is not a reflection of the principle of legality to only refer to article 1 and article 3.’
362
 
              However, the final definition of the ‘act of aggression’ adopted at Kampala, though 
it made reference to General Assembly Resolution 3314, did not include Article 2 and 
Article 4 as China requested.  Article 8bis(2) defines an ‘act of aggression’ as , ‘the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as 
an act of aggression…’.
363
 What follows in Article 8bis(2) is a list of ‘acts’, which 
reproduced more or less verbatim the 1974 General Assembly definition of aggression, 
describing different types of armed attacks orchestrated by one state against another state.
364
 
              Divergence also existed on the question of whether the reference to the state act of 
aggression in the Annex to Resolution 3314 should be subject to a qualifier. One camp 
insisted that there be a higher threshold for criminal conduct, and they would not accept an 
unqualified reference to Article 1 and 3 of the Annex to Resolution 3314.
365
 These 
proponents of the threshold clause argued that it would constitute important guidance for the 
Court, and in particular prevent it from addressing borderline cases.
366
 The other camp 
favoured a more inclusive definition that referred to the list of acts contained in Article 3 of 
the Annex to Resolution 3314 without any additional threshold. These delegations argued 
that there was no need to qualify a state’s act, as a certain threshold was inherent in the 
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limitation of the jurisdiction of the Court to the ‘most serious crimes of international 




             It soon became clear that a reference to Resolution 3314 needed to be qualified if 
consensus were to be achieved.
368
 The discussion paper proposed by the Chairman in 2007 
suggested two options: a manifest threshold or an ‘object or result’ test. 
369
 Critics of the 
‘object or result’ approach argued that it would unduly limit the scope of the crime of 
aggression. In addition, there was concern that the ‘object or result’ test would be difficult to 
reconcile with the principle of legality.
370
 Finally broad support was voiced for the manifest 
threshold.
371
 At the very beginning of the process of defining crime of aggression, China 
expressed the necessity for the inclusion of a threshold by stating ‘the issue of defining the 
crime of aggression was of great concern to all States. An appropriate threshold should be 
set, engaging individual criminal responsibility, and the basis for doing so should be 
customary international law...’
372
 However, there is no official record revealing China's 
preference for any specific qualifier at this stage.  
              The Kampala Review conference eventually adopted the ‘manifest’ threshold 
accompanied by a series of understandings. The threshold clause, which is contained in 
Article 8bis(1) of the Rome Statute, would limit the Court’s jurisdiction to those cases where 
the act of aggression ‘by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations’.
373
 As noted in the Introductory Chapter, the US 
government deliberately chose not to participate in the earlier negotiations on this matter 
before the Obama administrations characterised their voluntary absence from the Princeton 
Process as a mistake.
374
 In the fall of 2009, the US began its reengagement with the ICC ASP. 
By that time, however, the ASP had concluded the major part of its negotiations on defining 
the crime of aggression. Both at Kampala and previously, the US expressed its concern that 
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‘the current draft definition remains flawed.’
375
 The primary US objective for the Review 
Conference was to alter the definition that had been finessed – without US input – in the 
years leading up to Kampala.
376
 As momentum was not in their favour, the US did not insist 
on reopening the debate on the respective drafts, but proposed a set of draft understanding to 
narrow the definition. When the US delegation tried to ‘smuggle’ the idea into the 
understandings that in determining an act of aggression ‘the purposes for which force was 
used’ should be taken into account, and disguised it as an innocent reflection of the 
Resolution 3314,
377
 the Chinese delegation joined Iran in questioning the reference to 
‘purpose’ proposed by the US delegation.
378




              Two understandings were specifically devoted to the state component of the crime. 
Paragraph 6 and Paragraph 7 of the understanding were pressed hard by the US delegation as 
they raise the bar on the gravity of acts of aggression.
380
  Understanding 6 might be seen to 
increase the threshold requirement of a ‘manifest’ violation of the Charter in the definition of 
the crime of aggression,
381
 which encouraged examination of justified uses of armed force 
that might arise, for example, in self-defence, anti-terrorism strikes, and even humanitarian 
intervention. 
382
 Understanding 7 seeks to ensure that a ‘manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations’ is understood to mean that each of the three components of character, 
gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ violation.  
 
2.2 The Concerns of China regarding the Definition of the Crime of 
Aggression  
With regard to the state element of the crime of aggression, China insisted on a reference to 
the entirety of the General Assembly Resolution 3314 as opposed to the ‘pick and choose’ 
approach adopted by Article 8bis, which omits Article 2 and Article 4 of the Resolution 3314 
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allowing the Security Council to exclude and include acts not falling under the general 
definition. This Chinese position, however, does not echo, or even seemingly contradicts its 
previous view about the validity and content of the Resolution 3314 back in 1974.  
              The definition of aggression contained in Resolution 3314 was the product of seven 
years of work by the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression established 
by the General Assembly in 1967. As such, much of the committee’s work was already in 
progress when the People’s Republic of China entered the UN in 1972. The final report of 
the Special Committee as presented to the Sixth Committee therefore had no Chinese input. 
383
 The Sixth Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote at its 1503
rd
 meeting on 
20 November 1974. China expressed its serious reservations about, if not outright opposition 
to, the definition of aggression by stating that ‘if a vote had been taken on the draft 
resolution which had just been adopted…[China]would not have taken part in it’.
384
 There 
were several deficiencies in the definition particularly raised by China at that time. 
              The 1974 definition, in particular Article 2 and Article 4, was criticised by China as 
being deficient because it gave too much freedom of action to the Security Council, and thus 
to its permanent members. Under Article 2 and Article 4 of the General Assembly definition, 
the Security Council may decide that an act that meets the definition is nonetheless not 
aggression and,
385
 on the other hand, that acts other than those on the list may be regarded by 
the Security Council as aggression.
386
  As noted in the first part of this section, in 1974, 
China was the only country among the permanent members that expressed doubts about the 
broad discretion of the Security Council in determining acts of aggression. It was argued that 
‘as it stood the definition would enable the super-powers to take advantage of their position 
as permanent members of the Security Council to justify their acts of aggression and, by 
abusing their veto power, to prevent the Security Council from adopting any resolution 
condemning the aggressor and supporting the victim.’ 
387
 Therefore, ‘it was difficult to see 
how the definition could have the effect of deterring a potential aggressor.’
388
 The Chinese 
officials repeatedly voiced the opinion that the identification of the aggressor is more 
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important and more necessary than the actual definition of aggression.
389
 It pointed out that 
‘the whole text of the definition of aggression would become a mere scrap of paper if the 
permanent members could remain unpunished by casting a single negative vote in the event 
of their aggression against other countries.’
390
 It was no wonder therefore that China fiercely 
criticised Article 2 and Article 4 as part of the definition of the act of aggression.  
              However, a few decades later, in the debates on the criminalisation of aggression, 
China turned to support the reference to Article 2 and Article 4 which it previously identified 
as deficient provisions. When seeking a greater role of the Security Council in determining 
the act of aggression for the purpose of attaching individual criminal responsibility, China 
chose to bring Article 2 and Article 4 into play. It instead argued that ‘according to the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, it was the responsibility of the 
Security Council to make such a determination. Therefore, the definition of the crime of 
aggression and the conditions governing the jurisdiction of the Court for that crime were 
interrelated and indivisible.’
391
 It is obvious that the alternating Chinese position regarding 
the definition of the act of aggression as part of the crime of aggression clearly echoed, or 
even depended on, its shifting view about the role of the Security Council in the 
determination of an act of aggression during different periods in history. As discussed 
extensively in the first part of this section, China’s view about the proper role of the Security 
Council vis-à-vis aggression was not an issue of a legal character but rather a policy 
preference; accordingly, its position on the definition of act of aggression was not based on 
its reflections of the status of customary international law, but rather policy considerations.  
              This policy preference can also been seen in China’s shifting views about Article 1 
and Article 3 of Resolution 3314. In 1974, China pointed out that ‘the meaning of certain 
provisions was too vague, and there were many loop-holes in interpretation, both with 
regard to the criteria for determining acts of aggression and with regard to the enumeration 
of instances of aggression’
392
. This clearly referred to Article 1 and Article 3 respectively. 
The criteria for determining acts of aggression is spelled out in Article 1, which is identical 
to the current definition of act of aggression under Article 8bis(2). Back in the 1970s, China 
was keen on drawing a line between the ‘aggressor’ and the ‘victim of aggression’, and 
insisted that the latter has a right of ‘self-defence’. 
393
 In other words, China wanted a clear 
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distinction between the ‘act of aggression’ and ‘self-defence’. However, this goal was hard 
to achieve.  
              Although it was widely agreed that the state act underlying the crime of aggression 
has to be an illegal use of armed force, the prohibition of the use of force under the UN 
Charter and under customary international law, although clear in their core content, are 
surrounded by a grey area of legal controversy.
394
 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally 
prohibits any nation from using force against another with two exceptions: when force is 
required in self-defence (Article 51) or when the Security Council authorises the use of force 
to protect international peace and security (Chapter VII).
395
 One area in which there is 
ambiguity regarding Article 51 is in relation to the use of force by states in self-defence 
before an armed attack has taken place.
396
 There is even no consensus as to the use of 
terminology in this field.
397  
Examining post-Charter uses of pre-emptive force also illustrates 
that this is a decidedly grey area of the law.
398
  
                In fact, the line between aggression and self-defence against aggression has been a 
sensitive issue which has confronted China many times in history. For example, in 1951, 
China was condemned by the General Assembly resolution for having itself engaged in 
aggression in Korea,
399
 which it considered to be justified self-defence.
400
 Before the 
adoption of the General Assembly resolution, China accused the US, another permanent 
member of the Security Council, of committing an act of aggression against itself, 
401
 and it 
even submitted a draft resolution to the Council with the aim to condemn the US.
402
 
However, China's proposition was not supported by the international community and it 
ended up being labelled an aggressor. There were also other instances in which the use of 
force, though claimed by China as self-defence, 
403
 cannot be simply regarded as in strict 
                                                          
394
 Wilmshurst, ‘Jurisdiction of the Court’, pp.322-325.  
395
 Shaw, International Law, pp.1123-1124.  
396
 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 3
rd
 edition (OUP, 2008), p.114.  
397
 Christopher Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al- 
Qaida, and Iraq’, 4 San Diego Int’l L.J. (2003), 7-37, p.9. 
398
 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p.115.  
399
 GA Res. 498 (v)(1951). The General Assembly found that ‘China, by giving direct aid and 
assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea… has itself engaged in 
aggression in Korea.’ 
400
 Statement by Mr. Hsiu-Chuan Wu (China), SCOR, 527
th
 Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV. 527 (1950), 28 
November 1950, pp.21-22.  
401
 Ibid, pp. 4, 25.  
402
 Draft Resolution Submitted by the Representative of the General People’s Government of the 
People’s Republic of China at the 527
th
 Meeting of the Security Council Held on 28 November 1950.  
403
 E.g. 1962 China’s boundary conflict with India; 1969 China’ involvement in the Vietnam War 





compliance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, but instead fell within the grey area. 
Considering its territorial disputes with its neighbours and possible pre-emptive self-defence, 
the particular sensitivities it raised in the past still remain relevant to China’s position today.  
              Apart from the controversies surrounding self-defence, in recent years, 
humanitarian intervention has also stretched the boundaries of the lawful use of force, as 
NATO’s use of force in Kosovo brought forth the question of humanitarian intervention as a 
justification of the use of force.
404
 However, the legal status of humanitarian intervention 
remains unsettled under international law.
405
 Considering the experience of China during its 
‘century of humiliation’ when it was subjected to repeated interventions by foreign 
powers,
406
 its own current internal challenges to sovereignty, including in Tibet, Xinjiang 
and Taiwan and the risk of being a target of humanitarian intervention, there has been some 
caution surrounding the definition of the act of aggression. It is thus curious to notice that 
China did not hesitate to show its support for Article 1 of the Resolution 3314, which itself 
considered ambiguous in determining an act of aggression and indeterminate in addressing 
the grey area issues.  
              Apart from that, China also supported the reference to Article 3, some provisions 
of which were previously identified by China as flawed. For example, in 1974, China singled 
out Article 3(d), according to which, ‘an attack by the armed forces of a state on the land, 
sea or air force, or marine and air fleets of another state’ will be qualified as an act of 
aggression.
407
 Article 3 sets forth a list of acts, regardless of a declaration of war, qualifying 
as acts of aggression. China argued that ‘article 3(d) was too loosely worded in so far as an 
attack on marine fleets was concerned’, and ‘in its present ambiguous form, it might be used 
by the super-Powers to slander a coastal State acting in defence of its sovereignty by 
labelling its action an act of aggression.’
408
 China insisted that ‘the Coastal State had the 
right to take action against fleets illegally entering their national waters in order to protect 
their national economic rights and interests and their marine resources’.
409
 China also 
claimed that ‘the draft definition must in no way prejudice the exercise of such rights by the 
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 Contemporary with the debates on aggression at the General Assembly, 
military activities in another state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) were a point of 
contention during the negotiations at the Third UN Conference of the Law of the Sea.
411
 The 
UNCLOS, however, does not clarify the specific issue of military activities in the EEZ and a 
major source of contention both in law, continues to be whether maritime states may 
unilaterally conduct military operations in the EEZ of the coastal state without permission.
412
 
Nevertheless, in the debates on criminalizing aggression, China did not raise particular 
objection to the inclusion of this provision at all.  
             In arguing for a reference to Resolution 3314 as a whole, which gave the Security 
Council great discretion in determining acts of aggression by virtue of Article 2 and Article 4, 
China chose to compromise its previous position on Article 1 and Article 3. This further 
proves that China's position on the definition of the state component of the crime of 
aggression shifts according to its policy preference for a stronger or a weaker role of the 
Security Council in the determination of an act of aggression. Therefore, the omission of the 
reference to Article 2 and Article 4 in the definition of the crime of aggression should not be 
regarded as a legal barrier for China to accept the Kampala amendment.  
              In fact, the definition of the crime of aggression is actually moving towards the 
Chinese position. The inclusion of a threshold was consistent with the Chinese position, and 
the ‘manifest’ threshold does not contradict the Chinese view as known from the current 
materials available. Historically, China categorically rejected the idea of introducing 
‘aggressive intent’ into the definition of aggression. It insisted that aggressive intent is a 
subjective element, which can be determined only when it is manifest through concrete 
objective acts of aggression.
413 
 It was pointed out that the objective facts must be taken as 
the basis for judging whether a state had harboured aggressive intent, rather than the other 
way round. In the view of China, the determination of an act of aggression cannot, and 
should not, be made on the basis of whether a state had an aggressive intent.
414
 It is, therefore, 
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no wonder that China challenged the US’s initiative to introduce the ‘intent’ dimension into 
the understandings of what the state component of the crime of aggression is at the Kampala 
Conference. As a result, the general definition does not make explicit reference to the 
purpose for which force is used, despite US efforts to include such language. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of the ‘manifest’ threshold and the understandings can help to preserve 
the grey area issues that traditionally concerned China. In a sense, the current definition of 
the crime of aggression triggers less Chinese sensitivities, than was previously the case with 
the General Assembly definition on aggression. If anything is moving further from the 
Chinese current position regarding aggression, it is the missing role of the Security Council. 
However, as discussed previously, the lack of a Security Council filter should not be 






                                  Chapter VI 
Proprio Motu Powers of the ICC Prosecutor and the Concerns 
of China  
 
Section I The Negotiating Process and the Concerns of China  
 
The independent ability of the Prosecutor to initiate his/her own investigations and cases was 
one of the most hotly debated issues during the negotiations of the Rome Statute. The debate 
over the role of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers was essentially a fight over the proper 




            Under the Draft Statute prepared by the ILC, a complaint by a state party or a 
referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter were the only mechanisms by which the jurisdiction of the Court could be triggered.
2
 
During the discussion that took place in 1995 in the Ad Hoc Committee, a number of 
delegations expressed concern that the role of the Prosecutor under the ILC Draft Statute was 
too restrictive.  They put forward suggestions that would grant the Prosecutor the power to 
initiate proceedings on his or her own motion on the basis of information provided not only 
by Governments or the Security Council but also by other sources, including individuals and 
non-governmental organisations.
3
 The opposing view was that the lack of a state party or a 
Security Council referral should be taken to mean that a crime was not of international 
concern. There should, therefore, be no reason for the Prosecutor to act on his or her own 
motion. 
4
 The question whether or not to authorise the Prosecutor to initiate investigations in 
the absence of a prior complaint by a state or the Security Council became one of the most 
contentious issues in the negotiations over the ICC. 
5
 
          The Preparatory Committee debates continued to mirror and further elaborate the 
two basically opposing positions with respect to the proprio motu power. 
6
 An increasing 
number of states supported giving the Prosecutor power to initiate investigations and 
                                                          
1
 Allison M. Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court’, 97 AJIL (2003), 510-552, p.518.  
2
 1994 ILC Draft Statute, Arts.25 and 23(1).  
3
 Ad Hoc Committee Report, paras.25, 113 and 114.  
4
 Ibid, para.26.  
5
 Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejić, ‘Article 15’, in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 581-593, p.582.  
6





complaints on his or her own motion for the purpose of triggering the Court’s jurisdiction. 
7
 
In their view, as states or the Security Council, for a variety of political reasons, would be 
unlikely to lodge a complaint, the prosecutor should be empowered to initiate investigations 
ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source.
8
 In this regard, they 
usually cited the authority of the Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals to do 
so.
9
 However, some other delegations, including the P-5 opposed giving the ICC Prosecutor 
this power.
10
 It was argued that such an independent power would lead to the politicisation of 
the Court and allegations that the Prosecutor had acted out of political motives. In addition, 
this power would lead to overwhelming the limited resources of the Prosecutor with 
frivolous complaints.
11
 Both supporters and opponents of an independent Prosecutor feared 
the risks of politicisation of the Court which, both sides agreed, would undermine the 
impartiality and independence of the Court. However, they reached exactly opposite 
conclusions on how to insulate the Court from these risks.
12
  
              Given the depth of opposition to an independent Prosecutor it became clear that the 
concerns of these states would have to be addressed by means of additional checks on 
prosecutorial power if the proposition of a proporio motu Prosecutor was to stand any 
chance of success.
13
 At the last session of the Preparatory Committee held in April 1998, 
Argentina and Germany proposed a system of control by the PTC of the Prosecutor’s 
decision.
14
 This joint proposal was well received and was reproduced with no changes in the 
draft ICC Statute that was submitted to the Diplomatic Conference.
15
 
               At the Rome Conference, there were sharp debates about whether the Prosecutor 
should have the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu, in the absence of a 
complaint or referral by the Security Council or a state party. 
16
 China took a particularly 
strong stance against the idea of a prosecutor with proprio motu powers, and declared that it 
‘could not accept the provisions allowing the Prosecutor to initiate action ex officio.’
17
 It 
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maintained ‘that a cautious approach should be adopted when addressing such questions as 
trigger mechanisms and means of investigation, in order to avoid irresponsible prosecutions 
that might impair a country’s legitimate interests.’
18
 The provision for a standing 
independent prosecutor authorised to initiate investigations and indictments also provoked 
objection from the US, which demanded that the prosecutorial function be dependent always 
upon the Security Council’s decision to trigger investigation of any ‘situation’ of alleged 
crimes.
19
 Despite the delegates’ rejection of the Security Council as the ultimate regulator of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, many states recognised the danger posed by arming the Prosecutor 
with unfettered discretion.  
              The authorisation by the PTC was considered by the majority of states to constitute 
a sufficient system of checks and balances of the powers conferred on the Prosecutor.
20
 
China, however, considered that the provision that the PTC must consent to the investigation 
by the Prosecutor was not an adequate restraining mechanism.
21
 In its view, ‘the 
Prosecutor’s right to conduct investigations or to prosecute proprio motu, without sufficient 
checks and balances against frivolous prosecution, was tantamount to the right to judge and 
rule on State conduct.’
22
 However, the majority view that such a proprio motu power was 
necessary to preserve the Prosecutor’s independence eventually won the day. 
23
  Building 
upon the Argentinean and German proposal, the proprio motu power of the prosecutor is 
recognised in Article 15 of Statute, which lays out some sources that could submit 
information on the alleged commission of a crime to the Prosecutor and the Prosecutor’s 
right to seek additional information from other sources.  To allay the fears of the opponents 
of this approach, the Prosecutor’s determination is subject to judicial review by a PTC before 
he or she can actually proceed with the investigation.  
                Despite the judicial checks and balances that are contained within the Rome 
Statute, the inclusion of the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor in the Statute contributed 
to the Chinese stance not joining the ICC at the end of the Rome Conference. China argued 
that ‘the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor under Article 15 of the Rome Statute may 
make it difficult for the ICC to concentrate on dealing with the most serious crimes, and may 
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              Shortly after the Rome Conference, China addressed its concern about the proprio 
motu power of the Prosecutor in the Sixth Committee in significantly greater detail ‘the 
power of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu was a controversial issue. In 
the first place, article 15 of the Statute stipulated the Prosecutor could initiate investigation 
proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. As a 
result of a compromise reached during the negotiations, there was no modifier next to the 
world ‘information’ in the article. Nevertheless, the implied meaning of ‘information from 
any sources’ was not thereby weakened. The article empowered individuals, non-
governmental organizations and other bodies to bring cases before the Court and gave them 
virtually the same right as State Parties and the Security Council to trigger the Court’s 
jurisdiction mechanism. As a result, the Court would not be able to concentrate its limited 
resources on dealing with the most serious international crimes. Secondly, if the Prosecutor 
could initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of such information, that meant that 
the authority of the Prosecutor was so extensive that he or she could influence or interfere 
directly with the judicial sovereignty of a State. Although a Pre-Trial Chamber was provided 
for in the Statute with a view to preventing the abuse of authority by the Prosecutor, in order 
for such a mechanism to be effective, either the members of the Pre-Trial Chamber, or the 
members of the Chamber and the Prosecutor, should be the product of different legal 
systems and different political and cultural backgrounds. The Statute, however, contained no 
such provision. It was possible, therefore, that both the members of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and the Prosecutor might come from the same region or share the same legal, political or 




              The concerns of China over this issue exist on two levels: the possible abuse of the 
authority by the Prosecutor, and the insufficient checks on the proprio motu power. China 
also expressed its concern about the ways that information can be received by the Prosecutor, 
especially communications from individuals. This concern can find some resonance with 
China’s traditional concerns about the UN human rights treaty bodies. 
26
 
           These concerns of China regarding the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor were 
raised in the late 1990s. However, there have been developments in practice since the Rome 
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Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. During its First Session in 2003, the ASP 
unanimously elected Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, a highly respected lawyer from Argentina 
who had previously prosecuted top leaders of a military junta in his home country, 
27
 as the 
first Chief Prosecutor of the Court.
28
 He asserted that he ‘will use this power with 
responsibility and firmness, ensuring compliance with the Statute’.
29
 Ms. Fatou Bensouda 
from Gambia, who had severed as Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC since 2004, took office in 
2012 as the second Chief ICC Prosecutor after being elected by consensus during the Tenth 
Session of the ASP.
30
 So far, the ICC has opened investigations into eight situations,
31
 of 
which, two were commenced proprio motu by the Prosecutor (Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire). 
Therefore, a close examination of the Prosecutor’s current work may help alleviate China’s 
concerns. In addition, the practice of the Court can also provide some insight as to the 
criteria used for the supervision by the PTC over the exercise of this power.  
 
Section II The Prosecutor’s Proprio Motu Power in Context and in 
Practice  
 
Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has the authority to initiate an 
investigation proprio motu on the basis of ‘information on crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court’.
32
 The Statute invites the Prosecutor to seek ‘information’ from states, UN organs, 
inter-governmental or non-governmental organisations, and other reliable sources that he or 
she deems appropriate.
33
 Irrespective of the source of information sent to the OTP, the 
Prosecutor has indicated that it would conduct an initial evaluation of each communication 
received to determine whether there is a ‘reasonable basis’ to proceed with an 
investigation.
34
 To make this determination, rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
dictates that the Prosecutor ‘shall consider the factors set out in Article 53, paragraph 1(a) 
to (c).’
35
 The Prosecutor must consider whether ‘the information available to the Prosecutor 
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provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been or is being committed’, and whether ‘the case is or would be admissible’.
36
 In addition, 
the Prosecutor must consider whether ‘taking into account the gravity of the crime and the 
interest of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice.’ 
37
 In summary, the Prosecutor has to consider the 
situation in light of several factors in deciding whether to exercise the proprio motu authority: 




               Despite these criteria, the Prosecutor still retains a significant amount of discretion 
in where, and against whom, the ICC directs its efforts.
39
 How the Prosecutor is to ‘analyse 
the seriousness of the information received’ is not spelled out in the Statute. The 
prosecutorial determination as to whether or not a given situation of crisis within which ‘the 
most serious crimes of international concern’ have been allegedly committed is of ‘sufficient 
gravity to justify further action by the Court’, and whether or not its investigation would 
serve the ‘interests of justice’ is not guided by legal criteria.
40
 The problem of prosecutorial 
discretion emerges from the absence of fixed guidance in the Rome Statute.
41
 However, 
while existing legal rules do not determine whom to investigate and indict, either the 
Prosecutor may develop prosecutorial policy or the Court’s judges may direct or guide the 
Prosecutor through their interpretation of the Rome Statute. To date, uncertainties raised by 
the silence or ambiguities of the Rome Statute have already been addressed, in whole or in 
part, by the practice of both the OTP and the PTCs.  
 
1. Policy of the Prosecutor  
 
As early as September 2003, a document was produced that outlined a general strategy for 
the OTP and the priorities for its work.
42
 According to the strategy document, the OTP will 
focus its investigations and prosecutorial activities on those who bear the greatest 
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responsibility for core crimes.
43
 At that time China expressed its support for the ‘practical 
and transparent approach adopted by the Prosecutor’.
44
 In September 2006, the OTP 
published its ‘Prosecutorial Strategy’, which affirms that, in selecting cases, ‘the Office 
adopted a policy of focusing its efforts on the most serious crimes and on those who bear the 
greatest responsibility for these crimes’. 
45
 More recently, the OTP reiterated in its 2009-
2012 Prosecutorial Strategy Paper that ‘focused investigations and prosecutions’ is one of 
the four ‘fundamental principles’ of the OTP’s prosecutorial strategy in order to make 
efficient use of limited resources.
46
  
                According to the OTP’s records, it has received 9,717 communications by the end 
of 2012.
47
 To date, the office has made public its preliminary examinations of 18 situations, 
including those that have led to the opening of investigations (Uganda, DRC, Central African 
Republic, Darfur, Kenya, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali), those where the Office made a 
decision not to proceed (including Venezuela, Iraq and Palestine), and those that remain 
under preliminary examination (Columbia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, South 
Korea and Nigeria).
48
 The stark contrast between the number of communications received 
and those under preliminary examination reflects the caution of the Prosecutor and the 
focused prosecutorial strategy on the most serious international crimes.  
           The Prosecutor did not actually invoke Article 15 of the Statute until November 
2009, in an application to initiate an investigation with respect to the post-election violence 
in Kenya.
49
 On 23 June 2011, the Prosecutor filed his request for authorisation from the 
Chamber to commence an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire in 
relation to post-election violence in the period following 28 November 2010.
50
 In both 
situations, the Prosecutor considered three factors in determining whether there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation; namely, jurisdiction (temporal, either 
territorial or personal and material); admissibility (complementarity and gravity); and the 
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           The first test that will be considered by the Prosecutor is whether a case falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. Both in its policy papers and in practice, the Prosecutor 
considers that for a crime to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it has to satisfy the 
following conditions: firstly, the crime must be one of the crimes set out in Article 5 of the 
Statute; secondly, the crime must have been committed within the timeframe specified in 
Article 11 of the Statute; and thirdly, the crime must satisfy one of the two criteria laid down 
in Article 12 of the Statute.
52
  
              Of the 9,717 communications the Prosecutor has received, 4,316 were determined 
to be manifestly outside of the Court’s jurisdiction after initial review. 
53
 For example, the 
Prosecutor responded to information regarding alleged crimes against humanity committed 
in Venezuela by saying that, based upon communications received and a review of external 
sources, there was insufficient evidence establishing a ‘widespread or systematic attack 




             In addition to the jurisdictional considerations, the Prosecutor also has to take 
account of the admissibility criteria. As noted earlier in this work, the test for admissibility 
requires a determination of whether the relevant state has made or is making a genuine effort 
to either investigate or prosecute, which is known as the principle of ‘complementarity’.
55
 
Furthermore, the admissibility criterion involves consideration of whether the case is of 
‘sufficient gravity.’
56
 Complementarity is designed to serve as a pragmatic and limiting 
principle rather than an affirmative means for an aggressive prosecutor to target the nationals 
of states that are hesitant to embrace ICC jurisdiction and authority.
57
 As can be seen from 
the discussions in Chapter IV,
58
 the ICC’s complementarity regime allows a state to restrain 
a zealous Prosecutor by launching a domestic investigation and prosecution, thus removing 
the case from the Court. More significantly, in practice the OTP has developed a positive 
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which ‘encourages national proceedings wherever 
possible’,
60
 and thereby may greatly reduce state fears of an antagonistic Prosecutor.  
             Although any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is a serious matter, 
the Statute (Article 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c) and 17 (1)(d)) clearly foresees and requires an 
additional consideration of ‘gravity’.
61
 Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute provides that the 
Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where, the case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court. In addition, by virtue of Article 53, the Prosecutor is to 
take into account ‘the gravity of the crime’ in deciding whether to initiate an investigation,
62
 
as well as in deciding not to proceed because there is not a sufficient basis for prosecution.
63
 
In practice, the Prosecutor of the ICC has treated gravity not only as a hurdle to satisfying 
the admissibility of a situation or a case, but also ‘one of the most important criteria for 
selection of [the OTP’s] situations and cases.’
64
  
               The emphasis on gravity in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was not 
apparent in early pronouncements by the Prosecutor.
65
  By mid-2005, when the Prosecutor 
applied to the PTC for the first arrest warrant in the situation in Uganda, the issue of gravity 
had become more prominent. The OTP has investigated crimes allegedly committed by both 
the LRA and the national Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), but has only brought 
charges against the former. The Prosecutor has repeatedly explained his decision by saying 
that the criterion upon which he selected his first case in Uganda was gravity, noting that 
crimes allegedly committed by the LRA were much more numerous and of a much higher 
gravity than the alleged crimes committed by the UPDF.
66
 The Prosecutor continues to refer 
to gravity considerations when explaining his/her office’s policy toward selecting particular 
investigations and cases over others.
67
 The Prosecutor issued a public statement in February 
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2006 explaining his decision not to proceed on the basis of complaints filed concerning the 
behaviour of British troops in Iraq since the 2003 invasion.
68
 According to the OTP, an 
initial evaluation of the information submitted regarding crimes in Iraq established that there 
was a ‘reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been 
committed.’
69
 Nevertheless, the Prosecutor concluded that the situation in Iraq ‘did not 
appear to meet the required gravity threshold of the Statute’.
70
 Gravity also played an 





 and Côte d'Ivoire.
73
 Though ‘gravity’ is not defined in the Statute, the 
Prosecutor has developed several factors relevant in interpreting and applying the concept. 
74
 
               If the OTP has satisfied itself that the above factors are met, it has still to assess the 
‘interest of justice’, within the terms of Articles 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c).
 
The Rome Statute 
gives the Prosecutor discretion to decide not to initiate either an investigation or prosecution 
on the grounds that to proceed would be contrary to the ‘interests of justice’. While 
jurisdiction and admissibility are positive requirements that must be satisfied, the ‘interests 
of justice’ is a potential countervailing consideration that may produce a reason not to 
proceed.
75
  In September 2007, the OTP made public a policy paper clarifying its approach 
to this concept.
76
 The paper emphasises that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion where 
the ‘interests of justice’ is invoked is ‘exceptional in its nature and that there is a 
presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution’.
77
 So far, the Prosecutor has not yet 
found that the opening of an investigation into any situation would not be in the interests of 
justice.  
              When exercising proprio motu powers, the Prosecutor has been acting cautiously in 
line with the considerations outlined above, and there is no sign of prosecutorial abuse. In the 
Kenya decision, the Prosecutor submitted that there was a reasonable basis to believe that 
crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Court were committed in the context 
of post-election violence in 2007-2008.
78
 In addition, due to the ‘absence of national 
proceedings relating to those bearing the greatest responsibility for these crimes, and in the 
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light of the gravity of the acts committed, the Prosecutor found that the cases that would 
arise from its investigations of the situation would be admissible’.
79
 Furthermore, based on 
the available information, the Prosecutor had no reason to believe that the opening of an 
investigation into the situation would not be in the interests of justice.
80
 Following the same 
strategy, the Prosecutor arrived at the same conclusion with regard to the preliminary 
examinations in the Côte d'Ivoire situation.81   
 
2. Limitations to Prosecutorial Discretion of the Prosecutor   
 
The negotiating history of the Rome Statute demonstrated the decision to invest the 
Prosecutor with a significant degree of autonomy to select cases is coupled with an array of 
formal limits on his independence. Both the ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute afford the 
Prosecutor significant powers and independence. Investigations may be initiated and 
indictments issued by the prosecutor on the basis of information received from any source.
82
 
The Prosecutor’s independence is much more circumscribed in the ICC than in the ICTY or 
ICTR. The states that negotiated the Rome Statute elected to create a prosecutor with a 
greater amount of independence than the ILC had envisioned. Simultaneously, they 
constructed a complex pre-trial procedure that endows a PTC with significant oversight 
powers over the Prosecutor’s activities. In addition, there are numerous other provisions 
already contained in the Statute representing directly or indirectly, additional safeguards, 
control or filter mechanisms for the Prosecutor and the Court itself. One should not evaluate 
the independent role of the Prosecutor by severing it from the other parts of the Rome 
Statute.
83
 The Statute provided the Prosecutor with the ability to initiate proceeding ex officio 





 2.1 The Pre-Trial Chamber Authorisation  
Whilst the Prosecutor may decide to initiate an investigation, the authority to start a full 
investigation is the PTC’s prerogative.
85
Article 15(3) of the Statute obliged the Prosecutor to 
seek authorisation from the PTC before proceeding with an investigation on his or her 
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initiative, thus introducing early judicial review of proceedings initiated on the Prosecutor’s 
own motion. Article 15(4) empowers the PTC to consider the Prosecutor’s ‘request and the 
supporting material’ against a ‘reasonable basis’ standard, with a view to authorising the 
commencement of the investigation.
86
    
               Literally, the language ‘reasonable basis’ contained in Paragraph 4 is identical to 
the standard that Paragraph 3 sets for the Prosecutor prior to the submission of the request to 
the PTC. However, the Rome Statute is silent about the precise content of the ‘reasonable 
basis’ under Paragraph 4, which will only emerge through the practice of the PTC. 
87
 So far, 
there have been three ‘authorisation’ decisions from PTCs in response to requests from the 
OTP to open investigations based on its proprio motu power. In response to the Prosecutor’s 
request for authorisation to conduct an investigation using his proprio motu powers into the 
violence which had taken place in the post-election period in Kenya,
 88
 PTC II granted the 
authorisation on 31 March 2010.
89
 One year later, PTC III granted the Prosecutor’s request 
for authorisation to open investigations proprio motu into the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in 
relation to post-election violence in the period following 28 November 2010.
90
 The third 
authorisation was issued by the same Chamber, which decided to expand its authorisation for 
the ICC prosecutor’s investigation in Côte d'lvoire to include crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court allegedly committed between 19 September 2002 and 28 November 2010.
 91
 
             Being the first judicial pronouncements on the exercise of prosecutorial proprio 
motu, these three decisions are indicative of how the judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion will be exercised in practice. It is quite interesting to note that both PTCs 
contained judges who had been involved, in earlier diplomatic careers, in the Rome Statue 
negotiation. Judge Kaul, who was in the Kenya PTC, had been a representative of Germany, 
and Judge Fernandez,
92
 who participated in the two Côte d'lvoire decisions, was one of the 
key members of the delegation of Argentina. As a matter of fact, the Rome Statute’s 
provision concerning judicial review of prosecutorial discretion had been proposed jointly by 
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the delegations of Germany and Argentina.
93
  It was no wonder that in the first two decisions 
the PTCs it was explicitly acknowledged that the judicial review of prosecutorial discretion 




              Both Chambers referred to Article 15 and the link with Article 53 to base its 
finding of what it needed to evaluate.
 95
 The Kenya PTC explained the rationale at great 
length. It observed that the language ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ used in both Articles 
15(3), and 15(4) and in the Chapeau of Article 53(1) is identical, 
96
 therefore, ‘the provisions 
prescribe the same standard to be considered both by the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.’ 
97
 It emphasised that ‘rule 48 of the Rules filled the lacuna by establishing a link 
between article 15 and 53 of the Statute thereby unifying the applicable criteria for the 
initiation of an investigation.’ 
98
 It further pointed out that ‘if the purpose of article 15 
procedure is to provide the Chamber with a supervisory role over the proprio motu initiative 
of the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation, then it is not possible to fulfil this 
function, unless the Chamber applies the exact standard on the basis of which the Prosecutor 
arrived at his conclusion.’
 99
 The Chamber therefore concluded that it must equally consider 
whether the requirements set out in Article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Statue were satisfied in order 
to decide whether to authorise the Prosecutor to commence an investigation.
100
 This 
approach was subsequently endorsed by the Côte d'Ivoire PTC.
101
 Even though the 
relationship between Articles 15 and 53 was far from clear in the Rome Statute,
102
 the 
interpretation by those who had drafted the provision may set a standard practice for the 
Chamber’s review of the Prosecutor’s request.  
               Specifically, PTC II interpreted the evidentiary test of ‘reasonable basis’ to impose 
strict requirements on the Prosecutor. Bearing in mind the importance of their supervisory 
role, the Chamber rejected interpreting reasonable basis as a ‘reasonable suspicion’;
103
 the 
Prosecutor’s evidence must point towards a ‘reasonable conclusion’.
104
 The Chamber 
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reaffirmed that the admissibility test has two main limbs: complementarity and gravity.
105
 In 
order to satisfy the criteria of admissibility, the Prosecutor must present, along with evidence, 
a ‘potential case’ of suspects and their specific alleged crimes,
106
 though the Rome Statute 
does not explicitly mention the submission of such a list of suspects and crimes before the 
start of an investigation. The Chamber interpreted the Rome Statute to find that this 
information is necessary in order to ‘facilitate a mutual understanding between the Court and 
the relevant State(s)’ about the scope of the complementarity assessment.
107
 Along the same 
line, the Côte d'Ivoire Chamber found that the evaluation of ‘gravity’ should be conducted in 
a general sense, as regards the entire situation, but also against the backdrop of the potential 
case(s) within the context of a situation.
108
 The interpretation by the Chambers may pose a 
significant hurdle for the Prosecutor, who might not be able to construct a list of suspects 
with their alleged crimes, not to mention their gravity, before the permission to investigate 
and collect evidence is granted. However, this requirement will make it easier for a state with 
jurisdiction over a case to divest the ICC of jurisdiction by immediately investigating or 
prosecuting.  
               In addition, there were other limitations posed by the PTC on the extent of the 
Prosecutor’s investigation, for example, the crimes that are allowed to be investigated,
 109
 the 
location of the investigation,
110
 and the permitted timeframe of the alleged crimes under 
investigation.
111
 This work does not intend to exhaustively identify all the checks and 
balances.  The ones elaborated above are sufficient to indicate that in practice the PTC has 
upheld strictly the judicial review process within the Rome Statute that is designed to 
prevent the Prosecutor from initiating politicised investigations without sufficient evidence. 
The PTC has thus established important, detailed precedents for future requests for 
Prosecutor-initiated investigations. The review of the Prosecutor’s decisions by the PTC 
diminishes the risk of politically motivated investigations as a result of abuse of discretion 
by the Prosecutor.  
              The PTC’s decisions also establish strict principles and procedures to follow for 
future Prosecutors asking permission to investigate on their own initiative.  The standards 
adopted by the PTC are to be taken into account by the Prosecutor if he/she is going to 
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convince the Court to grant authorisation. For example, in its Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, the Prosecutor acknowledged that the term of ‘reasonable basis’ had been 
interpreted by the Chambers of the Court to require ‘a sensible or reasonable justification for 
a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court ‘has been or is being 
committed.’ 
112
 If the PTC decision holds, it should go a long way toward silencing criticism 
from China about the Prosecutor’s power to conduct these investigations.  
               A special regime applies to the exercise of proprio motu power with respect to the 
crime of aggression. If prosecution for the crime of aggression is triggered by a state party or 
results from the Prosecutor exercising proprio motu authority, there is a so-called 
‘jurisdictional filter’. It is the Pre-Trial Division that authorises the commencement of an 
investigation.
113
 This is similar to the mechanism that applies to proprio motu prosecution 
for the other three crimes pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute, the only difference being that 
in the case of aggression the task belongs not to the Pre-Trail Chamber, which is composed 
of three judges, but to the Pre-Trial Division, which has a minimum of six judges.
114
 In 
Kampala, China expressed serious reservations over granting the ICC prosecutor the ability 
to proceed with an investigation of an alleged crime of aggression without a Security 
Council finding, a close study of the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor and its 
supervision by the PTC may therefore shed some light on alleviating China’s concern in the 
context of crime of aggression.  
 
2.2 Other Checks and Balances  
It would be misleading, however, to examine the restraints placed on the ICC Prosecutor 
solely in terms of judicial checks.
115
 The PTC review is not the only check on the 
prosecutorial discretion provided for in the Statute. Other safeguards against potential abuse 
of power may be found. The possibility of a Security Council deferral of an investigation or 
prosecution also provides checks on proceedings initiated proprio motu. The Security 
Council retains an imposing power of intervention in the examination of Prosecutorial 
discretion. Under Article 16, the Security Council may defer an investigation for 12 months 
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by adopting a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
116
 The Prosecutor is also 
subject to a variety of important checks exerted by the states. 
               Another important check comes from the ASP, which is responsible for electing 
the Prosecutor
117
, disciplining and removing the Prosecutor for misconduct,
118
 and allocating 
the budget to the OTP.
119
 Through membership in the ASP, the treaty members appoint by 
majority vote the Court’s senior officials, including its Prosecutor, who heads the OTP for a 
maximum non-renewable term of nine years, and its eighteen judges, who serve nine-year 




               The drafters of the Rome Statute, in an attempt to shield the Prosecutor from 
external political pressure, introduced certain basic guarantees directed at preserving his/her 
independence. In this sense, Article 42(1) of the Rome Statute establishes that the OTP ‘shall 
act independently as a separate organ or the Court’, and that ‘a member of the Office shall 
not seek or act on instructions from any external source.’ Furthermore, Paragraphs (3) and (4) 
of Article 42 establish that the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall have ‘high moral 
character’ and ‘extensive practical experience’ in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases; 
that they shall be elected ‘by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the 
Assembly of States Parties’, and that they shall not be eligible for re-election. In addition, 
Paragraphs (5), (6), (7), and (8) of Article 42 stipulate that the Prosecutor and the Deputy 
Prosecutor ‘shall not engage in any other occupation of a professional nature or in any 
activity which is likely to interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to affect 
confidence in his or her independence’, and they shall not ‘participate in any matter in 
which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground’. Even if, against all 
odds, a politically-motivated prosecutor were to be appointed, the Rome Statute is fitted with 
provisions for the removal from office of a prosecutor who has ‘committed serious 
misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties.’
121
 The Statute provides that any person 
being investigated or prosecuted may at any time request the disqualification of the 
prosecutor where his or her impartiality may reasonably be doubted on any ground. 
122
 The 
Prosecutor may be removed from office by a majority vote of the ASP only for ‘serious 
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              Regarding the selection of the ICC Prosecutor and Judges, China has expressed its 
concern that ‘the Prosecutor might come from the same region or share the same legal, 
political or cultural background’, which ‘would neutralize the Pre-Trial Chamber’s check 
and balance role’.
 124
 However, Article 36(8) of the Rome Statute explicitly listed the factors 
that states parties are to consider in the selection of judges, and includes representation of the 
principal legal systems of the world, equitable geographical representation, and gender 
balance.
125
 The ASP has recalled this obligation, reminding the Court of its obligation under 






3. Trigger Mechanisms of the ICC and Individual Petition 
System of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies  
 
In expressing its concern towards the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor, China 
considered that ‘article 15 empowered individuals, non-governmental organizations and 
other bodies to bring cases before the Court and gave them virtually the same right as State 
Parties and the Security Council to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction mechanism.’ This 
proposition again reveals something of a confusion on the part of China between the ICC and 
UN Human Rights Treaty bodies.  
              As noted previously, China traditionally maintains a distance from the UN human 
rights treaty bodies, which deal directly with individual complaints of human rights 
violations.
127
 Under their individual petition systems, an individual, or in some cases a group 
of individuals, can submit a communication to the treaty bodies to trigger their complaints 
procedure.
128
 However, the Rome Statute explicitly provides three ways to trigger the ICC’s 
jurisdiction: individual communication is not one of them. Therefore, a state’s failure to 
guarantee a defendant due process rights as enumerated in the human rights treaties, which 
has been discussed in the complementarity chapter, will not give the individual a right to 
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bring a claim against the state at the ICC. The ICC is, properly understood, distinct and 
separate from the individual petition mechanism under the UN treaty bodies, which China 
has been traditionally reluctant to accept. In addition, unlike referrals by the Security Council 
or states, investigations initiated proprio motu are divided into two discrete phases. The first 
is the preliminary investigation, where the Prosecutor makes an initial assessment as to 
whether a prima facie case exists. Upon receipt of information from an individual or other 
sources, the Prosecutor cannot start a full investigation but is limited to a preliminary 
examination which could include seeking additional information and receiving written or 
oral testimonies at the seat of the Court. If the Prosecutor determines that a prima facie case 
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                                   Chapter VII  
Concerns of China regarding Crimes against Humanity and 
War Crimes  
 
Throughout the negotiation process, one of the major guiding principles in the elaboration of 
the definition of the crimes under consideration was that these definitions should be 
reflective of customary international law.
1
 The Chinese delegations subscribed to this general 
approach. One representative noted that ‘his delegation felt that the definition of crimes 
should be made on the basis and within the scope of concepts that had been accepted by the 
majority of States and had become integrated into customary international law’.
2
 However, 
the task of reaching agreement on the precise definitions of the crimes was much more 
challenging, as there were disagreements about the content of customary international law.
3
 
At the end of the Rome Conference, China maintained that ‘the definition of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity had already exceeded commonly understood and accepted 
customary law.’
4
 Two hotly debated issues which proved to be concerns for China were: 
whether a nexus to armed conflict needed to be included in the definition of crimes against 





Section I Crimes against Humanity  
 
The Report of the Preparatory Committee reveals that there was an ongoing disagreement 
over whether a nexus to armed conflict needed to be included in the definition of ‘crimes 
against humanity’.
6
 Requiring crimes against humanity to have been committed in armed 
conflict would mean that offenses committed in times of so-called ‘peace’ would not be 
covered by the definition. Some delegates argued that existing law required some type of 
connection to an armed conflict and that in any case, the majority of such crimes were 
invariably committed during armed conflicts.
7
 Other delegations expressed the view that 
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crimes against humanity could occur in time of armed conflict or in time of peace and that 
the armed conflict nexus that appeared in the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter was no longer 
required under existing law. 
8
 
              While the preparatory negotiations had by no means settled this issue, the task 
facing the delegations at the Rome Conference was to reflect the definition of those crimes 
under customary international law.
9
 In Rome, the clear majority of delegations were of the 
view from the outset that current customary international law did not require a nexus to 
armed conflict. 
10
 Only a handful of states, including China, and a number of Middle East 
states continued to support the retention of a war nexus requirement.
 11
  Advocates of a nexus 
with armed conflict were divided between those who argued that the conflict must be 
international in nature and those who contended that an armed conflict sufficed.
12
  In the 
final conference, the majority view prevailed and no nexus to armed conflict was required 
under the ICC definition of crimes against humanity.
13
  
              After the adoption of the Rome Statute, China restated its objection towards the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity during peacetime.
14
 According to the 
Chinese delegation, the definition of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute not 
requiring the state in which they are committed be ‘at war’ is contrary to the existing norms 
of customary international law.
15
 It contended that, ‘in accordance with customary 
international law, they [crimes against humanity] were crimes committed during wartime or 
during an extraordinary period related to wartime… The Statute, however, failed to link 
those crimes to armed conflict and thereby changed the major attributes of the crimes.’
16
 
China also pointed out that ‘many actions listed under that heading belong to the area of 
human rights law rather than international criminal law.’
17
  
              There were, however, some ambiguities in the Chinese statements regarding 
whether China required a nexus to international armed conflict. One Chinese statement made 
at a critical time during the negotiation process was ‘the definition of war crimes and crimes 
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against humanity had already exceeded commonly understood and accepted customary law. 
The Chinese delegate opposed the inclusion of non-international armed conflict in the 
jurisdiction of the Court and reference to crimes against humanity’. 
18
 This has been 
interpreted in some scholarly literature as an underlying Chinese requirement for a nexus to 
international armed conflict. For example, Professor Schabas has interpreted this very 
statement using the following words ‘China said that it was still opposed to the inclusion of 
crimes against humanity without a link to international armed conflict’.
19
 This is the only 
statement that is capable of being interpreted in that way. Other statements made by the 
Chinese authorities have been formulated differently, wherein no reference was made to 
international armed conflict. Therefore, there are two possible interpretations of the Chinese 
position: one requires a general linkage to armed conflict; the other is more limited to 
international armed conflict. Given the lack of clarity on this issue, this work will deal with 
both possible Chinese positions. As the major objections of China towards the definitions of 
crimes against humanity were raised in the context of customary international law, it is 
therefore necessary to first find out China’s general approach towards customary 
international law.  
 
1. China’s Approach towards Customary International law  
 
As seen in Chapter II, there has been an increasing Chinese engagement with the 
international legal system in recent decades.
20
 Notably, China has ratified or acceded to a 
great number of international conventions in various fields.
21
 It has also made considerable 
progress with respect to implementation of international treaties in its domestic legal 
system.
22
 In contrast to this positive attitude towards international treaties, China’s approach 
towards customary international law has been flexible, which is reflected in its past and 
present practice.  
             During the 1950s and 1960s, when it was refused entry to the UN and most of the 
existing multilateral treaty regimes, China often invoked customary international law for 
protection. 
23
 During the period of exclusion from the UN, Chinese publicists invoked the 
                                                          
18
 Statement by Mr. Daqun Liu (17 July 1998), para.38.  
19
 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, p.110. 
20
 See Ann Kent, ‘China’s Changing Attitude to the Norms of International Law and its Global 
Impact’, in Pauline Kerr et al. (eds.) China’s New Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 55-76, p.55.  
21
 Hanqin Xue, ‘China’s Open Policy and International Law’, 4(1) CJIL (2005), pp.133-139.  
22
 See Hanqin Xue and Qian Jin, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’, 8(2) 
CJIL (2009), pp.299-322.  
23





principle of pacta tertiis in maintaining that the PRC could not be legally bound by a number 
of international conventions.
24
 In addition, China denied that UN General Assembly 
resolutions possessed any legislative or legally binding force.
25
 China also invoked the pacta 
tertiis principle whenever she rejected certain resolutions or decisions made by the UN.
 
 
Shortly after the adoption of the General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution, the PRC’s 
special representative declared in the Security Council that ‘without the participation of the 
lawful representatives of the People’s Republic of China, the people of China have no reason 
to recognize any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations’.
26
  In 1965, the Chinese 
Foreign Minister publicly demanded the cancellation of the UN resolutions against the PRC, 
in particular, the General Assembly Resolution 498(v) of 1 February 1951, which 
condemned the PRC for having committed aggression in Korea.
27
  
               On the other hand, China asserted that many of the norms embodied in 
international conventions, including those from which it was excluded, emanated from 
customary law and found a new manifestation in treaty form.
28
 The relationship between the 
UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Existence
29
 is a convenient example. In 1954, 
the Chinese Government explicitly declared that the Five Principles ‘should apply to China’s 
relations with Asian states and other countries in the world’. 
30
 In the following year, in a 
book entitled ‘Peaceful Coexistence in International Law’ written by a leading Chinese 
scholar, the respect for territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty, which headed the list 
of the Five Principles, were mentioned as ‘mutually inclusive and complementary principles 
of customary international law’ recognised in the UN Charter (Article 2(4)).
31
  From time to 
time, Chinese officials and publicists invoked such norms as ‘the standards of international 
law and dignity and justice’, the ‘elementary rules of international law’, ‘international law 
and practice’ and ‘an established pattern of conduct’ in their assertions. 
32
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              In the 1970s and 1980s, China seldom invoked customary international law, 
resorting instead to certain General Assembly resolutions as the authoritative references for 
supporting its position.
33
 This shift was mainly attributed to the resumption of the Chinese 
place in the UN. China repeatedly invoked certain resolutions that were adopted since her 
entry as authoritative support in legitimizing her position. This started with the very 
resolution that restored the lawful rights of the PRC in the UN.
34
 Another example was at the 
Second Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1974, when the 
Chinese delegate invoked the relevant General Assembly resolutions on the international 
seabed regime as the authoritative reference for the Conference to proceed on the issue.
35
 
China did not even hesitate to attack the practice of other states for their failure to comply 
with the UN resolutions.
36 
   
              In the 1990s, during the negotiation for a permanent international criminal court, 
China excluded itself from the Rome Statute regime by resorting to the protective shield of 
customary international law. To understand this somewhat curious Chinese alternating 
approach towards customary international law, it is necessary to firstly establish China’s 
attitude towards the hierarchy between international treaties and international customs.    
             Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, which is widely recognised as the 
most authoritative and complete statement as to the sources of international law,
37
 
international treaties is placed before customs, and it is not clear whether the order of their 
listing creates a hierarchy of sources or is simply a matter of convenience.
38
 Most Chinese 
scholars though take the position that treaties and customs are the two principal sources of 
international law,
39
 place custom after treaties in their discussion on principal sources of 
international law.
40
   
              Chinese domestic legislation also put the two primary sources in a hierarchical 
structure, that is to say, international treaties are followed by international custom. Though 
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the Chinese Constitutional Law has no explicit statute relating to the hierarchical structure, 
41
 
such a structure is a salient feature in many other Chinese laws.
42
 For example, Article 142 
of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China provides the 
most authoritative statement on the sources of international law in such a way ‘the 
application of law in civil relations with foreigners shall be determined by the provisions in 
this Chapter. If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of 
China contains provisions differing from those in the civil laws of the People’s Republic of 
China, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are ones 
on which the People’s Republic of China has announced reservations. International Practice 
may be applied to matters for which neither the law of the People’s Republic of China nor 




              The term ‘international practice’ is taken from the English publication of the 
Chinese State Council,
44
 which is used instead of ‘international custom’ in those Chinese 
laws.  The original term (guo ji xi guan) in Chinese, if literally translated into English, is 
‘international usage’. According to Stark, ‘the terms “custom” and “usage” are often used 
interchangeably.’
45
 Though the term of ‘international custom’ is not mentioned at all in 
Chinese domestic law, it seems that ‘international practice’ or ‘international usage’ refers to, 
or at least includes ‘international custom’. Therefore, customary international law is inferior 
to international treaty in the Chinese legal hierarchy.  
                Both Chinese scholars and Chinese legislation rank international treaties higher 
than international custom, and China did not exhibit a consistent approach to uphold 
customary international law in the past, it was thus not persuasive for China to turn to 
customary international law for rejecting the adoption of an international convention in 
Rome in 1998. Nevertheless, the question still remains as to if there exists preponderant 
evidence supporting China’s proposition about the connection between crimes against 
humanity and armed conflict under customary international law.  
              Article 38 of the ICJ Statute defines the essence of international customs as 
‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ without indicating what constitutes such 
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 In practice, in order to prove the existence of a customary rule, it is necessary to 
show that there exist a ‘general practice’ which conforms to the rule and which is ‘accepted 
as law’.
47
  The ICJ noted in the Continental Shelf Case, that the substance of customary 
international law must be ‘looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of 
states’.
48
 There is no consensus view among western scholars as to where to look for the 
evidence of customary law.
49
 In 2011, the ILC decided to include the topic ‘Formation and 
Evidence of Customary International Law’ in its programme of work.
50
  
               The view of prominent Chinese international law scholar Professor Tieya Wang
51
 
on how to find evidence of customary international law is similar to that of Starke.
52
 
According to Wang, evidence of international custom can be adduced from materials and 
documents emerging from the three sets of circumstances in which custom develops: (1) 
diplomatic relations between states as expressed in treaties, declarations and statements, 
various diplomatic documents, and other instruments; (2) practice of international organs as 
expressed in resolutions and judgments/decisions; (3) internal conduct of states as expressed 
in internal laws, judgments, administrative decrees, and other formulations.
53
 This work does 
not intend to make an exhaustive study of the state practice and opinio juris about the issue 
in question, but to identify the developments in these circumstances regarded by the most 
prestigious Chinese international law scholar as material sources of custom.  
 
2. The Historical Evaluation of Severing the Connection 
between Armed Conflict and Crimes against Humanity   
 
2.1 The Military Tribunals  
The genesis of the war nexus requirement was the Nuremberg Charter, 
54
 Article 6 of which 
defines crimes against humanity as requiring a nexus with other crimes over which the 
Nuremberg Tribunal had jurisdiction, namely crimes against peace and war crimes.
 55
 This 
meant that crimes against humanity had to be committed in the context of an armed conflict 
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or military occupation, since both war crimes and crimes against pace were de facto linked to 
the war.
56
 This formulation became known as the ‘war nexus’.
57
 The Nuremberg judgment 
left unclear whether the tribunal believed the nexus requirement to be an element of crimes 
against humanity, or merely a limitation on its jurisdiction, which has been long debated 
among scholars.
58
 The definition on crimes against humanity in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
59
 (‘Tokyo Charter’) was substantially similar 
to the one found in the Nuremberg Charter. 
60
 The Tokyo trial did not provide any further 
guidance on ‘crimes against humanity’ either, as there was no explicit charge of this crime.
61
 
The preponderant scholarly view nevertheless suggests that the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
mandatory connection with crimes against peace or ordinary war crimes applied only to the 
jurisdictional reach of the International Military Tribunals, but the incidence of war is not a 
prerequisite lying at the root of crimes against humanity.
62
 The requirement of war nexus 
was subsequently removed in the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL No. 10),
63
 




2.2 UN Conventions  
The trend towards eliminating the war nexus was not only evidenced by the CCL No. 10, but 
was also accelerated by a series of international conventions adopted by the UN. It is 
generally accepted that treaties can be evidence of customary law.
65
 As early as 1948, the 
Genocide Convention 
66
 provided that ‘the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, 
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law 
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which they undertake to prevent and punish.’ 
67
 Genocide is arguably the gravest form of a 
crime against humanity.
68
 By dropping any nexus with war, the Genocide Convention 
provided a basis for the subsequent developments of severing the war nexus in the context of 
crimes against humanity.  
              In 1968, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 
69
 which explicitly 
provides that ‘irrespective of the date of their commission…no statutory limitation shall 
apply to war crimes…crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time 
as peace.’ 
70
 Five years later, in 1973, the General Assembly formalised the status of 
apartheid as a crime against humanity in the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
71
 Article I of the Convention declares that 
‘apartheid is a crime against humanity.’
72
 Acts of apartheid are proclaimed as ‘crimes 
violating the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations… consisting a serious threat to international peace and 
security’, however, no connection to war was posited as a condition for the criminalisation of 
these acts.  
              Apart from these UN Conventions, the ILC also affirmed that crimes against 
humanity do not require a nexus with armed conflict. In 1951, the ILC adopted the first Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
73
 Instead of requiring a nexus 
with either war crimes or crimes against peace, this formulation required crimes against 
humanity to be connected with ‘the offences defined in this article.’
74
 However, the attempt 
to require a link to other crimes under international law as part of the definition of crimes 







 For example, Article 18 of the 1996 Draft Code provided that ‘a crime against 
humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a 
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large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group’. 
78
 
The ILC thus deliberately rejected any connection between crimes against humanity and 
armed conflict,
79
 and its final draft formed part of the preparatory material available to the 
Commission and to governments when the drafting process for the Rome Statute was 
initiated. 
80
 The interpretations of the ILC can be considered authoritative because the UN 





2.3 UN Resolutions  
The post-Nuremberg initiatives of abolishing the war nexus not only existed in international 
conventions, but also ranged from General Assembly Resolutions to Security Council 
Resolutions. Professor Wang was particularly interested in the resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly. In his opinion, the most obvious effect of these resolutions is their 
evidential value in the formation and development of international law.
82
 It will be recalled 
in this context that the resolutions of the General Assembly ‘may show the gradual evolution 
of the opinio juris required for the establishment of the new rules.’
83
  
              Even before the adoption of the Apartheid Convention, the General Assembly 
adopted a number of resolutions in which the policies and practices of apartheid were 
condemned as a crime against humanity. In a resolution adopted in 1965, the General 
Assembly condemned ‘the polices of apartheid and racial discrimination practiced by the 
Government of South Africa in South West Africa, which constitute a crime against 
humanity’. 
84
 The General Assembly reaffirmed that ‘apartheid is a crime against humanity’ 







            The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR adopted by the Security Council resolutions 
represent important recent codifications of the law of crimes against humanity. The Chapeau 
to the definition of crimes against humanity in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute reads that ‘the 
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
                                                          
78
 Ibid.  
79
 ILC Commentary to Article 18 (Crimes against humanity), para.6, in 1996 ILC Report.   
80
 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p.195. 
81
 Ramaa P. Dhokalia, The Codification of Public International Law (Manchester University, 1970), 
p.203.  
82
 Tieya Wang, International Law, p.20.  
83
 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para.70. 
84
 GA Res.2074(XX)(1965), para.4. 
85
 GA Res.2202(XXI)(1966), para.1; GA Res.2189 (XXI)(1966), para.6. 
86
 GA Res.2262(XXII)(1967), para.2; GA Res.2326 (XXII)(1967), para.5.  
87





following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character, and directed against any civilian population.’
88
 In the U.N. Secretary-General’s 
report on the ICTY Statute, he noted, in an opinion contrary to the language of Article 5, that 
crimes against humanity are ‘prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an 
armed conflict, international or internal in character’,
89
 suggesting that this limitation in the 
Statute is jurisdictional rather than definitional.
90
 Though the Security Council itself muddied 
the water in the ICTY Statute by providing a connection between the crimes against 
humanity and the existence of an armed conflict,
91
 it did not insist upon the nexus when it 
established the ICTR one year later. The definition of crimes against humanity in the ICTR 
Statute did not make any mention of armed conflict, thus de-linking crimes against humanity 
entirely from war, whether internal or international.
 92
 In addition, the clause that a crime 
against humanity must be committed in an armed conflict was omitted from the statutes of 
later ‘hybrid’ tribunals, which were established on the basis of Security Council 
resolutions,
93
 including the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
94
  the East Timor Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes
95




2.4 Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals  
As mentioned above, Professor Wang also acknowledged that evidence of customary law 
may sometimes be found in the decisions and judgments of international organs. In fact, the 
jurisprudence of the UN ad hoc Tribunals likewise endorsed the trend towards severing the 
connection between the crimes against humanity and armed conflict. While the ICTY Statute 
incorporates the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict, the ICTY Chambers have 
repeatedly stated in its decisions that this restriction was intended to limit the jurisdiction of 
the ICTY, not to reflect contemporary international law.  
            In the Tadić Case, the Appeal Chamber in its jurisdiction decision described the 
nexus as ‘obsolescent’, and said that ‘there is no logical or legal basis for this requirement 
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and it has been abandoned in subsequent state practice with respect to crimes against 
humanity.’
97
 It concluded that ‘it is by now a settled rule of customary international law that 
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, 
as the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a connection 
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that crimes 
against humanity be committed in either internal or international armed conflict, the 
Security Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary 
under customary international law.’ 
98
 In the subsequent judgment of the Tadić Case, the 
Trial Chamber confirmed the findings of the Appeals Chamber in the jurisdiction decision.
99
 
The Appeals Chamber in its judgment restated that ‘the armed conflict is a jurisdictional 
element, not a substantive element of the mens rea of crimes against humanity’.
100
 Similarly, 




              As shown above, there is preponderant evidence which contradicts the Chinese 
view on the need for a war nexus in the context of crimes against humanity. It might be true 
that because of the seemingly conflicting approaches adopted by the earlier authorities, 
giving rise to two possible perspectives of current customary international law, appeals to 
authorities could not be decisive at the negotiations at Rome in 1998.
102
 Nevertheless, to the 
extent that uncertainty may have existed as to whether a nexus to armed conflict was 
required under current customary international law before 1998, the adoption of the ICC 
Statute – as a statement of the collectively agreed view of numerous states – should serve as 
very strong evidence that such a nexus is not required in customary international law.
103
 It 
might be plausible for China to contest the customary status of crimes against humanity 
without a war nexus during the negotiation process of establishing the ICC, but the Chinese 
objection has gradually lost its ground since the Rome Statute was adopted. An argument 
could be made that the inclusion of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute is a 
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progressive development of international law rather than merely a codification of custom.
104
 
However, it should be noted that every codification of international law is regarded as an 
element of innovation, meaning the difference between codification of custom and 
progressive development of law is a matter of degree - between minor and major changes of 
the law, respectively. 
105
  
             Admittedly, however, there is still room for China to justify its position by 
resorting to the rule of the persistent objector, which allows a nation that objects to an 
emerging customary norm to refuse to be bound by that norm even after the norm attains the 
status of customary international law.
106
 The question therefore is whether China is qualified 
to be a persistent objector in this sphere. It should be noted from the outset that the purpose 
of introducing the concept of persistent objector into this work is not to examine whether 
China can contest the application of the relevant customary norms to itself, but rather to 
evaluate how strong the Chinese objections are, and the likelihood that China would shift its 
attitude. 
 
3. China as a Persistent Objector to Crimes against 
Humanity Committed during Peacetime?  
 
Under the persistent objector rule, a state which persistently objects to an emerging norm is 
not bound by the norm once it gains the status of customary international law.
107
 The leading 
authorities for the principle of the persistent objector are the opinions of the ICJ in the 
Asylum Case
108
 and in the Fisheries Case,
109
 however, both times were arguably in obiter 
dicta. Supporters of the concept of the persistent objector often refer to separate or dissenting 
opinions of judges in these and other ICJ cases.
110
 While many commentators believe that the 
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doctrine of persistent objector has been widely accepted,
111
 there are controversies 
surrounding this concept. This research does not intend to examine comprehensively all the 




              If one accepts that it is legally possible to be a persistent objector, the question then 
turns to what conditions a state must fulfil in order to opt out of the new customary rule. The 
ICJ did not explain in either the Asylum Case or the Fisheries Case just what a state needs to 
do in order to qualify as a persistent objector. It is, for example, far from clear just how 
persistent the objecting state must be and by what means that objection must be made 
known.
113
 It is generally agreed that there are basically two conditions. First, the state must 
object when the rule is in its nascent stage, and continue to object afterwards. Evidence of 
objection must be clear, and the objector state must rebut a presumption of acceptance. 
114
 
Second, the objection must be consistent.
115
 The meaning of ‘consistently’ varies with the 
circumstances of a particular case.
116
 In general, consistency does not require that an 
objection (however lodged) be senselessly repeated. Rather, it appears that in most 
circumstances the objecting state simply must not act inconsistently with, contradict, or 
otherwise contravene the objection in order to maintain its position. 
117
 While China clearly 
voiced its objection to the customary law status of crimes against humanity without a linkage 
to war during the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute establishing 
the ICC in 1998, the question arises as to whether China’s objection was consistent.  
              As a contracting party to the Genocide Convention,
 118
 China is obliged to punish 
persons who commit genocide, whether ‘in time of peace or in time of war.’
119
 It has thus 
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assumed an obligation to punish one crime against humanity, namely genocide, which would 
constitute an international crime if it were committed in time of peace. By ratifying the 
Apartheid Convention in 1983, China also affirmed that another kind of crime against 
humanity – apartheid – could occur in time of peace.  
             During the ILC deliberations on its last Draft Code of Crimes on the Peace and 
Security of Mankind in 1996, Mr. He, who had been a member of the Crawford Working 
Group on the ICC, stated that ‘crimes against humanity embracing crimes committed in 
times of war and in times of peace.’
120
 Mr. He also made a somewhat curious statement that 
‘the concept of crimes against humanity stemmed from the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal. Originally, it had applied to offences committed in peacetime. The scope of such 
crimes had now been extended to cover offences committed in time of war.’ 
121
 As discussed 
in the Introductory Chapter, the fact that the Commission members serve in a personal 
capacity (not as representative of their states) does not inhibit their views from being taken 
from or influenced by their governments. A convenient case is the same view shared by Mr. 
He and the Chinese authorities on the compulsory jurisdiction and state consent of the ICC 
Statute.
122
 Moreover, as many of the Commission members are officials of their governments, 




              In addition, there have been several General Assembly resolutions which labeled 
apartheid as a crime against humanity,
 
 and China voted in favor of one of the resolutions 
adopted in 1979 which explicitly stated in its preamble that ‘apartheid is a Crime against 
humanity’.
124
 The views of China as a P-5 member may also carry weight as both the ad hoc 
tribunals were established under its authority. Though China abstained in the Security 
Council’s resolution establishing the ICTR, its abstention could not be regarded as state 
objection to the elimination of war-connecting link in the ICTR Statute. As noted by the ICJ, 
‘a state which abstains is probably in the same position as a state which votes for the 
resolution, since it is well established that a State which does not take part in the formation 
of a rule of general customary law is bound by that rule unless it expressly dissents from an 
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 China also voted in favour of the Security Council resolutions establishing the 






 the instruments of which 
all omitted a connection between crimes against humanity and armed conflict.  
              As noted earlier, there were some ambiguities flowing from the different 
formulations of the Chinese statements on the war nexus to crimes against humanity. If the 
Chinese position is construed as requiring a linkage to armed conflict in general, China 
cannot be considered as a persistent objector given its past practice as discussed above. 
Alternatively, if the Chinese requirement is interpreted as limited to international armed 
conflict, it cannot be qualified as a persistent objector either. This is obvious from the fact 





to the ICC, which issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity committed in purely 
non-international armed conflicts in both Sudan and Libya.
131
  
              To sum up, even though China raised its objection towards eliminating the war 
nexus requirement for crimes against humanity at Rome, it cannot be considered to be a 
persistent objector. Persistent means that an objecting state must, at a minimum, maintain its 
dissent to a degree where it can demonstrate that it had not consented to the rule even before 
it became a rule. If a state does not maintain its objection, it may be considered to have 
acquiesced.
132
 China’s objection to the customary law status of crimes against humanity is 
not so robust and uncompromising. This is not just reflected in the test of the ‘persistent 
objector’ doctrine, but also can be seen indirectly from the alternating views of the Chinese 
legal experts, who had exerted their influence through participation as members of Chinese 
delegation to the Rome conferences.  
              One such delegate was Mr. Daqun Liu, who worked as Deputy Director General 
and Legal Adviser for the Treaty and Law Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
from 1993 to 1998, and headed the Chinese delegation to the Rome Conference. In Rome, 
Liu had firmly objected to severing the connection between crimes against humanity and 
armed conflict, but he completely discarded his objection in his book entitled ‘The 
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International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute’ published in 2006.
133
 Liu 
observed that ‘the developments of customary international have indicated that, crimes 
against humanity is a separate category of crimes independent of war crimes and crimes 
against peace. Therefore, crimes against humanity can be committed in time of armed 
conflict or in time of peace, there is no requirement of a connection to armed conflict.’ 
134
 
The views of Chinese delegates, albeit in a personal capacity, are particularly revealing on 
issues and questions where the official position remains ambiguous. Since 2002, Liu has 
been a permanent judge at the ICTY. In fact, there has been Chinese legal experts’ 
engagement with the ad hoc tribunals since their establishments. Professor Haopei Li 
135
 
served as judge at the Appeals Chamber at the ICTY from 1993 to 1997, and he was 
involved in the Tadić judgment. Even though he wrote a Separate Opinion,
136
 he did not 
disagree with the Tribunal’s view about the customary law status of crimes against humanity 
without a war nexus. From 1995 to 1997 Li also served as judge at the ICTR.  Professor 
Tieya Wang, the most influential Chinese international law scholar, was elected in 1997 as a 
judge of the ICTY.
 137 
 Professor Wenqi Zhu, who held positions as a Legal Advisor and 
Appeals Counsel in the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY from 1995 to 2002, has made a 
great contribution to the development of international criminal law as a new branch of 
international law in China. 
138
  
             It should be noted that the all the Chinese legal experts’ engagement with the ad 
hoc tribunals were contemporary with or even later than the Chinese government’s 
articulation on the connection between crimes against humanity and armed conflict under 
customary international law. Given the fact that the ad hoc tribunals have played a 
significant role in severing the war nexus, the involvement of the Chinese legal experts, 
including the former chief negotiator of the Chinese delegation to the Rome Conference, 
simply makes the Chinese objection less compelling. In addition, not only the weight of 
western scholarly authority supports the view that a nexus to armed conflict is no longer 
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required for crimes against humanity under international law, 
139
 there are very few Chinese 
scholars explicitly opposed to the inclusion of the crimes against humanity during peacetime 




4. Crimes against Humanity and Human Rights Issues  
 
Without a linkage to armed conflict, China maintained, ‘many actions listed under that 
heading of the crimes against humanity belongs to the area of human rights rather than 
international criminal law’. 
141
 It further explained that ‘in listing specific acts constituting 
crimes against humanity, the Statute added a heavy dose of human rights law. Hence, crimes 
against humanity as defined in the Statute represented “new wine in old bottles”. His 
delegation believed that what the international community needed at the current stage was 
not a human rights court but a criminal court that punished international crimes of 
exceptional gravity. The injection of human rights elements would lead to a proliferation of 
human rights cases, weaken the mandate of the Court to punish the most serious crimes and 
thus defeat the purpose of establishing such a court’. 
142
 
   There are two Chinese confusions in the context of crimes against humanity that 
led it to put the ICC in a ‘human right box’: one is about international criminal law and 
international human rights law, the other is on the mandates of the ICC and international 
human rights bodies.  
 
4.1 International Human Rights law and International Criminal Law 
International human rights law has traditionally focused on establishing the obligations owed 
by states to individuals.
143
  It is for states to decide how they will enforce human rights 
obligations on their own agents; except in the case of the most serious abuses, this will rarely 
be by criminalizing the activity concerned.
144
 International criminal law, on the other hand, 
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focuses on the criminal liability of individuals, not states.
145
 In the definition of the crimes 
which are taken as being constitutive of substantive international criminal law, the official 




              International criminal law has a great deal in common with international human 
rights law.
147
 Almost all international crimes also qualify as human rights violations and 
many as violations of international humanitarian law, a factor which has caused confusion 
about the boundaries of international criminal law.
148
 International crimes are broad 
categories covering specific sub-categories of prohibited conduct, these physical acts 
(murder, deportation, unlawful imprisonment, and so on) when undertaken by state actors are 
almost always violations of human rights law. Take crimes against humanity for example, 
the specific acts that constitute crimes against humanity normally overlap with some of the 
prescriptions of the international human rights regime. Torture, which can be classified as a 
crime against humanity, is the very subject of a separate human rights treaty, namely, the 
Convention against Torture. Similarly, the ICCPR prohibits slavery the slave trade and 
‘arbitrary arrest and detention’, which are also listed under the definition of crimes against 
humanity of the Rome Statute.
149
  
              In fact, the process of evolution from enunciated human rights protections to their 
criminalisation is a well-established pattern in the evolution of international criminal law. 
150
 
Some of the enumerated acts under the crimes against humanity heading overlap with human 
rights violations that have been criminalised in other human rights conventions under 
another label. For example, enforced disappearance (Article 7(i)), which is listed under 
crimes against humanity of the Rome Statute is also covered by a specialised convention 
criminalizing the practice.
151
 On the other hand, the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes 
against humanity criminalises certain human rights violations that have not been criminalised 
in other conventions, which means some of the enumerated acts of Article 7 are brand new 
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criminalisation of human rights as crimes against humanity.
152
 The definition of crimes 
against humanity under the Rome Statute has been expanding as a catchall international 
crime that criminalises certain human rights violations, whether the specific acts are 
criminalised under their respective human rights treaties or whether they are the subject of 
specialised conventions that may or may not criminalise them.
153
  
              However, while many or most of the prohibitions of international criminal law are 
rooted in human rights or humanitarian law, and are intended to reinforce those rules, the 
scope of international criminal law is much narrower.
154
 It addresses only the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.
155
 In short, not every human 
rights violation has been criminalised. The drafters of the Elements of Crimes were 
concerned that crimes against humanity could be used to criminalise all human rights 
violations.
156
 Therefore, they included a statement in the introduction to those elements 
designed to limit that possibility ‘since article 7 pertains to international criminal law, its 
provisions must be strictly construed, taking into account that crimes against humanity as 
defined in article 7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole, warrant and entail individual criminal responsibility, and require 
conduct which is impermissible under general applicable international law, as recognized by 
the principle legal systems of the world.’ 
157
  
              The Kupreškić Trial Chamber was careful, however, not to indicate a complete 
overlap between crimes against humanity and human rights law in this context, opining that 
cases from human rights and refugee law ‘cannot provide a basis for individual criminal 
responsibility. It would be contrary to the principle of legality to convict someone of 
persecution based on a definition found in international refugee law or human rights law.’
158
  
              In addition, international criminal law not only requires the specific elements of the 
offence (murder, torture, etc.), but also the contextual elements which allow these offences to 
be listed in one of the broader categories of international crimes. For example, under the 
Rome Statute, if it occurs in the context of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian 
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population, the perpetration of murder or torture will constitute a crime against humanity.
159
 
These contextual elements are crucial in transforming human rights violations into 
international crimes. Therefore, though there are overlaps between international criminal law 
and human rights law, they do not fully correspond.  
 
4.2 Different Mandates between the ICC and International Human Rights 
Bodies.  
As a corollary to the normative difference between international criminal law and 
international human rights law, the violations of each is dealt with by different types of 
international judicial bodies, namely, international criminal tribunals and international 
human rights bodies (or the ICJ in certain circumstances). The ICC was not created as a 
human rights court
160
 or an institution to monitor human rights.
161
 Although the crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC have a close relationship with the protection of human rights, this 
does not mean that the ICC will evolve into a court of human rights.  
             Firstly, while international human rights bodies deal with state responsibility,
162
 the 
ICC is only concerned with individual criminal responsibility. State responsibility under 
international law is separated from the legal responsibility of the individual. 
163
 Each of the 
two forms of responsibility is the consequence of the violation of a different rule binding on 
a different subject of international law, namely individuals or states. If an individual whose 
acts are attributable under international law to a state commits an international crime, this 
does not automatically mean that the state is responsible for an international wrong. 
Individual criminal responsibility under international law is without prejudice to state 
responsibility, 
164
 which also means that individual responsibility does not eliminate the 
international responsibility of states.
165
 In fact, both a state and an individual could be held 
responsible for a single act under international law. A limited number of acts can lead both to 
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 The conjunction of individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility is 
most obvious in the context of aggression.
169
 Even if there is a connection between a system 
of international protection of human rights, based on state responsibility, and another system, 
based on international criminal responsibility of those who are the material authors of such 
violations, these two systems may coexist in parallel.
170
 As Triffterer put it, the finding that 
an individual is guilty of committing a crime in an official capacity in the context of a state 




              Modern international practice highlights the important distinction between 
individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility, and the different fora for 
determining these issues. For example, military officers and civilian leaders, acting at the 
behest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have been indicted by the ICTY, while the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was charged with genocide by Bosnia before the ICJ.
172
 The 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY came essentially to the same conclusion stating in the Čelebići 
Judgment of 16 November 1998 that: ‘the International Tribunal is a criminal judicial body, 
established to prosecute and punish individuals for violations of international humanitarian 
law, and not to determine state responsibility for acts of aggression or unlawful 
intervention.’
173
 In a similar way, a Rome Conference Delegate from Singapore declared that 
‘realism dictated that the aim should not be to establish a court of human rights of the kind 
that existed in Europe or the Americas…but, rather, to give tangible recognition to the fact 
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that some acts were so universally abhorred that their perpetrators should not escape 
punishment.’ 
174
 The ICC merely has jurisdiction to try individuals.  It is thus different and 
distinct from a human rights court, which only acts in the context of the law of state 
responsibility. Even though some international crimes may entail state responsibility,
175
 state 
responsibility per se is not addressed in the ICC context.  
              When bearing in mind the different mandates of the two kinds of bodies and 
looking back at the issue of complementarity discussed in Chapter IV, it is abundantly clear 
that a state’s compliance with international human rights standards is not within the purview 
of the ICC.  Were the protection of human rights of the accused in national jurisdictions 
added to the mandate of the Court, this would indeed add a dimension entirely different from 
the initial idea for the establishment of the ICC.
176
 As noted above, the cornerstone of the 
Statute is, instead of state responsibility for human rights violations, the criminal 
responsibility of individuals for international crimes.
177
  The ICC does not have a mandate to 
judge or assess human rights compliance by states under other international human rights 
instruments, it therefore should not be referred to as a human rights court.  
              Secondly, as noted in the analysis of the differentiation between international 
human rights law and international criminal law, not every human rights violation is 
criminalised under the latter regime. In other words, not every violation of human rights 
gives rise to individual criminal responsibility of an international character. The international 
criminal courts and tribunals do not exist to prosecute violations of the whole panoply of 
human rights.
178
 The ICC only concentrates on gross human rights violations that amount to 
international crimes, while international human rights bodies relate to ordinary human rights 
violations. Gross human rights violations normally entail aggravated state responsibility, 
which are serious breaches of certain obligations owed towards the international community 
as a whole.
179
 Individual responsibility for gross human rights violations overlaps, most of 
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the time, with aggravated state responsibility.
180
 On the other hand, ordinary human rights 
violations would mostly give rise to ordinary state responsibility. 
181
 
                In fact, China’s past practice in other fora has implicitly acknowledged the 
suggested dichotomy between ordinary human rights violations and gross human rights 
violations. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, Chinese foreign policy has been 
characterised largely by adherence to a rigid concept of state sovereignty and steadfast 
insistence on the principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs.
182
 In the 
Chinese State Council White Paper on Human Rights published in 1991, it was stated that 
‘China is opposed to interfering in other countries’ internal affairs on the pretext of human 
rights…and so hurting sovereignty’.
183
 In the view of China, ‘human rights are essentially 
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a country. Respect for each country’s sovereignty 
and non-interference in internal affairs are universally recognized principles of 
international law, which… of course are applicable to the field of human rights as well’.
184
   
              Notwithstanding this position, China left some room for the international 
intervention in respect of gross human rights violations: ‘the International Community 
should interfere with and stop acts that endanger world peace and security, such as gross 
human rights violations caused by colonialism, racism, foreign aggression and occupation, 
as well as apartheid, racial discrimination, genocide, slave trade and serious violation of 
human rights by international terrorist organizations.’
185
 China’s different approaches 
towards the different kinds of human rights violations have also been confirmed by the State 
Council of China in 2004. It stated that ‘China continues to insist that dialogue on rights 
issues be carried out on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and that states refrain from 
coercive intervention except in cases of widespread and systematic violation of rights that 
characterize failed states torn by ethnic strife and genocide.’ 
186
 In its 2005 Position Paper 
on UN reform, China reiterated that ‘each state shoulders the primary responsibility to 
protect its own population,’ but it also explicitly acknowledged that ‘when a massive 
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humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate concern of the international community to 
ease and defuse the crisis.’ 
187
 
                With regard to the gross human rights violations that can constitute international 
crimes, China has signalled a shift from an ideological insistence on non-intervention 
towards a more pragmatic approach to humanitarian crisis. While China continues to 
champion a strong concept of state sovereignty and non-interference in interstate relations, 
its actions since the end of the Cold War evidence a willingness to acquiesce in, and even 
actively support, multilateral humanitarian interventions that obtain both Security Council 
authorisation and target state consent. 
188
   
              Notwithstanding sovereignty concerns, China actively participated in UN 
peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Bosnia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Haiti, and 
Sudan.
189
 Furthermore, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which was unanimously 
affirmed by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit,
190
 has been further endorsed by 
China both in the abstract
191
 and in practice.
192
 This is a significant change in China’s 
position, as it formerly endorsed a more absolutist conception of sovereignty and resisted 
attempts to make sovereignty conditional on a state’s internal situation. However, despite 
these movements, there is a significant Chinese confusion about ordinary human rights 
violations and gross human rights violations in the context the ICC, or more precisely, 
crimes against humanity.  
 
Section II War Crimes  
 
During the debates in the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee, delegations 
agreed generally that the elaboration of the list of war crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction 
should not be an exercise in legislation. Rather than legislating and creating new war crimes, 
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only war crimes reflecting well established international law should be included under the 
Draft Statute. 
193
 Delegations informally came to broadly agree on two cumulative criteria to 
select and define the war crimes to be included: First, the conduct concerned must amount to 
a violation of customary international humanitarian law. Second, the violation of 
humanitarian law concerned must be criminalised under customary international law.
194
  
              The debates about whether the concept of war crimes was applicable in internal 
armed conflicts triggered a battle between two camps. On one hand, a minority of states, 
including China, strongly believed that the ICC Statute should not include such norms, as it 
was feared that ICC competence over such crimes would be an unacceptable intrusion on 
sovereignty and would undermine the general acceptability of the Statute. 
195
 They further 
argued that ‘individual criminal responsibility for such violations was not clearly established 
as a matter of existing law.’
196
 However, from the outset of the negotiations, a clear majority 
of delegations supported the inclusion of war crimes in internal armed conflict.
197
 It was 
noted that most of the armed conflicts that have raged around the world since World War II 
have been conflicts of a non-international character, and that it is precisely in internal armed 
conflicts that humanitarian considerations are most often brutally disregarded and national 
criminal justice systems least likely to adequately respond to violations.
198
 Whether 
violations of the laws of internal armed conflict should be included in the Draft Statute 
remained a source of real disagreement until late in the day.
199
 Indeed, even the final draft 
submitted by the Preparatory Committee for the consideration of delegates at the Diplomatic 
Conference included the option of deleting those sections (Section C and D of Article 5) 
dealing with internal armed conflict.
200
  
               The retention of relevant provisions on non-international armed conflict was 
strongly supported by the majority of delegates before the Committee of the Whole and the 
Conference Plenary. 
201
 The view was expressed by the Chinese representative that ‘his 
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delegation favoured deletion of section C and D, relating to internal armed conflicts, as not 
being in keeping with international customary law; however, it was open to other 
suggestions’
202
 After the adoption of the Statute, China reiterated its position that it ‘had 
doubts about the inclusion of war crimes in domestic armed conflict in the Court’s 
jurisdiction, because provisions in international law concerning war crimes in such conflicts 
are still incomplete.’
 203
 China also pointed out that ‘states with robust legal systems are 
capable of prosecuting war related offences committed in internal armed conflicts. Domestic 
Courts have apparent advantages over the ICC in prosecuting these types of crimes.’
204
  
                Intimately connected to the question of whether internal conflicts should be 
covered, and equally divisive, was the issue of exactly which norms are applicable in such 
conflicts. 
205
 Most delegations were of the opinion that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions
206
 and several provisions of Additional Protocol II (APII) 
207
 give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law, and therefore should be 
included as war crimes under the draft statute. 
208
 However, other delegations expressed the 
view that non-international armed conflicts should not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court either with respect to Common Article 3 or APII. 
209
 In particular, the view was 
expressed that APII as a whole had not achieved the status of customary law.
210
  
               At the Rome Conference, the competence of the Court over serious violations of 
Common Article 3 did not raise difficulties. A large and growing majority confirmed its 
commitment to the inclusion of violations of Common Article 3 and other serious violations. 
Furthermore, a small number of delegations, which had persistently opposed the Court’s 
jurisdiction over internal armed conflict, began to indicate some flexibility, at least with 
respect to Common Article 3.
211
 China mainly questioned the customary status of APII. 
According to the Chinese statement before the Sixth Committee, ‘the provisions of Geneva 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were very weak in 
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comparison with those of Additional Protocol I and the question of whether some of those 
provisions had acquired the status of customary international law was still in debate.’ 
212
 
                Eventually, the inclusion of violations of the laws of internal armed conflict won 
the day, and Article 8 includes both ‘serious violations of article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions’
213
 and ‘other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of 
international law’.
214
 China maintained that ‘the definition of war crimes goes beyond that 




                In summary, China’s objection towards the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes in 
non-international armed conflict was built on three interrelated arguments: firstly, non-
international armed conflict is not within the scope of war crimes under customary 
international law; secondly, the current definition of war crimes goes beyond that accepted 
under customary international law and APII to the Geneva Conventions; and thirdly, the 
jurisdiction over war crimes in non-international armed conflict should remain in the hands 
of domestic courts. As the main objections of China towards war crimes were similarly 
raised in the context of customary international law, the analysis in this section will follow 
the same approach adopted by the crimes against humanity section in examining these 
objections. 
 
1. Customary International law and Individual Criminal 
Responsibility for War Crimes in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts  
 
Individual criminal responsibility for violations of the norms applicable in international 
armed conflicts was firmly established in international law in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Judgments and was further elaborated by, for example, the grave breaches provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol I.
216
  It is however true that, until the early 
1990s, it was generally agreed among commentators that individuals do not incur criminal 
responsibility under international law for war crimes committed in non-international armed 
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 The International Committee of the Red Cross held the view that no such thing 
as war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts existed. 
218
 This view was also 
shared by the Commission of Experts established by the Secretary-General, which concluded 
that the scope and the content of customary international law applicable to internal armed 
conflict was ‘debatable’
219
 and that there does not appear to be a customary international law 
applicable to internal armed conflict which includes the concept of war crimes.
220
  
               This position was primarily based on the complete silence of Common Article 3 of 
the 1949 four Geneva Conventions and of APII to these Conventions with respect to 
individual criminal responsibility. Violations of Common Article 3 or APII are not grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions for which criminal responsibility necessary lies.
221
 The 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions were not prepared to criminalise this conduct in the 
context of a domestic conflict, 
222
 however, nowhere in the Geneva Conventions is such 
prosecution ruled out or prohibited. The creation of the ICTY and ICTR marked the turning 
point towards international criminalisation of the offences committed in non-international 
armed conflicts.
223
 In fact, there has been a clear tendency in practice and evolving 
customary international law towards international criminalisation of the offences committed 
in non-international armed conflicts since 1993. 
 
1.1 United Nations Practice   
The UN has considered the issue of war crimes in several fora, of which the contribution of 
the Security Council to the criminalisation of the rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts was the most significant. The Security 
Council has been instrumental in developing the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for serious violations of the laws of war in internal armed conflicts, not only 
with the creation of the ICTY and ICTR but particularly through its consistent practice.  
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               The Statute of the ICTY did not explicitly provide for, nor did it exclude, the 
criminalisation of serious violations of the laws or customs of war if they were committed 
within the context of internal armed conflict. With regard to the interpretation of Article 3 of 
the Statute (entitled ‘violations of the laws or customs of war’), the Commission of Experts 
established by the Secretary-General found in its final report that ‘there does not appear to 
be a customary international law applicable to internal armed conflicts which includes the 
concept of war crimes.’
224
 While the Security Council and the Commission of Experts 
remained extremely cautious about the application of war crimes in internal armed 
conflicts,
225
 the US, the UK and France had maintained during Security Council debates on 
the Tribunal’s Statute that the term ‘laws or customs of war’ used in Article 3 of the Statute 
covered all obligations under humanitarian law agreements in force in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia at the time the acts were committed, including Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Convention, and the 1977 Additional Protocols to these Conventions.
226
 
                 In contrast to the ICTY, the ICTR Statute expressly mentions serious violations of 
Common Article 3 and APII as coming within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
227
 The 
Commission of Experts previously set up by the Security Council qualified the armed 
conflict which took place between 6 April 1994 and 15 July 1994 as a non-international 
conflict. 
228
 The Secretary-General supported the conclusions reached by the Commission of 
Experts and recommended to the Security Council that individuals who have perpetrated 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, in particular Common Article 3 and 
APII should be brought before an independent and impartial international criminal 
tribunal.
229
 The approach taken by the Security Council in relation to the ICTR was 
summarised in a report of the Secretary-General as follows:  ‘the Security Council … elected 
to take a more expansive approach to the choice of the applicable law than the one 
underlying the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, and included within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal international instruments regardless of whether they 
were considered part of customary international law or whether they customarily entailed 
the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrators of the crime. Article 4 of the statute, 
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accordingly, includes violations of Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not yet 
been universally recognized as part of customary international law, and for the first time 
criminalizes common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions.’ 
230
 
                Ever since, or even prior to the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, the Security 
Council has repeatedly called for individual accountability for atrocities committed in 
internal conflicts, recognizing the criminal status of such acts. This is how, on the occasion 


























 the Security Council asserted that the individuals 
who violate international humanitarian law, or the people ordering these violations, will be 
held personally responsible. Without ever mentioning the character of the conflicts as 
internal or international, the Security Council has consistently reaffirmed in non-
international armed conflicts, the criminal responsibility of all individuals who commit 




              In particular, recognizing the need to end impunity and to help in the restoration 
and maintenance of peace, the Security Council, by Resolution 1315, requested the 
Secretary-General of the UN to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone 
to create an independent court. 
244
 It tries persons for crimes against humanity,
245
 violations 
of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of APII,
246
 other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law
247
 and some offences under Sierra Leonean Law.
248
 In 2004, 
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the Council asked the Secretary-General to create a Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan; its lengthy report identified 24 different offences 
recognised by customary international law as war crimes in internal conflicts and concluded 
that various sides had committed numerous war crimes. 
249
 In response, the Council referred 
the atrocities in Sudan to the ICC in 2005.
250
 More significantly, the Security Council 
unanimously passed Resolution 1970, referring the ‘situation’ in Libya to the ICC. The 
subsequent International Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council 
concluded that a non-international armed conflict had occurred and international crimes 
specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed in Libya.
251
 The 
Security Council practice was thus extensive and virtually uniform in qualifying these acts as 
constituting serious violations of humanitarian law entailing individual criminal 
responsibility, treating international and internal armed conflicts alike.  
                The contribution of the UN to criminalizing violations of the law of internal armed 
conflicts was not limited to the Security Council. The General Assembly has also had 
occasions to act in this sphere.  The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, which was the result of the 
ILC’s decade-long project mandated by the General Assembly aiming at authoritatively 
codifying crimes under general international law, included a category of acts committed in 
violation of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict not of an 
international character as war crimes.
252
 According to the ILC Commentary, this category of 
war crimes as addressed in subparagraph(f) ‘consists of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflict contained in article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and article 4 of Protocol II.’
253
 The 
ILC further explained that ‘the subparagraph is drawn from the statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda (art.4), which is the most recent statement of the relevant law. The 
Commission considered this subparagraph to be of particular importance in view of the 
frequency of non-international armed conflicts in recent years.’
254
 
                Facing the atrocities which had occurred in the DRC, the General Assembly 
constantly stressed that the occupying forces should be held accountable for violations of 
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human rights and humanitarian law committed in the territories under their control. 
255
 
Likewise, the Secretary General also repeatedly called for the criminal responsibility of 
individuals who committed serious violations of the laws of war in internal armed conflicts 














1.2  Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals  
The trials conducted by the ICTY and ICTR of persons accused of war crimes committed in 
non-international armed conflicts confirm that persons are criminally responsible for those 
crimes.
 
The Appeal Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadić case conclude that ‘there is no doubt 
that violations of humanitarian law entail individual criminal responsibility, regardless of 
whether they are committed in international or internal armed conflicts’.
262
 This proposition 
was clearly reinforced by the ICTY in the Čelebići Case
263




                The Tadić Appeal Chamber outlined the traditional dichotomy between the 
regulation of international and internal armed conflicts,
265
 but felt that the approach of 
international law had, over time, become less State-oriented, inevitably leading to the 
following question: ‘why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or 
the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as 
proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in 
war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when 
armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereignty state? If international 
law, while of course, duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn 
to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy 
should gradually lose its weight.’
266
 The Appeal Chamber repeated its position in the 
Čelebići case that ‘to maintain a distinction between the two legal regimes and their criminal 
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consequences in respect of similarly egregious acts because of the difference in nature of the 
conflicts would ignore the very purpose of the Geneva Conventions, which is to protect the 
dignity of the human persons.’
267
   
                The Appeal Chamber pointed out that even though no express mention of 
Common Article 3 (or APII) was made in the ICTY Statute this was not to be interpreted as 
an exclusion thereof from the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.
268
 The Appeal 
Chamber also disagreed with the Commission of Experts’ interpretation regarding Article 
3.
269
 In the Chamber’s view, ‘article 3 functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that 
no serious violations of international humanitarian law are taken away from the jurisdiction 
of the International Tribunal.’
270
 As noted earlier, the Secretary-General stated that the 
violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions were criminalised for the first 
time when the Security Council created the ICTR.
271
 According to the Appeal Chamber, the 
Secretary-General’s statement meant that provisions for international jurisdiction over such 
violations were expressly made for the first time.
272
 It further maintained that ‘in establishing 
this tribunal, the Security Council simply created an international mechanism for the 




               The matter was dealt with differently in relation to the ICTR insofar as the Statute 
itself recognises that war crimes can be committed in the context of an internal armed 
conflict. In 1998, an ICTR Trial Chamber in the Akayesu Case concurred with the findings in 
Tadić: ‘the Chamber considers the findings of the ICTY Appeal Chamber convincing and 
dispositive of this issue, both with respect to serious violations of common Article 3 and of 
additional Protocol II’
274
 The Chamber concluded that ‘the violation of these norms 
[common Article 3 and Article 4 of APII] entails, as a matter of customary international law, 
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1.3 Multilateral Treaties 
The adoption of multilateral treaties, establishing individual criminal responsibility for 
serious violations of the laws of war in internal armed conflict, has gained momentum since 
1993. 
                Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflicts has been explicitly included in four international conventions. The 1996 
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which apply both 
in internal and international conflicts, put the obligation on ratifying states to enact penalties 
and to hold criminally responsible any person who might violate this convention.
276
 The 
1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel enjoins states parties to 
‘make the crimes set out in paragraph 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which shall 
take into account their grave nature.’
277
 Furthermore, the Second Protocol to the Hague 
Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 
26 March 1999 establishes the criminal responsibility of persons who violate the Protocol.
278
 
Article 22 of this instrument provides for its application in the event of an armed conflict not 
of an international character. 
279
 It is true that these conventions, which proscribe certain 
activities of international concern, do not create international tribunals to try the violators or 
engage with individual criminal responsibility directly. These treaties, however, put the 
obligation on ratifying states to ensure the imposition of penal sanctions on these 
individuals,
280
 thus reflecting the new trend of criminalising the violations of laws of war 
committed in internal armed conflicts.  
                Most significantly, the adoption of the ICC Statute in itself constitutes a most 
remarkable confirmation, as ‘one of the major guiding principles in the elaboration of the 
definitions of the crimes was that these definitions should be reflective of customary 
international law.’ 
281
 By first adopting and then signing Articles 8 (2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the 
ICC Statute, states have, in an overwhelming and steadily growing majority solemnly 
expressed the view that there is individual criminal responsibility directly under customary 
international law for war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts.
282
  Though 
no provision on the use of certain prohibited weapons was included in the list of war crimes 
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applicable in internal armed conflicts in the 1998 ICC Statute, the Kampala Review 
Conference removed this distinction between the criminalisation available in international 
and non-international armed conflicts. The Belgian Amendment
283
 to the Rome Statute, 
which was adopted by consensus in the Kampala Review Conference, expanded the Court’s 
existing jurisdiction over the war crimes in international armed conflicts contained in the 
Subparagraphs (xvii), (xviii) and (xix) of Article 8 (2)(b) to armed conflicts of a non-
international character by including the same crimes in Article 8(2)(e) as new Subparagraphs 
(xiii), (xiv) and (xv).
284
  
               The individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in non-
international armed conflicts has been implicitly recognised in three other treaties, namely, 
the Chemical Weapons Conventions,
285
 the Ottawa Convention banning Anti-personnel 
Mines, 
286
 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.
287
 All require states to take all feasible measures, 




            Numerous states have also adopted legislation criminalizing war crimes committed 
in non-international armed conflicts, most of it in the past decade.
289
 It is likely that more 
will follow, in particular states adopting implementing legislation for ratification of the 
Rome Statute and wishing to take advantages of its complementarity principle. There have 
also been many official statements since the early 1990s in national and international fora 
affirming individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflict.
290
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2. Customary Status of Article 8(2)(c) and Article 8(2)(e) under the Rome 
Statute 
 
The discussion on the desirability of including internal armed conflicts was of course 
inseparable from the discussion of which norms might apply in internal armed conflicts;
291
 
and it was equally divisive. In the view of China, ‘the definition of “war crimes” goes 
beyond that accepted under customary international law and Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Convention’, 
292
 and the customary law status of some of the provisions of Protocol 
II were still in debate. 
293
 
                Under the Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(c), referring to ‘serious violations of article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions’, essentially reproduces Common Article 3. Article 
8(2)(e), referring to ‘violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of 
an international character …’, goes much further, listing at length other serious violations of 
the laws of internal armed conflict. As already indicated by its wording, the provision of 
subparagraph (e) does not have recourse to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It deals with 
criminal responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts other than Common Article 3. While most of the offences 
listed in Article 8(2)(e) have their origins in APII, some provisions go even further than 
those contained in APII.
294
 However, this is not the same as saying that Article 8(2)(e) goes 
beyond ‘that accepted under customary international law’ as China claimed.  
              Convincing evidence of the customary status of Article 8(2)(c) and 2(e) is provided 
by the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law.
295
 The study details 
customary rules applicable to situations of international and non-international armed conflict. 
The offences listed in Article 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) are covered in these rules. 
296
 Article 8(2)(c) 
encompasses serious violations of Common Article 3, the customary international status of 
which is not controversial.
 297
 It is settled jurisprudence that customary international law 
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imposes criminal liability for serious violations of Common Article 3.
298
 Article 8(2)(e) 
enumerates other norms applicable in non-international armed conflicts. The norms are 
derived from various sources, including the Geneva Conventions, APII and even API.
299
  It is 
however true that the customary nature of the normative provisions of APII is still 
debatable.
300
 When APII was drafted and adopted, there was reluctance on the part of states 
to agree that rules of customary law governing non-international conflicts existed.
301
 The UN 
Secretary-General stated in his report that APII was ‘not yet universally recognized as part 
of customary international law’,
302
 but this is not necessarily the approach taken by the ad 
hoc tribunals themselves.  
                The Statute of the ICTY does not explicitly provide for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
over serious violations of APII. The UN Secretary-General stated in his report that Protocol 
II was ‘not yet universally recognized as part of customary international law’. 
303
 However, 
many of the provisions of APII are now considered by the ad hoc tribunals to be customary 
in nature, even though as a whole it may not yet be said to be part of customary international 
law. In the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, the Chamber pointed out that ‘many provisions of 
this [Additional Protocol II] can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as 
having crystallized emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly 
instrumental in their evolution as general principles.’
304
  This stance has also been endorsed 
by the ICTR.  In the Akayesu Case, the Chamber directly pointed out, ‘Additional Protocol II 
as a whole was not deemed by the Secretary-General to have been universally recognized as 
part of customary international law. The Appeal Chamber concurred with the view inasmuch 
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as “[m]any provisions of this Protocol[II] can be regarded as declaratory of existing rules 
or as having crystallised in emerging rules of customary law[ ]”, but not all.’ 
305
  
                It is true that, as China pointed out, the Statute does innovate by qualifying as war 
crimes the violation of certain provisions of international humanitarian law not included in 
APII.
306
 For instance, Article 8 (2)(e)(iii) states ‘intentionally directing attacks against 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or 
civilian objects under the international law of armed conflicts’. China argued that ‘on 
protection of United Nations personnel, his delegation considered that that matter could not 
be assimilated to a war crime. Moreover, since peacekeeping personnel could be regarded 
as combatants and other personnel as civilians, the Statute already covered United Nations 
personnel and the paragraph could therefore be deleted’. 
307
 
             Although the provision on humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping may at first 
glance appear novel, the drafting of the provision ensures that this is simply a specific 
example of the general obligation not to attack civilian targets. Thus, while the provision 
may be technically redundant, it has symbolic importance as a clear signal by the world 
community that attacks against such personnel are recognised as serious crimes of 
international concern.
308
  It should be noted that the war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(iii) can 
also be found in the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel, 
309
 to 
which China is a party state. 
310
 Article 9 obliges states parties to the Safety Convention to 
make the listed offences crimes ‘under [their] national law’ (Article 9(1)) and to make them 
‘punishable by appropriate penalties’ (Article 9(2)). The Safety Convention does not provide 
for international jurisdiction to prosecute crimes according to Article 9. This provision is 
recognised as a war crime for the first time in the ICC Statute but emerges as an extension of 
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                In addition, the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone includes the 
eight offences listed in the ICTR Statute, which are violations of Common Article 3 and 
Protocol II, as well as three other offences, characterised as other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. One of the three other offences is committing an attack 
against peace-keeping personnel, which borrowed directly from the ICC Statute. This seems 
to indicate once again that more principles and crimes apply in internal armed conflicts than 
those stemming from Common Article 3 or APII. China did not specify which offenses listed 
under Article 8(2)(e) it considered to be beyond customary international law, and a review of 
the sources of each of each offence of Article 8(2)(e) is beyond the scope of the present 
section. However, studying a single case sheds light on dispersing the concerns of China.  
 
3. China as a Persistent Objector to War Crimes Committed in Non-
International Armed Conflicts? 
 
While China clearly voiced its objection to the customary law status of individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts during the 
negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC in 1998, 
there has been a compelling trend both in practice and in theory pointing in a different 
direction to the Chinese proposition. The question arises as to whether China qualifies as a 
persistent objector.  
             As discussed earlier, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have 
recognised and repeatedly emphasised the principle of individual criminal responsibility for 
serious violations of humanitarian law, strengthening the claim that individual criminal 
responsibility extends beyond the confines of atrocities committed in the course of an 
international armed conflicts to violations of humanitarian law perpetrated in the course of 
an internal conflict. China has endorsed almost all these Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions recognizing individual criminal responsibilities for violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in non-international conflicts, in particular, the 
Security Council’s statutes for the two ad hoc tribunals.
312
  
              As early as the discussions around the drafting of the Yugoslavia Statute, voices 
urging international criminalisation of violations of Common Article 3 and APII had been 
heard. While the other permanent members of the Security Council voiced their support for 
the inclusion of violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocols under the ICTY 
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Statute, China did not take that opportunity to express its opposition to the criminalisation of 
violations of the laws of war committed in non-international armed conflicts. The trend 
towards regarding Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II as bases for individual 
criminal responsibility was accentuated in reports concerning atrocities in Rwanda. There 
was no opposition in the Security Council to treating violations of Common Article 3 and 
APII as bases for the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrators. China did not 
exercise its veto power at the Security Council to prevent the referrals of Darfur or Libya to 
the ICC, which would possibly prosecute war crimes committed in the domestic conflicts of 
both situations.
313
 The complete lack of Chinese protest to the assimilation process of 
recognizing individual criminal responsibilities for war crimes committed in non-
international armed conflict evidenced by the Security Council and General Assembly 
practice would bar China’s claim to be a persistent objector.   
              The fact that China became a party to most of the multilateral treaties,
314
 which 
explicitly or implicitly established individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of 
the laws of war in internal armed conflicts, is additional evidence pointing to China’s 
confirmation of the principle that such violations must engage the individual criminal 
responsibility of offenders in international law.  
                Even though China raised its objection towards the customary law status of 
individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts once at Rome, it cannot be qualified as a persistent objector. The reason is simple: 




                Another objection raised by China was that some war crimes listed under the 
Rome Statute went beyond customary international law and APII. A particular case it 
pointed out was the offences against peace-keeping personnel. However, China is a party to 
the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel, which obliges states to 
criminalise the same acts under domestic law. This also shows that China did not 
consistently object to criminalising violations of international humanitarian law beyond 
Common Article 3 and AP II.  
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              In fact, the concept of the persistent objector is rarely used by states in their 
international relations; this is because its use would show a state’s isolation from the rest of 
the international community. Instead, states usually claim that a rule has simply not yet 
crystallised to become custom.
316
 It is more attractive and convincing for a state to argue that 
a rule does not exist at all, thereby attempting to place itself within the more general position, 
than to argue that a rule exists but that it is exempt from the application of that rule which is 
contrary to its own interests. This is why states generally argue that a rule has not yet 
crystallised sufficiently to become customary law instead of flatly rejecting its application.
317
 
Thus the particular way in which the objection is crafted is not necessarily significant.
318
 In 
the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the US, the UK and France did not argue that 
they were persistent objectors; rather, they argued generally that customary international law 
did not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
319
 China never argued that it was a persistent 
objector, but it refused to accept the application of the Rome Statute due in part to the 
alleged inconsistencies with customary international law.  
                Whilst China raised objections to the customary law status of war crimes in non-
international conflict, this was an issue that was undergoing rapid developments. Since 1998, 
there have been many developments in practice pointing in the opposite direction to the 
Chinese position. Rather than making subsequent objections, China itself actually played a 
constructive role in the formation or crystallisation of the customary norms. In addition, the 
shifting view of the Chinese legal experts also makes Chinese objection less robust. For 
example, the former Chinese diplomat Mr. Daqun Liu, who firmly objected to the inclusion 
of war crimes in domestic armed conflict in the Court’s jurisdiction in his official capacity as 
a Chinese delegate at the Rome Conference, started to show some flexibility in his book 
published in 2006.
320
 Liu acknowledged the trend towards blurring the conventional 
dichotomy between international and internal armed conflicts.
321
 In his words: ‘in the area of 
armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far 
as human beings are concerned.’ 
322
 Two other Chinese scholars further pointed out that ‘it 
appears to be the universal view that war crimes are punishable whether they are committed 
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in the course of domestic or international armed conflict’. 
323
 Above all, the overwhelming 
academic view also supports this trend.
324
 
              In fact, on a closer examination of China’s opposition to the extension of the 
concept of war crimes to internal armed conflict, it appears that China does not object to the 
criminalisation of violations of the laws of war committed in internal armed conflict, rather it 
prefers the issue be dealt with by domestic courts. However, the question of what actions 
constitute crimes must be distinguished from the question of jurisdiction to try those crimes.  
 
4 War Crimes committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and some 
other Concerns of China towards the Rome Statute  
 
It is true that national criminal suppression of core crimes remained the default mechanism 
prior to the entry into force of the ICC Statute subject to some exceptions, consisting of the 
few occasions on which international criminal courts and tribunals or internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals have effectuated the core crimes prohibitions. However, as 
much as it is clear that national criminal jurisdictions are assigned a central role in the 
suppression of core crimes and do at times act accordingly, as endemic are the obstacles, that 
prevent them from fulfilling that role.
325
 This research does not intend to deal with all the 
problems relating to national suppression, but to point out the biggest obstacle facing China, 
which, as noted earlier, has insisted that ‘domestic Courts have apparent advantages over the 
ICC in prosecuting these types or crimes’. 
326
 The fact that China has not yet implemented 
any legislation to deal specifically with war related offences may withhold from its national 
criminal jurisdiction the necessary legal framework to prosecute those accused of war crimes. 
In the absence of such specific provisions, China can only enforce the prohibition of war 
crimes committed in domestic armed conflict by reference to ordinary domestic crimes. 
Besides the conceptual difference between domestic and international crimes – the latter 
being crimes of not only domestic but also international concern- this ‘ordinary crimes 
approach’ may entail a number of problems.
327
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             The obstacles to national suppression of core crimes, and the conceptual premise 
that core crimes are crimes that are universal in nature and entitle the international 
community as whole to act, have led to the establishment of international(ised) courts and 
tribunals. Such international jurisdictions raise the question as to the allocation of their 
respective competences in relation to national criminal jurisdictions. The model adopted to 
allocate the respective competences of the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions does not 
seem to be incompatible with China’s insistence for domestic jurisdiction over war related 
offences in internal armed conflict.  
             As discussed in Chapter IV, the Rome Statute answers the question as to the 
relationship between the ICC and national criminal jurisdiction in a markedly different 
manner from the instruments establishing the ICTY and ICTR, which have primacy over 
national courts. By providing that the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal 




            In addition, there are war crimes specific safeguards within the Rome Statute. 
Article 124 permits states to opt out of the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes committed on 
their territory or by their own nationals for a period of up to seven years.
329
 It also mandates 
a review of the opt-out by the Review Conference. Consistent with its position towards the 
Court’s automatic jurisdiction,
 
China spoke in favour of the retention of Article 124 during 
the Review Conference,
330
 and succeeded in extending the opt-out mechanism over war 
crimes for another five years.
331
 Paragraph 3 of Article 8 clarifies that ‘nothing in paragraph 
2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law 
and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all 
legitimate means.’ This provision is a compromise to accommodate the concerns of some 
states, including China and Russia, which feared the inclusion of non-international armed 
conflicts in the jurisdiction of the Court could ‘be used as a tool for unjustified interference 
with domestic affairs’.
332
 In this respect, see also the Seventh and Eight Preambular 
Paragraphs of the Statute, on the obligation to refrain from the use of force and the principle 
of non-intervention, which was included for similar purposes. 
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              There are also thresholds built into the Statute for war crimes committed in non-
international armed conflict. Article 8(2)(d) and (f) explicitly exclude ‘situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts 
of a similar nature’. In the Elements of Crimes, the two thresholds for non-international 
armed conflict are labelled ‘limitations’. 
333
 In the Sixth Committee in 2000, the Chinese 
delegate, Mr. Wen Sheng Qu made a very positive statement with regard to the Elements of 
Crimes: ‘although during the Rome Conference his delegation had expressed reservations on 
the definition of some crimes, it had shown great flexibility and a constructive sprit during 
the preparatory process and had joined the consensus, acknowledging the work carried out 
by the Preparatory Commission and believing that, on the whole, a certain degree of 
balance had been struck, with the interests of all parties being taken into account.’ 
334
 As Qu 
had raised the strongest objections towards the Rome Statute in 1998 at the Sixth Committee, 
his softening opinion may suggest the path China may take.  
               The practice of the Court so far may also have negated the Chinese concern to a 
greater extent. As the PTC II has noted that ‘the Statute requires any armed conflict not of an 
international character to reach a certain level of intensity which exceeds that of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts 
of a similar nature. In the view of the Chamber, this is ultimately a limitation on the 
jurisdiction of the Court itself, since if the required level of intensity is not reached, crimes 
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                                      Chapter VIII  
                                     Conclusions 
 
As seen in the Introductory Chapter to this work, China has long been supporting the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court. It has accepted that the creation of such an 
institution was a positive addition to the international legal architecture. The question for 
China has never been whether there should be an international criminal court, but rather what 
kind of court it should be, in order to operate with independence, impartiality, effectiveness 
and universality within the global system.
1
 To this end, China was actively involved in the 
discussions leading to the creation of the ICC. In the course of the negotiations, the Chinese 
delegation identified and articulated a range of specific concerns, some of which were taken 
on board at that time, and some of which remained outstanding at the end of the negotiations 
process. China then reiterated its concerns without making any significant changes to the 
original arguments, and decided to vote against the Rome Statute in 1998.  
              However, unlike the position of the US during the Bush Administration, which 
adopted a policy of public hostility to undermine the Court, since its negative vote, China has 
maintained a dialogue with the ICC and involved itself in the processes leading to its 
continuous evolution. At the same time, there were certain specific concerns identified by the 
Chinese authorities in the 1990s which acted as barriers of a legal character; these were seen 
as preventing its move towards full participation in the Court. However, since these concerns 
were first articulated, there have been significant developments with regard to the 
finalisation and amendment of the Rome Statute, the practice of the Court and the Security 
Council, and even in the content of customary international law. The substantive chapters 
have examined China’s specific ICC concerns, both individually and collectively, in light of 
all of these developments.  
 
Section I Revisiting China’s Specific Concerns regarding the ICC  
 
The Chinese position is based on, and rooted in, a range of specific concerns, which were 
articulated even before 1998 when the Rome Statute was finalised. In fact, the subsequent 
negotiation process yielded a number of outcomes which were favourable to the original 
Chinese position. By the end of the Rome Conference, many important elements had been 
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reshaped to accommodate China’s concerns. For example, as discussed in Chapter IV, in the 
early stages of the negotiation process, one of the concerns of China was the uncertain nature 
of the concept of complementarity. This concern was partly cured by the fact that the Rome 
Statute has given the notion of complementarity a degree of specificity through the 
mechanism of admissibility. In addition, some of China’s concerns were due to uncertainties 
about the way in which particular provisions would be applied in practice. However, the 
force of these concerns have, to a greater or lesser extent, been reduced by virtue of the 
subsequent developments of the substantive law and practice surrounding the ICC Statute in 
the past 15 years. Undoubtedly, back in 1998, there was still a lack of clarity as to precisely 
how aspects of the complementarity principle would apply in practice; matters like this 
would only become clear after the Court had the opportunity to consider, in detail, the terms 
of the Rome Statute during the course of proceedings brought before it. It is understandable 
that China regarded the Court with a degree of suspicion while these uncertainties remained. 
However, as the relevant practice of the Court has gradually clarified these issues in a 
manner favourable to the Chinese position, the legal barriers which were a significant 
obstacle to more direct engagement with the ICC have been much diminished. A similar 
example can also be drawn from Chapter VI on China’s fears regarding the uncertainties 
relating to the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power. The post-statute practice of the Court has, 
however, confirmed that the mechanisms in place are sufficient to guarantee the non-abuse 
of this power.  Properly understood this practice should certainly allay China’s suspicions to 
a great extent.  
               As seen in Chapter V, some of China’s concerns regarding the jurisdiction of the 
ICC have become less robust because of the Security Council’s ICC-related practice which, 
of course, has been moulded with the involvement of China itself.  As a permanent member 
of the Security Council, China constantly has to engage with ICC-related issues, but that 
practical engagement has been in tension with its technical concerns about the Rome Statute 
raised in the 1990s. The practice of the Security Council, directly or indirectly, touched upon 
some of those areas of substantive concern to China, for example the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in non-international armed conflicts. 
However, these technical concerns did not weigh so heavily as to lead China to block the 
proper functioning of the ICC in these specific kinds of contexts. China has balanced the 
tension between its practical position in the Security Council and some of its technical 
concerns about the Rome Statute by partly ignoring the latter. Through constructive 
engagement with the ICC, China has also obtained some opportunities to reshape the 





and deferral powers. This negates some of China’s technical concerns regarding the Rome 
Statute. In fact, through the dynamic interactions between the Security Council and the ICC, 
the trajectory of the ICC practice is heading towards alleviating part of the underlying 
concerns of the Chinese authorities.  
               It can be recalled from Chapter VII, that the rapid developments of certain fields of 
customary international law relevant to the Rome Statute have also caused some of China’s 
concerns regarding the core crimes to appear to be less compelling than was originally the 
case. Admittedly, the customary law status of war crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflict and crimes against humanity during peacetime was not without controversy 
during the period when the Chinese propositions were first formulated. It is equally 
undeniable, however, that these issues related to fields of customary law that have been 
undergoing rapid development in the past two decades. In fact, the customary international 
law relating to individual criminal responsibility in internal conflicts was not evolving in 
manner to which China could effectively claim to be a persistent objector. The customary 
law developed significantly through innovative interpretations by the ad hoc tribunals. Due 
to the nature of that process and the power conferred on the ad hoc tribunals to develop 
individual criminal responsibly, China did not have an opportunity to influence the outcomes 
or claim to be a persistent objector within that institutional context. The subsequent 
negotiations to establish the ICC preponderantly took the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals as being reflected as customary international law. The overwhelming evidence now 
points in the opposite direction to the Chinese view on these issues, and the customary law 
status of both crimes as reflected in the Rome Statute are now firmly entrenched. Instead of 
being a persistent objector, China has actually played a constructive role in the formation or 
crystallisation of these customary norms. Therefore, even though the Chinese reservations 
originally had merit, the strength of these objections is now much diminished due to these 
substantial developments and clarifications. In addition, all the Amendments to the Rome 
Statute adopted at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010 directly touched China’s pre-
existing concerns about the Rome Statute, and some of these concerns have been 
satisfactorily addressed to a certain extent.  
               Even though not all of China’s specific concerns have been resolved in a manner 
which is completely along the lines of the Chinese thinking in the past two decades, the key 
lies in whether the balance of the advantages and disadvantages of these issues has shifted 
sufficiently to provide a level of comfort to the Chinese authorities. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter V, the adoption of the crime of aggression at Kampala has taken the 





to a juridical forum, thus moving further away from the Chinese position as expressed in 
Rome. However, on the other hand, China’s endeavour in Rome to limit the ICC’s 
jurisdiction by reference to the principle of state consent has been partly achieved in 
Kampala in the context of the crime of aggression. Similarly, even though the Kampala 
expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts, to some extent seems to intensify the pre-existing concerns of the Chinese 
authorities, the retention of the opt-out regime for war crimes acts to alleviate China’s 
concerns somewhat in this regard. In other words, none of these Chinese reservations are 
isolated from the others, and they need to be viewed collectively in order to determine 
whether, in the round, the gap between China and the ICC is still as significant as it used to 
be. As demonstrated in Chapters III, IV and V, China has a range of concerns in relation to 
the jurisdictional scope of the ICC. State consent, complementarity and the Security Council 
all play a substantial role in limiting the ICC’s jurisdictional reach at different levels. Some 
of the Chinese concerns have overlooked the totality of the treaty regime, and this kind of 
narrow analysis can be greatly misleading or simply erroneous. China’s concerns about the 
insufficiency of each ingredient in protecting state sovereignty can be alleviated to some 
extent by considering them in combination. 
              Apart from these movements, some of the Chinese propositions themselves can no 
longer withstand critical examination. When examining China’s specific concerns 
objectively and dispassionately from a legal perspective, it must be concluded that some of 
them do not have legal merit. For instance, there is overwhelming evidence suggesting that 
the Chinese proposition that there exists a Security Council monopoly on determining acts of 
aggression does not have any legal substance. In the same vein, the Chinese objection 
towards the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals from non-consenting non-states parties is, as 
we have seen in Chapter III, based on a misunderstanding about the nature and scope of 
certain provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
               All the movements and misunderstandings suggest, in combination, that there is 
both an obvious need and an opportunity for the Chinese authorities to reassess its objections 
towards the ICC which were formulated some 15 to 20 years ago. Since the first Chinese 
articulation of its concerns at a very early stage, there have been substantial movements in 
respect of these matters towards alleviating the underlying Chinese concerns. However, these 
movements have not yet found reflection in the policy of China towards the ICC. In other 
words, the barriers that China itself identified as standing in the way of its full participation 
in the ICC when properly and fully analysed no longer constitute a significant impediment to 





               Being a permanent member of the Security Council staying outside of the ICC, the 
US shared similar concerns with China about the ICC's jurisdiction over nationals of non-
states parties, the prosecution of the crime of aggression without the approval of the UN 
Security Council and the ICC prosecutor’s proprio motu powers to investigate, discussed 
respectively in Chapters III, V and VI. Due to the fact that its concerns were not 
satisfactorily resolved at the end of the negotiation process, the early years of the Bush 
administration were marked by open hostility to the court. However, this position shifted 
during the second Bush term and under the Obama administration to a cautious willingness 
to support the ICC. Once counted as a fierce opponent of the ICC, the US has now in effect 
put itself into the position comparable with that which China has occupied throughout. In 
other words, the US is gradually coming back on to a path which clearly echoes the Chinese 
position of active and positive engagement with the ICC. The reason why the US has shifted 
its position is partly because its concerns, including those shared with China, have been 
alleviated to a certain extent by virtue of the developments of both law and practice 
surrounding the ICC. For example, as seen in the Security Council Chapter, some of the 
developments were largely a result of initiatives by US policy makers who sought to 
minimise the US concerns about the ICC, which in some ways were supported by the 
Chinese authorities. The Obama administration has clearly taken these developments into 
account when re-examining its relationship the ICC, and reflected them in its renewed policy 
of principled engagement. This is also a particularly propitious time for China to reconsider 
its position towards the ICC. If China were to make a reassessment, it would be a question of 
whether to take a step beyond its current stance of positive engagement with the Court as a 
non-state party. In other words, if there is going to be a re-evaluation, the re-evaluation has 
to be whether it still makes sense for China, in legal terms, to stay outside of an institutional 
structure which it is said otherwise to support.  
The legal barriers that China itself identified as standing in its way of joining the 
ICC when properly and fully analysed no longer constitute a significant impediment to its 
ratification of the Rome Statute. However, the legal concerns do not exhaust all factors 
influencing Chinese policy-makers’ attitude towards the ICC. There are several possible 
policy reasons China may have for not ratifying the Rome Statute. Firstly, due to the 
competing territorial and jurisdictional claims between China and its neighbours, the risk of 
armed conflict in the South and East China Sea is not insignificant.
2
 A possible clash 
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stemming from US military operations within China’s EEZ may add a further level of 
complexity to the region.
 3
 All this inevitably gives rise to the question of whether the 
increased scrutiny of, and legal challenges to, the possible military actions of China will 
push it further away from the ICC.
4
 Secondly, the Chinese government has not excluded the 
use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Were China to become an ICC State Party, the 
Chinese military would face the potential risk of being criticized for committing war crimes 
in an internal armed conflict, which might fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
5
 Thirdly, as 
a rising power, China still confronts many thorny domestic challenges. The possible 
occurrence of separatist/terrorist violence in Tibet or Xinjiang provinces is susceptible to be 
used by anti-China actors to interfere in China’s internal affairs through the forum of the 
ICC.
6
 In addition, a lingering hesitation may exist among Chinese policy-makers that the 
ICC could be used as an instrument to scrutinize China’s human rights situation.
7
 These 
various policy concerns, to a certain extent, are already reflected in China’s legal arguments. 
For example, China’s legal articulations regarding the crime of aggression clearly overlap 
with its policy choice of a stronger Security Council. There are also occasions where China’s 
policy concerns even outweigh its legal concerns. An example can be drawn from China’s 
position regarding complementarity, which should arguably be framed as policy difficulties 
rather than legal objections.
8
 In fact, there seems to be a tendency among governments to 
dress up political concerns as legal concerns, which can be seen from some American 
scholars’ observation of the US government’s arguments in relation to the ICC.
9
 Therefore, 
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even though almost all of the legal arguments made by the Chinese government do not upon 
close examination hold water, China might lack the political will to join the ICC at the 
current stage given the various interests at stake noted above.  
However, were the Chinese policy to shift in a way which recognises the legal 
analysis contained in this work and decide to move towards full participation in the ICC, this 
would be consistent with the broader Chinese policy of increasing engagement with 
international judicial bodies.  
 
Section II Revisiting China’s Position towards the ICC in the Wider 
Context  
                 
Traditionally, China shunned participation in international adjudication, preferring to settle 
all disputes through direct negotiation. One theme of the traditional concerns that restricted 
China’s engagement with international judicial bodies, as discussed in Chapter II, is that of 
compulsory jurisdiction, which China regarded as being antithetical to state sovereignty. 
This traditional concern has contextual resonance with China’s specific concern towards the 
ICC’s automatic jurisdiction. However, since the 1990s, contemporary with or even after the 
ICC negotiations, the primary concern which had traditionally surrounded the discussion of 
Chinese engagement with international adjudicative bodies has been broadly resolved in 
relation to a full range of international adjudicative bodies properly so-called. Though there 
have been substantial Chinese movements in relation to international adjudication in 
economic and technical areas, that movement has been least pronounced in the domain of 
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human rights. It appeared that there has been a human rights dimension to aspects of Chinese 
policy thinking in relation to the ICC as discussed respectively in the Chapters on 
complementarity, crimes against humanity and the proprio motu power of the ICC 
Prosecutor.  These aspects have clearly demonstrated the ways in which China has 
considered the ICC as a human rights court of the traditional kind. 
                However, even though China has had and continues to have sovereignty concerns 
in respect of the way in which certain international human rights instruments and their 
associated institutional architecture operate, the ICC is not the appropriate box in which to 
place these kinds of concerns. As we have seen in a thread of discussion throughout this 
work, the ICC is different and distinct from international human rights treaty bodies in a 
number of vital ways. Procedurally, different from the rights of individual petition under the 
UN human rights treaty bodies, individual communication is not one of the three ways to 
trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction.
10
 In terms of substance, the ICC is concerned only with gross 
human rights violations that amount to international crimes and not with ordinary human 
rights violations.
11
 Different from categorising ordinary human rights violations as internal 
affairs, China itself has recognised that it is a common task of the international community 
as a whole to put a stop to atrocities and other forms of grave and massive violation of 
human rights. More importantly, the ICC deals with individual criminal responsibility rather 
than state responsibility.
12
 Without the mandate to judge human rights compliance by 
states,
13
 the ICC should not be regarded as triggering China’s traditional concern towards 
international human rights adjudication when the Court is properly viewed. 
              In addition, with regard to China’s traditional concern about the international legal 
scrutiny of military activities, the crime of aggression, which is closely connected with the 
resort to force by a state, at one level might seem to intensify China’s sensitivity in this area. 
However, unlike the traditional kind of international judicial bodies, even though a state’s act 
of aggression is implicated in the commission of a crime of aggression under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, the ICC will not deal with state responsibility or adjudicate inter-state disputes 
for the reasons presented in Chapter VII on the mandates of the ICC. Despite this, the Rome 
Statute does not ignore the prerogatives of states to choose whether to adjudicate disputes on 
military activates under the ICJ Statute or the UNCLOS as discussed in Chapter V. In fact, 
China can move towards full participation in the ICC without becoming vulnerable to the 
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operationalization of the crime of aggression by making use of the opt-out mechanism in the 
same way as it approached the UNCLOS’s jurisdictional provision over military activities.  
               China’s initial approach towards the ICC was consistent with its traditional 
positioning with respect to international judicial bodies, though articulated in the specific 
ICC context. As discussed in Section I, there have been substantial movements towards 
alleviating China's specific ICC concerns since they were first articulated in the 1990s.  In 
addition to that, during the same period of time, there have been significant movements 
towards greater Chinese engagement with certain international judicial bodies without being 
impeded by China’s traditional concern towards compulsory jurisdiction. This provides 
further encouragement for a Chinese reassessment of its position towards the ICC not just in 
the ICC specific sense but also in the broader contextual sense. The misunderstandings in 
both contexts also point to a need for China to re-examine its concerns regarding the ICC. 
Notwithstanding its continuing sensitivities in the human rights area, China’s progressively 
wider engagement with international judicial bodies should not be hindered by the 
miscalculation of putting the ICC in a ‘human rights box’.  Were China to re-evaluate its 
position and decide to participate fully in the ICC, it would be consistent with the broader 
Chinese policy of engagement with international judicial bodies, and would not be 
considered as inconsistent with its continuing disengagement with international adjudicative 
bodies in the human rights area.  
 Furthermore, China’s distrust with respect to the ICC at one level relates to its 
traditional distrust of international law, at another level it echoes its traditional scepticism 
about the international adjudicative process. China’s engagement with international criminal 
law almost dates back to the creation of the body of law when the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
tribunals were established. Though China does not view international criminal law as subject 
to the same criticism as some 19th century international law, it is sceptical about certain 
rules, in particular the definitions on the crimes against humanity and war crimes. While the 
Tokyo trials did not win China’s trust in the adjudicative process of an international criminal 
tribunal, with more and more international law experts being elected as judges on the 
benches of the ad hoc tribunals, China’s attitude has been gradually changing, but its distrust 
is not entirely gone. The crime of aggression, for example, reflects both of these kinds of 
concern. On one hand, the crime of aggression has not been defined to the satisfaction of 
China; on the other hand, China has been contesting the ability of the ICC to make decisions 






 These two kinds of Chinese concern seem to be linked by the fact that the 
international criminal courts or tribunal have been seeking to rapidly develop the applicable 
law through interpretive techniques that some have termed ‘modern positivism’.
14
 For 
example, in its 1995 decision on the issue of jurisdiction in the Tadić case, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber eroded the distinction between international and internal conflict by 
enunciating a customary law of war crimes in internal conflicts although it was unclear 
whether the necessary practice could be established.
15
 Some Chinese scholars oppose this 
approach to the development of international criminal law on the basis that it undermines 
both the settled law and the principles of participation in the formulation of the law.
16
  
However, were China to move towards more direct engagement with the ICC, there would 
be an opportunity to influence the formation and application of international criminal law, as 





Section III The Incentives for China to Join the ICC  
 
Being a non-state party, China has nonetheless benefited from its positive engagement with 
the ICC during the life-span of the Court’s existence. Unlike the US policy of disengagement 
during the Bush Administration, the Chinese government did not walk away from the 
continuing evolution of the ICC but remained benignly engaged. Part of the reason that led 
the US to shift its policy was the realisation of the disadvantages of its insulation from, or 
opposition to, the ICC. The Obama administration came to realise that the US would have 
too much to lose if it continued to let the opportunity to institutionalise international criminal 
justice slip away. The US eventually got beyond its frustration with the past impasse, and 
started to appreciate, as China already has, the benefits of positive engagement with ICC. 
These benefits have contributed to the US moving towards the current level of Chinese 
engagement with the court.  
             By doing so, the US has, to some extent, regained its leadership in seeking justice 
for the worst perpetrators of atrocities and influence over the future developments of the ICC. 
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Constructive engagement with the ICC has also reinforced the US’s leading role as a 
permanent member of the Security Council and as a major international player within the 
international community since massive human rights violations almost always have large 
ramifications in terms of international peace and security. However, the benefits of positive 
engagements with the ICC as a non-state party can by no means be regarded as comparable 
with the advantages of being a full member state. Now the time is ripe for China to consider 
whether it wants to seize the opportunity of joining the ICC.  
               Much could be gained by China if it were to have full membership in the ICC. 
Firstly, by ratifying the Rome Statute, China would be able to enjoy the current ‘privileges’ 
given to states parties by the Rome Statute, such as the exclusion of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over war crimes for five years and the immunisation from the ICC’s jurisdiction over newly 
amended crimes.
17
 More importantly, under the terms of the Rome Statute, each state party is 
entitled to be represented in the ASP meetings which are held at least once a year.
18
 The ASP 
has a wide range of responsibilities and is closely involved in the ongoing management of 
the Court.
19
 By being a state party to the Rome Statute, China would then be in a much 
stronger position to influence decision-making within the ASP and the developments of the 
Court. It would also allow China to vote in future elections of judges and other senior 
officials of the Court,
20
 such as the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor. A state party also has 
the right to nominate a candidate for election as a judge of the Court.
21
 One relevant 
consideration in the election of judges is the need for ‘equitable geographical 
representation’.
22
 Given the fact that Asia is the least represented regional bloc in the current 
composition of the ICC’s personnel, China stands a better chance of having one of its 
nationals elected within the make-up of the Court.  
               Secondly, joining the ICC would reinforce China’s influence in shaping the 
development of international law. The rise of international criminal law has been one of the 
remarkable features of international law since the 1990s. This emerging body of law carries 
weight and ‘structural’ implications, not only within its own sphere of activity, but for 
international law and institutions more generally.
23
 For example, the future 
operationalization of the crime of aggression will inevitably have some implications for the 
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existing international law on the use of force. If there are Chinese legal experts deeply 
influenced by the Chinese traditional legal culture, either within the composition of the ICC 
Chambers or the OTP, China will have a chance to indirectly influence the development of 
international law. Since the Chinese government has pursued greater engagement with a 
range of international judicial bodies, there has been an increasing number of Chinese 
international law experts involved and actively participated in delivering judgments and 
decisions of the ICJ, the WTO, the ICSID, the ITLOS, or even the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but this is currently missing in the context of the ICC. 
Staying away from the ICC and clinging to its traditional concerns means that a critical 
aspect of the international legal system would be developed without China’s involvement. 
               Thirdly, full engagement with the ICC would further strengthen China’s pre-
eminent position as a major international actor. China, a permanent member of the Security 
Council, carries special responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security. The 
core crimes under the Rome Statute are consistently and almost exclusively committed in 
circumstances which directly or indirectly trigger the interest of, or the central mandate of, 
the Security Council under the UN Charter. Under the R2P doctrine, the Security Council is 
responsible for determining appropriate action to take to prevent and stop atrocity crimes.
24
 
As demonstrated in Chapter V, the ICC has obviously enriched the Security Council’s modes 
of intervention in complex conflicts. The R2P doctrine, therefore, can be better advanced 
with greater Chinese participation in the ICC. It is true that being a non-state party, China is 
still able to constructively engage with the ICC through its permanent membership of the 
Security Council on issues relating to peace and security. However, by referring the 
situations of other non-states parties to the ICC while staying outside the Court itself, China 
is risking its credibility as a responsible international player.  
               In fact, since the 1990s, China has become more and more engaged with the 
international architecture of order. It has moved from being ‘suspicious and non-
participatory’, to ‘passively’ involved with reservations, to being a ‘more active and 
conscious advocate of multilateralism’.
25
 Some elements of the international architecture 
were constructed during a period when the Chinese government had no access to 
international mechanisms, but China has not tried to radically alter or undermine the current 
rules or institutions.
 
 Rather it has chosen to engage with them in order to obtain further 
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resources, knowledge and abilities to continue evolving as a great power.
26
 Since China 
resumed its place in the UN, many international organisations, including international 
judicial bodies, have benefited from Chinese engagement and support, and this in turn has 
heightened China’s credibility and strengthened its influence within them. These values 
could be further reinforced by China’s more direct engagement with the international justice 
system.  
              There appears to be an irreversible momentum towards the establishment and 
ongoing refinement of a system of international criminal justice designed to bring to account 
those responsible for international crimes. Historically, China was involved and played a 
significant role in the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals, the ad hoc tribunals, and the ‘hybrid’ tribunals. The establishment of the ICC is a 
significant undertaking described as fulfilling a vision of moving the world from a ‘culture 
of impunity’ to a ‘culture of accountability’.
27
 Being a member state to the ICC would 
reaffirm the standing Chinese commitment to uphold international criminal justice. On the 
other hand, staying away from the ICC would risk being interpreted as disdain for 
international justice as a whole. In fact, a functioning ICC will close off other paths to 
international justice. It seems clear that the states parties to the Rome Statute as a whole are 
heartily in favour of moving forward with expanding the ICC’s role in international criminal 
justice. This indicates a strong desire of the international community to avoid duplicating its 
work by creating additional ad hoc criminal tribunals for particular countries. Where national 
justice fails, the ICC will be the alternative. Sooner or later, the ICC will be the only realistic 
means of securing the principles of international justice to which China has so long declared 
its commitment. Full participation in the ICC would enable China to sustain its leadership on 
international criminal justice issues. That leadership is critical for it to continue to pursue 
other criminal justice initiatives, such as fighting against transnational crimes around the 
world.  
 Being a party to the Rome Statute would not only contribute to the ongoing 
evolution of the international criminal justice system, but also demonstrate China’s resolve 
to collaborate with other nations. The ICC is an integral part of the current globalizing 
tendency in which nations seek to exercise their sovereignty not unilaterally but through 
cooperative arrangements and rules. This includes rules to stimulate and regulate the global 
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economy, protect the environment, control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and curb international criminal activities. China has long been a leading exponent, and will 
be a prime beneficiary, of this growing international framework of cooperation. Committing 
to the ICC cooperative regime will help China to reaffirm its authority to exercise global 
leadership, which will depend upon the continued trust, confidence and cooperation of other 
nations. This would also have consequentially positive implications for Chinese policies of 
more general engagement with the international legal system.  
               Lastly, ratifying the Rome Statute would improve China’s international image and 
facilitate its peaceful rise. International image and reputation is an important asset for a 
country engaging in multilateral diplomacy and cooperation. Ignoring or resisting the ICC 
will damage the reputation of China as a highly responsible major power. Sudanese 
President Al-Bashir’s visit to China is an example of this. Even though a non-state party to 
the ICC does not have any obligation to arrest Al-Bashir, China was nevertheless criticised 
as providing a haven for a genocidal criminal, which is self-evidently detrimental to its 
international image.
28
 It would undermine the credibility that is the foundation of Chinese 
aspirations to global leadership. Acceptance of the Court would convey a clear message that 
China does not tolerate atrocities, which is an important and highly significant signal to be 
sent to the rest of the international community. In addition, the decisions taken at the 
Kampala Conference seem to signify the international community’s continued expectation 
that the ICC will grow as an important tool in encouraging peaceful settlement of disputes 
and discouraging military and other leaders from engaging in unlawful military activities. 
Considering the territorial disputes in which China has been embroiled, joining the ICC 
would be a means to reassure other states about the benign nature of China’s rise and of its 
commitment to serving as a responsible international actor.
29
 
              Above all, the significant movements, both in the specific ICC context and in the 
broader context of international judicial bodies, the fundamental misunderstandings, and the 
substantial incentives have provided a sufficient basis for China to re-evaluate its position 
towards the ICC. Were China to take this opportunity to make a reassessment, the most 
likely conclusion of its re-evaluation would be to join the ICC based on the reasons 
demonstrated in this work.  
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By committing to an international judicial scrutiny of military actions, which is immune from the 
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